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ABSTRACT
This thesis details research undertaken in two general hospitals in the South of England. The 
study examines perceptions of mental health problems in old age from the standpoint of those 
within the setting. I consider various social influences and ask whether different models of 
mental health service provision impact on how mental health problems are perceived and 
addressed.
Fifty-two qualitative interviews were conducted with older people, relatives and staff members. 
All of the older people were hospital patients, with some having diagnosed mental health 
problems. Similarly some of the relatives had seen a mental health professional. None of the 
research participants had contact with mental health services prior to their current hospital 
experience. None of the staff members had specific mental health qualifications.
Examination of the data highlights vying and powerful phenomena, associated with 
organisational and professional traditions. These intertwine and serve to influence how mental 
health problems in old age in this setting are both constructed and sustained.
The key findings uncover a paradox of visibility and invisibility. Mental health problems, 
particularly dementia, are noted in the presence of overt problematic behaviour that is perceived 
to interfere with the smooth running of the setting or the organisation. Many mental health 
problems, as defined by psychiatry, are not perceived. They remain invisible and unaddressed. 
Particularly the phenomenon of depression is not seen as a mental illness, but rather as an artefact 
of normal ageing, especially in the presence of ill health.
People with mental illness are not seen as the proper business of a general hospital ward. There is 
an expectation that external mental health experts should respond to the needs of this patient 
group. While there is evidence that the presence of a consultation / liaison mental health service 
can improve staff knowledge and skills, conclusions suggest that current models of service 
perpetuate the stigmatised position of older people with mental health problems in general 
hospitals.
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Chapter 1
An Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the Research Problem
I am a mental health nurse of more than twenty years experience, the majority of that 
time spent working with older people. Since the late 1990s my work has involved 
working as a mental health liaison nurse specialist providing a mental health service for 
older people with mental health problems in a general hospital setting.
In the course of my work, I have become aware that older people with mental health 
problems in the general hospital setting often do not have their needs recognised or met. 
I began to wonder why this was and to notice that my colleagues in the general hospital 
did not seem to have the same view of the world of mental health and illness as I had. 
For example to me an older person with depression was readily recognisable by 
observing and examining their thoughts, speech and actions; yet this was not so for my 
colleagues, of various professions. I began to consider that the perception of mental 
health problems in old age by people in the general hospital setting may differ from that 
of those who, like me, work within the mental health specialty. If this were the case it 
may explain why there is a difference of focus and recognition.
In the field of psychiatry, mental health problems are predominantly viewed from the 
position of biological medicine; that is, a belief that an illness is caused by biological 
and/or genetic deficiencies which can be remedied. In tile case of mental illness  ^
symptomology may be exhibited in reported experience and unusual behaviour rather 
than purely through bodily signs. Conversely the popular lay view of mental health 
problems is that they are characterised by the presence of behaviour that is out of place 
within the normal bounds of the dominant culture (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999). In this 
research I am interested in the perceptions of mental health problems in old age within a
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cultural setting that potentially sits in between the lay world and the specialist world of 
psychiatry.
In conducting this work I noted a considerable literature on the sociology of health and 
illness, mental health and on later life. There is rather less on mental health in later life. 
However, there is even less written on the issues that arise when these occur in 
combination in one setting.
My main interest then lies in establishing what constitutes mental health problems in old 
age, from the perspective of those within the general hospital setting. However, I also 
want to consider whether the ways in which mental health service expertise is accessed 
and provided in the general hospital affect how people formulate their views on mental 
health and illness. When I started the research there were two dominant potential models 
of mental health service in general hospitals. The traditional model is a method of 
intervention through which a psychiatrist makes a single response to a referral from a 
medical colleague who is seeking diagnostic or treatment advice. The 
consultation/liaison model describes a means of intervention whereby mental health 
expertise is provided following either formal or informal referral. There is emphasis on 
increased presence in the setting and the provision of education as integral to the role. I 
explore the role and service differences, between the two models, more thoroughly in 
Chapter 4.
Ih order to make the comparison between service models and their possible impact on 
constructions of mental health problems in old age, the research is conducted in two 
hospital sites in the South of England. I use fictional names for the hospitals, calling 
them Glimster General and Chapley Hospital. In Glimster a traditional mental health 
service is in place and Chapley uses a consultation/liaison model. I interviewed older 
people, relatives and staff members in each hospital, in order to explore any differing 
perceptions within each group of social actors represented in the setting.
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As I move through the research process, and explore the resultant data, it becomes 
increasingly clear that the ways in which mental health problems in old age are 
constructed reflect varying societal views on the subject, but also the particular power 
dynamics that are in play, and in conflict, within the settings. I specifically explore issues 
of power in the next chapter.
The focus of this research is on perspectives of mental health problems in old age in two 
general hospitals in south England. Although I make some references to a more 
international picture, I concentrate both my review of the literature and the analysis and 
theory development towards the issues as they pertain to England. Similarly, as the 
research was carried out in a largely uni-ethnic part of England, I do not focus 
specifically on issues of race and ethnicity as they impact on the experiences of ageing 
and mental health.
Throughout the examination I emphasise the changing societal and political constructions 
of mental health problems, and particularly how candidacy for service has developed, 
arguably to the exclusion of older people with mental health problems, particularly 
depression.
In this introductory chapter I provide a backdrop against which the context of being an 
older person with a mental health problem in a general hospital can be considered. First I 
provide a brief history of mental health service provision, particularly for those with a 
combination of physical and mental health problems. I explore some of the relevant 
social policy culminating in detail of how current service has historically developed to 
shape the services available today. I go on to consider some perspectives on old age and 
ageing, noting that older people are not readily afforded the same rights and voice as 
younger society members. I draw particularly on the theory of the “structured 
dependency” of ageing (Townsend 1981) whereby older people in hospital have been 
moulded into an anticipated role of quiet compliance. I touch upon issues of ageism and 
the stigma associated with mental iliness before I start to explore issues of mental health 
and illness.
3
Later in this chapter I provide an introduction to my choice in methodology by detailing 
my epistemological position in using an interpretive, constructionalist approach to this 
research. The final sections provide an overview of the research sites, the research 
questions and finally a chapter by chapter outline of the thesis.
1.2.1 History
There has long been recognition that mental and physical health problems are not 
mutually exclusive and that attention should be given to addressing all needs. However, 
particularly in Europe, the recognition has largely been unmatched by service change. 
Before focussing specifically on services for people in general hospitals, I briefly detail 
the history of events since the advent of the asylum.
It was the Lunatics Act of 1845 that required every county area in England to establish 
asylums. This was fuelled by a belief that people who were mentally unwell required 
specialist help. Specialists could, it was thought, reform their anti-social behaviour within 
the protected and peaceful environs of an asylum, where tranquillity, purposeful activity 
and religiosity could aid their recovery (Foucault 1967, Showaiter 1985). With the 
establishment of large, out of town, institutions there followed a period in which “the 
Victorians became gripped with a kind of custodial fever ... and detained people other 
than curable lunatics within their confines” (Murphy 1991 p36). The asylum population 
was predominantly female, with women who were perceived to be morally insane, rather 
than having evidently lost their reason, being housed in this establishment that sought to 
“domesticate madness” (Showalter 1985 p29). Whatever the good intentions of 
providing asylum for those in need, Scull (1979) describes the development of these 
institutions into forms of social control for the mad, as has developed and persisted, in 
line with the views of those in power at the time, along a convoluting path to this day.
Any patient in a general hospital perceived to be mentally ill was, with the building of 
these institutions, either discharged or sent to the asylum. If a person with a mental
4
health problem required general hospitalisation, for example for an operation, they 
received treatment and were promptly returned to the institution. In most instances, in 
the United Kingdom, this method of service organisation remained in place until the 
asylum closures in the late twentieth century.
The development of out of town institutions for people with mental health problems 
arguably facilitated the geographical and intellectual isolation between medicine and 
psychiatry (Lloyd 1996). Access to the asylum was confined to those perceived, at the 
time, as being severely mentally ill. It has been suggested that the differentiation 
between physical and mental illness followed the work of Charcot, a French neurologist, 
who sought to define hysteria from malingering (Busfield 2000). He, and others such as 
the philosopher Descartes, began to differentiate bodily ills from ailments that changed 
behaviour and function in the absence of an organic cause, the latter becoming the 
business of the asylums. Such definition of difference served to embed the social role of 
psychiatry as controllers of deviance (Lloyd 1996, Pilgrim and Rogers 1999, Busfield 
2000), albeit through medical intervention. This focus on social protection continues to 
this day with recent increasing focus on those aspects of deviance that are perceived to 
carry risk for the general population (Barker et al 1999).
Throughout the history of mental health service provision, definition, describing what 
constitutes candidacy for specialist intervention, has fluctuated. For example people with 
epilepsy were once regular inhabitants of mental hospitals; this was until specialists from 
the field of neurology defined what they perceived as a pure bio-medical definition of the 
disease and took control of this agenda. Interestingly people with dementia were also 
inhabitants of the large mental hospitals prior to their closure, but have not been similarly 
embraced as within the scope of general medicine. I will go on to explore this further and 
also consider how candidacy for mental health services have changed, over the years, 
particularly for people with depression.
Depression has emerged as a mental health problem relatively recently against the more 
overtly visible conditions that are now defined in psychiatry as severe mental illnesses,
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that is, schizophrenia and bi-polar affective disorder (formally manic/depression). 
Depression only became noted as a condition during the First World War when shell 
shock was noted and researched. Prior to this hysteria and melancholia were seen, and 
largely tolerated, as female conditions. The work of Sigmund Freud also served to 
challenge the view of an inevitable and hopeless female condition (Busfield 1996). With 
the recognition of shell shock, and arguably the strength of such recognition in a male 
population, the conditions of hysteria and melancholia were redefined as anxiety and 
depression. The word depression has now lost its place as a lay description of sadness 
and has become a medical condition. As the specialty of psychiatric medicine expanded, 
in the mid twentieth century, it sought to embrace the lesser mental illness of depression. 
In Chapter 4 1 continue the exploration into die position of depression within psychiatry 
today, concluding that it has moved out of the field of speciality, into the realm of general 
practice. I will develop discussion on where this leaves people with depression, 
particularly older people in hospital with depression, throughout the thesis.
The history, as I have described this far, demonstrates a will for distinction between those 
who qualify for medical and those who qualify for psychiatric services. I now go on to 
examine the history as it relates to the provision of mental health care in the general 
hospital setting.
1.2.2 Mental Health Care in the General Hospital
In the early years of the twentieth century the recognition of the phenomenon of “shell 
shock”, as a psychological reaction to the trauma of war, not only redefined hysteria and 
melancholia as anxiety and depression. It also promoted a feeling that mental health 
problems could arise due to life and social events and could exhibit, on occasion, through 
physical symptoms. This recognition built on theories of Sigmund Freud suggesting that 
there might not be a clear distinction between normal and abnormal behaviour (Pilgrim 
and Rogers 1999). In 1926, the MacMillan Report concluded that mental health was a 
public health issue warranting a preventative community service. It acknowledged clear
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links between mental and physical health problems, recommending interactive and 
complementary services.
“It has become increasingly evident that there is no clear line of demarcation 
between mental and physical illness. The distinction as commonly drawn is 
based on a difference of symptoms. In ordinary parlance a disease is 
described as mental if its symptoms manifest themselves predominantly in 
derangement of conduct and as physical if the symptoms manifest themselves 
predominantly in derangement of bodily function. A mental illness may have 
physical concomitants: probably it always has; though they may be difficult of 
detection. A physical illness on the other hand, may have, and probably 
always has, mental concomitants. And there are many cases in which it is a 
question whether the physical or mental symptoms predominate”
(MacMillan Report 1926, cited by Jones 1993 p131)
The report, however, did not lead to service reconfiguration in the UK. Since 1915, and 
the development of the Maudsley Hospital in London (Jones 1993), there have been 
many calls for, and experiments with, die introduction of specialist mental health units 
within general hospitals. There has, however, been no widespread uptake of this model, 
and such units remain a rarity to this day. Service development for people in general 
hospitals with mental health problems has more readily occurred in the United States 
where the number of psychiatric wards and psychiatric liaison services in general 
hospitals have increased (Lipowski 1983 a).
In 1953 the World Health Organisation (WHO) promoted a need for psychiatric bed 
reduction alongside a focus on community care. The plans were enhanced in the 1960s 
by the anti-psychiatry movement which claimed that the potential for recovery for people 
with mental illness were hindered rather than aided by the intervention of psychiatry 
(Szasz 1966). Also influential in the drive for asylum closure was the work of Gofftnann 
(1961), who defined such institutions as serving those who work within them, and not the 
patients, who were disempowered and abused (Jones 1993, Pilgrim and Rogers 1999, 
Lloyd 1996, Goodwin 1997). In England and Wales the agenda was further driven 
through legislation. The Mental Health Act of 1959 placed the drive towards community 
care within a legal framework (Speller 1964). Similar moves in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland followed.
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The forthcoming abolition of mental hospitals was announced in the UK in 1961. As 
recommended in the MacMillan report, Enoch Powell, the Health Minister, envisioned 
that future service provision would occur within general hospital sites with die closure of 
mental hospitals (Mayou 1989, Jones 1993). This radical plan was watered down in 
publication to allow a continuing role for mental hospitals. The subsequent Hospital Plan 
(Ministry of Health 1962) proposed the establishment of District General Hospitals 
incorporating adjoining acute psychiatric facilities. However, these too were not realised 
as general medicine failed to embrace the realms of psychiatry into its midst (Jones 
1993).
Further delays meant that it was not until 1975 that “Better Services for the Mentally HI” 
was published (Department of Health and Social Security, DHSS, 1975). There are many 
cited reasons for the closure of asylums becoming politically viable at this time (Jones 
1993, Pilgrim and Rogers 1999, Busfield 2000). Some argue that enhanced public 
awareness of the condition of those in mental institutions, through the wider publication 
of Goffman’s work (1961), provided social pressure to act. Others allude to the ongoing 
cost of maintaining and staffing large ailing buildings. The increased power of the 
pharmaceutical industry was another potential driver with the development of 
tranquillising medicines, such as chlorpromazine, meaning that symptoms could be 
dampened thus necessitating less need for 24 hour supervision.
“Better Services for the Mentally 111” put forward plans to close the asylums and to 
develop community care over the next 25 years. The paper envisaged improvements in 
primary care and, again, the incorporation of beds for the acutely mentally unwell within 
district general hospitals. Such philosophy, particularly about community care, gained 
further emphasis in the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act (Department of Health, 
DOH, 1990). Although psychiatric bed numbers dropped dramatically, from 133,000 to 
50,000 in the UK between 1959 and 1992 (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999), community 
provision did not rise to an equivalent extent and psychiatry has failed to integrate with 
general tnedicine, as was envisaged. It has been suggested that the failure to integrate, 
and thus provide a broader community focus, is inhibited by the ongoing medical rather
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than sociological ontological position (Prior 1993). I explore this argument further as the 
research progresses. Similarly I will further explore the possibility that mental illness has 
not become integrated into community, primary and secondary (hospital) health care due 
to the unchanging ontological divisions between medicine and psychiatry.
As the large psychiatric institutions closed, and the number of people with mental health 
problems in general hospitals increased, the traditional model of psychiatric consultation, 
described above (p2), was used. In this way a general hospital physician referred to an 
external expert psychiatrist when a psychiatric opinion was required.
In die late 1980s the WHO in Europe (WHO 1988, Huyse 1991) expressed concern about 
the future quantity and quality of psychiatric and psychological service delivery in the 
general hospital setting, especially in the light of asylum closures. They were specifically 
concerned with die increase in the population of older people and the consequent rise of 
late life psychiatric disorders alongside chronic physical illness. The WHO noted that 
older people with mental health problems now entered general hospital wards rather than 
psychiatric units. These older people often “fall between two stools; too mentally unwell 
for medicine and not unwell enough for psychiatry” (Holmes et al 2002). The WHO also 
considered issues related to AIDS and risk taking behaviour in young adults. Whilst die 
European Consultation Liaison Workgroup has received funding to research AIDS and 
risk behaviour in the young, no monies were made available for the study of older people 
(Huyse 1991, Huyse et al 1996).
A group of UK physicians and psychiatrists subsequently produced a joint report (Royal 
College of Physicians and Royal College of Psychiatrists 1995) which again emphasised 
the prevalence of mental health problems in older hospitalised patients and die need for 
service improvement. Argtiably these assertions of need have not brought about wide 
scale change in the recognition and acceptance of older people with mental health 
problems in the general hospital setting. However, it is notable that in the years since I 
started this work, in 2001, mental health liaison services for older people have 
proliferated.
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During the twentieth century, as well as service development being hampered by 
divisions between psychiatry and general medicine, a further potential rift occurred 
within service provision for older people. Prior to the World Wars and the advent of the 
NHS, there existed a two tier hospital system, that of voluntary and corporation hospitals. 
Voluntary hospitals could be choosy about who gained admission, with corporation 
hospitals having to accept anyone. This two tier hospital system meant that people 
presenting with interesting medical symptoms were chosen to go to the voluntary 
hospitals, whilst others, and generally those over 60, went to the corporation hospital or, 
if their behaviour was unacceptable, to the asylum. During and after the war years, when 
hospitals were merged through necessity, doctors from the voluntary hospitals were 
exposed to older people more readily and some perceived a new option of specialty for 
their “clinical gaze” (Foucault 1976). The geriatric specialty thus emerged in the 1930s, 
when Marjory Warren identified a need for a geriatric specialism (British Geriatric 
Society 2006). John Vincent (1999) argues that the growth of the geriatric specialty, 
from the 1960s, was further facilitated by the ongoing will from other doctors to keep 
older people out of their beds.
The split between psychiatry for younger and older adults, with the development of the 
psychogeriatric specialty, occurred later, in the 1970s. Arguably this development was 
linked with the growing knowledge about dementia, which I explore further in Chapter 4, 
as well as following the lead of their general medical colleagues. Such developments of 
speciality provided expert focus and research attention, yet arguably division has also 
served to create social and service division between younger and older people. Much of 
the focus of this thesis is to explore the effect of such divisions on perceptions of mental 
health problems in old age, particularly when they exist outside what may be construed as 
their natural setting, that is a mental health service setting.
I have now provided a brief history of general hospital provision and move on to consider 
the current situation with regard to mental health service provision in this setting.
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1.2.3 The Present
The service divisions, between young and old, medicine and psychiatry described above, 
are arguably now further emphasised by increasing specialism within general hospitals. 
The general hospital ward is now, in line with Turner’s vision (1995), subdivided into 
cardiology, endocrinology, urology and so on. Arguably there is a risk that workers in 
any such specialist areas may, as Turner feared, seek to ensure their exclusivity. Patients 
who do not fit in to the right category may be at risk of having some of their health needs 
unnoticed and unattended, whether those needs be related to another branch of general 
medicine or to mental health.
The historical and current divisions between general and mental health expertise and 
service provision embed a clear delineation between the specialties. Neither government 
policy nor professional education serve to encourage integration or an acceptance that 
caring for people with mental health problems is anything but the business of psychiatric 
services. Nurses do not perceive it as within their core role to have the expertise 
necessary to assess and care for those people with cognitive impairment (Wills and 
Dewing 2001) and such necessity is not delivered as part of their core education. Despite 
advice from the Nursing Council (UKCC 2000), highlighting the challenges in providing 
care for older people with mental health problems in acute medical settings, people are 
still defined as belonging under the umbrella of mental health services. They are seen as 
difficult rather than in need of therapeutic intervention (Wills and Dewing 2001, Norman 
2003).
The current high prevalence of mental health problems in old age within general hospitals 
is a new, and potentially increasing, phenomenon. As longevity increases with greater 
emphasis on care and treatment at home, older people in hospital are now more likely to 
have multiple problems including those related to their mental health (Care Services 
Improvement Partnership, CSIP, 2005, Royal College of Psychiatry, RCP, 2005).
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As discussed above, traditionally, historically and culturally, such problems have existed 
elsewhere, in mental institutions, or existed less, due to demographic changes or differing 
recognition and treatment criteria. There is therefore little history or established culture 
within the general hospital setting for people with mental health problems. Arguably 
mental health problems, where they exist concurrent to another “problem” have become 
homeless. In the past, whatever the concurrent problem, the person would be admitted to 
the large institution. Now people find themselves in services that are potentially not 
culturally adapted to their presence and in the care of staff not educated to meet their 
needs.
The speciality of liaison psychiatry has developed to address this need, as I go on to 
explore in Chapter 4. Some have warned of the dangers of creating a new psychiatric 
specialism in liaison psychiatry in that it produces further divisions (Lipowski 1983a, 
Katz 1996). Many argue that the speciality lies clearly under the umbrella of psychiatry 
(Lipowski 1983b, Lloyd 1991, Katz 1996, Holmes et al 2002), yet if mental illnesses are 
founded in biological change potentially it could lie within medicine.
The division between the young and the old, in terms of mental health service provision 
in England and Wales, has recently been emphasised within the definitions used in the 
National Service Framework for Mental Health (DoH 1999). The focus of this guidance, 
defined as being to address the mental health needs of adults of working age, is 
characteristic of the current and re-emerging direction of mental health services as being 
for people with defined severe and enduring mental health problems: schizophrenia, 
psychosis and bi-polar disorders. Less serious problems, notably anxiety and depression 
receive attention from mainstream services. The position of dementia is unclear. 
Arguably this leaves many people without the necessary mental health care and 
treatment.
I explore details of policies as they relate directly to the care of older people in Chapter 4, 
here noting that the principles of integration between general and mental health care,
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extolled by MacMillan in 1926 (Jones 1993), and most recently reiterated in 
“Everybody’s Business” (CSIP 2005), remain an illusive dream.
I have now examined the historical and current divisions between general and mental 
health services and between services for younger and older adults and highlighted some 
of the risks of exclusion that such divisions bring. I now move on to further explore one 
of those sources of potential social exclusion more closely. Here I look at perspectives 
on age and ageing, as they inform die work of this research.
1.3.1 Perspectives on Later Life
This research focuses on mental health problems in old age and the services provided for 
those with such problems. I continue to explore the concepts of mental health problems, 
mental health problems in old age and service provision extensively as the work 
progresses. Here I feel it important to make reference to theories of ageing as a 
background to the more specific investigation. I am interested particularly in die way in 
which society embraces, and indeed defines, the phenomenon of ageing, scientifically 
and socially. These constructions have significant influence on the power relationships 
that emerge as being particularly pertinent within this research, as older people are not 
afforded the same social credibility and valued position in the world as their younger 
counterparts.
There are said to be more than 200 reported theories of biological ageing (Redfern and 
Ross 2005) with a common conclusion that most living organisms show functional 
decline with advancing time, and that such changes are universal, progressive, intrinsic 
and degenerative (Bond et al 1993). The theories support a belief that evolutionary 
necessity, ensuring procreation of the species, drives the need for a set life span with a 
bodily deterioration until death. More recently the focus of biological science has been on 
genetics suggesting that, with specific intervention aimed at changing genetic disposition,
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life can be prolonged. This focus of belief serves to create old age both as a medical 
phenomenon and as an undesirable state (Vincent 2003).
The criticism of pure biological studies on ageing is that they tend to occur in the 
laboratory rather than in the context of the whole person existing in die world which itself 
culturally and socially influences the effects of time on the body. However, John Vincent 
(2003) suggests that biological theories are attractive to people as they provide potential 
for escape from the inevitable decline. “Treatment”, for example, of declining hearing 
acuity, helps us to avoid ageing by tagging it as remediable.
Successful ageing is now more frequently seen as the absence of disease than as the 
outcome of a successful life. Explanations and control have “passed from the pastor and 
priest to the doctor and geriatrician” (Vincent 2003 pl38) promoting the clinician in a 
position of power able to organise and categorise, make things better, or even decide on 
the time to die. When an older person is hospitalised s/he is seen as ready to be 
discharged when deemed medically fit, without redress to other circumstances that may 
make leaving hospital unachievable. Anyone who remains in hospital when they are not 
“unwell” is defined as a problematic “bed blocker”. Medicine has become the dominant 
mode of solution to problems in old age and in being so deters attention from social 
factors such as housing, employment and pensions. In these areas older people are 
viewed as problematic rather than unwell. I will go on to explore where mental health 
problems fit in with this as the thesis develops.
Possibly the best known theory of ageing among health care professionals, until recent 
years, is Cumming and Henrys’ Disengagement Theory (1961). It suggests that, in 
advancing age, people and society withdraw from each other in order to prepare for 
death. Although this theory has been much critisised as over-simplistic (Putman 2002) 
and unrepresentative (e.g.Vincent 1995, Phillipson 1998) it continues to feature highly in 
literature and is arguably influential in the lay and medical perception of old age as a time 
of natural withdrawal from the social world.
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As a background to this work, I draw particular attention to Townsend’s (1981) theory of 
“Structured Dependency” as it describes the dependence of older people as a product of 
the state, manufactured through political and economic restraint. Townsend suggests that 
the autonomy of older people has been curtailed and that reliance on the state is made 
inevitable. Physiological and biological changes are construed to render the older person 
cliildlike and without autonomy, as is reflected within the social setting of a general 
hospital. Patients are expected to conform and accept their care and treatment without 
question. The processes of retirement, minimum pensions, residential care and 
community services have arguably created a social dependence which is artificial, and 
which has suited industry, professionals and the economy. The practice of social 
exclusion due to age dates back to the late nineteenth century when the old were 
bracketed with the infirm and the feeble minded and perceived as “useless, worn out and 
unemployable” (Phillipson 1998 pi 10).
The recent trend in sociological research towards a “culture of personal identity”
(Gilleard and Higgs 2000) encourages those who study ageing to move away from ageist 
assumptions of homogeneity and powerlessness to consider the experience of ageing 
from a personal perspective. Such research has created a great variety of studies, which I 
do not replicate within this thesis, covering a wide variety of experiences ranging from 
the experience of widowhood to late life employment, with attention to issues of gender 
race and ethnicity (see e.g. Blakemore and Boneham 1994, Arber et al 2003, Davidson et 
al 2003, Davidson et al 2005, Walker 2005). As this research takes place within a 
predominant white British population, I have not focused particularly on the literature 
concerned with issues of non-white ethnicity in old age. I draw on some of the literature 
about gender, particularly in looking at the phenomenon of depression but note that the 
literature on depression in old age is very limited. There is a large literature on dementia, 
as I explore in Chapter 4.
Current research attention, from a non-biological perspective, includes attention to 
pension provision, driven by economic concerns; action against discrimination, driven by 
the agenda of social equality and fairness and improved health promotion; and
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management of health problems in old age. Chris Gilleard and Paul Higgs (2000) 
suggest that these agenda are driven by the presence of a growing number of older, more 
affluent and socially assertive people, products of the cohort that developed the “youth 
culture” in the 1960s. This population carries considerable polling potential and, as such, 
is of political interest. Such an argument may explain the propensity of research towards 
younger healthy older people rather than the unwell, older old who are the focus of this 
work.
Other psychological and social research on ageing has been precipitated by the much 
criticised (e.g. Fries 1980, Vincent 1995) view of the potential catastrophic effects of 
prolonged longevity alongside lowering birth rates creating a demographic time-bomb.
As evidenced in the Census figures in 2001 the proportion of the UK population who are 
over 65 is 12%, as against 7% in 1971. The projected increase in the U.K of those over 
65 is 14%, and those over 75 is 29% by 2021 (Government Actuary’s Department 2000). 
Clearly the escalation in the population of older people, against a decreasing 
proportionate workforce and increasing health care costs, is an issue of economic 
concern. As such it is being addressed through focus on pension provision and radical 
health service reform (DoH 2000, DoH 2005b, DoH 2006) aimed at minimising the need 
for hospital care and concentrating on the care of people with long term conditions at 
home. Those who argue against worries of the forthcoming catastrophe of the ageing 
population highlight the social benefits that the “grey economy” (Vincent 1995) bring in 
terms of essential non-paid activities such as grand-parenting, informal care, and other 
voluntary and charity work.
Peter Laslett (1989), following Fries (1980), focussed on the opportunities now available 
to healthy older retired people. This suggested optimism about older people being 
healthier, but also cautioned that the “fourth age” would bring a period of “compressed 
morbidity” (pi7), during which people experience a combination of social and health 
problems culminating in death. It is particularly this older old population who currently 
find themselves in general hospitals and who are likely to have both mental and physical
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health problems. It is on this population that the current review of health services 
concentrates. I now explore the limited literature available on the older old.
1.3.2 The Fourth Age
Within the literature there is a differentiation between the young old and the older old, 
sometimes termed, as the third and fourth agers (Laslett 1989). As I explore further in 
later chapters, such differentiation appears to be an issue in the conceptualisation of 
mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting. I highlight here two 
theories of ageing that separate the younger from the older old, the stage theories of Eric 
Erikson and his widow Joan Erikson, and James Fries aforementioned work on the 
compression of morbidity.
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Figure 2. The Increasingly Rectangular Survival Curve. 
About 80 per cent (stippled area) of the difference between 
the 1900 curve and the ideal curve (stippled area plus 
hatched area) had been eliminated by 1980. Trauma is now 
the dominant cause of death in early life.
Figure 1.1 The Survival Curve Fries (2002)
Eric Erikson, one of very few psychodynamic theorists who took an interest in later life 
(Bond et al 1993), defined eight stages of life achieved through the personal fulfillment
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of life tasks. Each life stage is characterised by positive and negative achievements of the 
task, for example in early adulthood one achieves “intimacy” as opposed to “isolation”.
In old age, the eighth stage, Erikson suggested that ones task is to achieve “ego integrity”, 
that is meaning and order in one’s world, against the opposite “despair and disgust” at not 
having achieved one’s life goals. In examining this work Bond et al (1993) suggest that 
Eriksson’s stage theory is sometimes taken, and therefore discarded, too literally, with 
failure to achieve at one life stage seeming to prevent development within the next. They 
suggest that this work should enable us to focus on the whole person who has 
experienced triumphs and defeats during life, and who is the product of that history, 
making people more and more unique as they age. Arguably this is the view that Tom 
Kitwood drew upon in formulating his person centred approach to dementia care 
(Kitwood and Bredin 1991) as I discuss in Chapter 4. This person centred care approach 
is at the core of current policy direction within health and social services with consumer 
focus on the individual, choice and preference. Interestingly after her husband’s death, in 
her late life experience at the age of 91, Joan Erikson talked of a ninth, and maybe a 
tenth, life stage termed as “beyond integrity” (Coleman and O’Hanlon 2004) alluding to 
“gerotranscendence” as a move towards death. She thus recognised that, having achieved 
her “ego integrity”, she prepared readily for the inevitability of death.
Taking a parallel view of the end of life, James Fries (1980, Kalache et al 2002) 
identified the theory of a “Compression of Morbidity”. Fries noted that, due to advances 
in medical treatment and disease prevention, people were living longer and longer and 
that therefore the major cause of death now occurred from non-communicable disease in 
extreme old age. Thus the age of first disability and major infirmity occurs within a 
compressed period at the end of life, during the last 18 months of life, often after the age 
of eighty. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, Fries talked of a move from a triangular survival 
curve, whereby the likelihood of death increased with advancing age, to a rectangular 
position whereby most people become unhealthy and die in late old age. Trauma has 
now become the main cause of earlier death. This theory underpins the current policy 
direction described above (pl6) whereby considerable health policy focus is being 
addressed towards lengthening the period of healthy ageing and on the management of
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long term conditions; that is, those that occur within the period of the compression of 
morbidity (Fries 2002).
Notably, like non-communicable physical illnesses, the prevalence of mental health 
problems, particularly dementia, increases with advancing age. However, the likelihood 
of co-morbidity, that is the presence of both physical and mental ill health, is not 
prominent within Fries’ work. This appears to be an example of the divisions between 
general and psychiatric medicine which is a feature throughout this thesis.
As I have noted on the previous page, political rhetoric has moved towards the agenda of 
social empowerment, consumerism and the provision of choice encouraging social and 
health improvement for older people, under the heavy guidance of the state but not in the 
custody of it (Gilleard and Higgs 2000). Such progress, aimed at promoting social 
inclusion and health, is laudable but arguably inaccessible to the older old, particularly 
those who are in ill health. Recommendations, for example those on social inclusion 
(Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2005), focus on howto maximize the health 
potential of older people and enhance quality of life through exercise, engagement and 
better service, yet in doing so, exclude those who do not escape the ultimate social 
exclusion through being hospitalised and institutionalised.
Arguably the differentials occurring between the young old, and the older old, render the 
unwell old more and more excluded with die potential for increased stigma being 
attributed due to their inability to meet social demands of healthy ageing and their 
inability to not be financially burdensome on the state (Gilleard and Higgs 2000, Bender 
and Wainwright 2004, Tester at al 2004). The differentiation between these arbitrary 
groups cannot be correlated with chronological age but is differentiated by disability and 
burden. Those in the fourth age are segregated from the world into the special settings, of 
elderly care wards or care homes, and excluded by virtue of their spoiled identity and 
societal invisibility (Goffman 1961). Peter Coleman and Ann O’Hanlon (2004) note that 
older people over 85, in awareness of functional loss and physical frailty, do define 
themselves as being in “old age”, whereas younger older people do not.
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The few studies, focusing on long term care homes rather than hospitalisation, suggest 
that withdrawal from the bothersome relationships in life is seen as advantageous in one’s 
frailty. People have described contentedly living one day at a time, defined as social 
aloneness, as opposed to the derogatory term of loneliness. Peter Coleman and Ann 
O’Hanlon (2004 p 164) cite Brandtstadter and Greve (1994) and their theory of 
assimilative and accommodative modes of ageing. In assimilation the older person 
strives to adapt to change through optimising and compromising. The person strives to 
maintain themselves in their lifestyle by fighting against the adversity of increasing age, 
functional and health changes. However, there comes a time when, in older old age, one 
achieves acceptance of how one has aged and changes are accommodated rather than 
striven against. It is, of course, questionable whether the described changes in feelings 
about ageing are attributable to an ageing process, personal life history (Kitwood and 
Bredin 1991), or that they are a reflection of society’s view that, once one has reached 
decrepitude, one is of no further social purpose. The correlations between spirituality and 
contentment in old age are an ongoing focus of research in ageing, though also often with 
focus on younger, more able, cohorts (Coleman and O’Hanlon 2004).
Such theory, implying that disengagement can be adaptive, fly in the face of criticism of 
disengagement theory. Disengagement may then be desirable for some of the 
institutionalised old who may not want to engage and be empowered in line with current 
rhetoric. I explore this difference in terms of depression in old age in the later chapters.
I have now examined the background to this research in terms of the historical and 
current nature of mental health service provision, particularly in the general hospital, and 
also by examining concepts of age and ageing. I now move into the core subject of the 
thesis, that of mental health problems.
20
1.4 Mental Health Problems and Mental Health Problems in Old Age
As I have already emphasised, the core concepts under scrutiny in this research are those 
around mental health problems in old age. From the literature, as I go on to explore in 
future chapters, there are three core evident ontological positions: the lay/popular view, 
that of bio-medicine, and sociological models.
The public perceive mental illness in terms of deviant behaviour, out of line with social 
normality. Those attributed with a mental illness are often seen as bad rather than mad 
(Pilgrim and Rogers 1999). Fear, stigma and social exclusion are emphasised and 
potentially perpetuated by the ways in which mental health problems are depicted in the 
media (Philo 2001). The medical and psychological ontological positions focus on 
remediable biological or behavioural aspects of the disease.
More recently, within mental health services, a broader, sociologically based perspective 
on mental health and illness is being advocated. Using this approach the person with 
mental health problems is seen as having a social disability. Recovery approaches 
(Anthony 1993, Barker 1999, DoH 1999, 2006b) focus on enabling people to live with 
their disability and encourage social inclusion, the development of coping skills and 
working with social networks. In terms of mental health problems in old age, this agenda 
is reflected within current approaches in dementia care as I examine in Chapter 4.
As I move through the literature and examine the data gathered in this research I will 
continue to explore perceptions of mental health and illness against these three core 
positions, the lay position, the bio-medical and the psychosocial.
The focus of my attention is also drawn to the potential differences in perception about 
adults of working age as opposed to mental health problems in older people. I have 
already mentioned the historical Cartesian division between general and psychiatric 
medicine and the age related separation that occurs in geriatric and psychogeriatric 
services. There is evidence within the political agenda that mental health problems in old 
age are not viewed in the same way, or with the same clarity of focus on the severity of 
the condition, as those for younger people.
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The National Service Framework for Mental Health (DoH 1999) clearly defines that 
those adults of working age who meet the requirement for the attention of mental health 
services are people with severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar mood 
disorders. Retired people are not included in these criteria and the dominant mental 
health problems of old age, dementia, delirium and depression; do not achieve 
specification as severe.
Within the policy context, the needs and service requirements for older people with 
mental health problems are addressed under the generic agenda for older people. For 
example, the National Service Framework for Older People (DoH 2001a) contains a 
specific chapter, Standard 7, on mental health issues. The recently published 
“Everybody’s Business” (CSIP 2005) emphasises that recognition and attention to the 
mental health needs of older people is within the remit of mainstream services. There is 
less clarity about what constitutes a condition severe enough to fall within the scope of 
specialist services and thus about who qualifies as a “proper” mental health service 
patient. Referral to mental health service is encouraged in the presence of suspected 
Alzheimers disease or severe depression. However, if, as I suspect, people outside 
mental health circles do not readily use biomedical classification, attention to the 
problems will not occur.
I continue my exploration of the literature around mental health problems in Chapters 3 
and 4. My intention here has been to highlight the evident lack of consensus about what 
constitutes a mental health problem in old age with a potential resultant confusion about 
service provision. This research aims to contribute in filling this gap.
I now turn to provide some background into the theoretical framework I chose as a basis 
for this research. I go on to briefly examine the research settings and the scope of the 
data.
2 2
1.5.1 An Epistemological Position
Prior to moving into the literature review and Ihe body of the thesis, I explore here my 
sociological approach to the phenomenon of mental health problems in old age in the 
general hospital setting.
As I have explained, my original rationale in conducting this research was founded in a 
suspicion that mental health problems in old age may be conceptualised differently by 
different societal groups, notably staff from psychiatry and staff in general hospitals, and 
that such differences potentially affect the nature of both recognition and attention to 
such problems.
There has long been philosophical debate about what constitutes “reality” and 
“knowledge” with a wide variety of opinion and definition emerging. Here I begin by 
looking at the dominant ontological position within medicine and psychiatry before 
considering the alternative interpretive, constructionist approach that I go on to explain 
further in Chapter 5.
1.5.2 Scientific Positivism
A positivist view of the world can be said to be one in which there exist facts and truths 
about reality that are fixed and proven scientifically. Such facts are the results of human 
conceptual judgements and categorised for convenient usage (Porter 1998); in terms of 
medicine they are categorised into diagnoses.
Despite varying perspectives on mental health and illness, which I discuss further in 
Chapter 3, the orientation of practice in psychiatric services is based within a positivist 
approach of theory development. Practitioners and service organisers perceive those in 
their care to be “ill” using identified diagnostic terms that characterise certain 
presentations and expectations (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999). Such definitions are allocated 
following medical systematic experimental research, using methodology developed to 
deduce diagnostic reality by testing hypothetical theory against data. Models of care and
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treatment serve to emphasise and further define constituents of the diagnoses (Prior 
1993).
Using this illness framework, older people using psychiatric services are defined by 
diagnosis as being psychotic, having dementia and so on, and afforded treatment, often 
pharmacologically, accordingly. Such an approach can be said to mirror that of generic 
medicine, whereby doctors seek to define diagnosis, prognosis, aetiology and treatment, 
using the same epidemiological position founded in scientific reality. However, there 
exists concern that mental illnesses are less clearly shown to be biological in explanation 
and therefore the perception of “truth” is more readily challenged.
1.5.3 A Constructionist Position
The sociological theories, upon which I draw, suggest that knowledge is constructed from 
what is seen and heard within the lived environment (Porter 1998). As humans we learn 
through our social experience and adapt our learning with changing circumstance. In this 
way the diseases, described in the field of psychiatry, may not be universally perceived as 
such.
I work on the premise that everyday theories about the world are built inductively from 
data, rather than deduced by testing against hypotheses. I draw particularly upon the 
approach of Norman Denzin (1989) and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991) in 
Interpretive Interactionism and Social Constructionism, respectively. The former is 
concerned with how perceptions reflect the innate qualities that people attribute to a 
phenomenon in forming interpretations thereof. Such an approach is relevant to the 
exploration of mental health problems in old age given the potential for the influence of 
the stigma associated with both age and mental illness.
Berger and Luckmann (1991), describing Social Constructionism, talk of the fluidity with 
which the social world is perceived. Knowledge, they assert, is not static, nor necessarily 
the same for different people in the same cultural setting. As I am exploring a
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phenomenon, mental health problems in old age, arguably outside its anticipated setting, 
such an approach is the vehicle of choice.
I consider the theoretical framework in more detail, and as it is operationalised for this 
research, in Chapter 5.
1.6 The Research Settings and the Scope of Data
As I am seeking to explore how mental health problems in old age are socially 
constructed in the general hospital setting, I need to achieve data from the people who 
feature within that social setting. Although my original source of enquiry arose out of a 
potential difference in staff perceptions, between general and psychiatric services, I want 
to examine the perceptions of all involved parties in order to view the whole and to 
observe differences and make comparison.
The presence of mental health problems in general hospital settings impacts upon many 
people and groups: the older people themselves, other hospital patients, relatives and 
friends, as well as on health and social care workers and service managers. The social 
actors all have thoughts, feelings, behaviours, beliefs, communication methods and 
memories associated with, and influenced by, their experience (Williams and May 1996). 
As well as the personal and experiential influences carried by each person, further 
influence occurs due to the setting itself, an institution carrying history, administrative 
structures and mechanisms. I explore these further in the next chapter and in Chapter 6.
Data for the research was gathered in “elderly care” wards in two general hospitals in the 
South of England. I call the hospitals Glimster General and Chapley Hospital in order to 
anonymise them. I conducted qualitative interviews with older people, relatives and staff 
members. In Glimster General the traditional consultative model of mental health service 
provision is in place. In Chapley Hospital I provided mental health consultation and 
liaison interventions. Of course there were methodological complications in conducting 
research in a site in which I also worked clinically as I explore in Chapter 5. However, at
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the time the research started there were no other accessible sites using a 
consultation/liaison model of service.
In analysing and exploring the data I have drawn conclusion upon both what are 
construed as mental health problems in old age in this setting and what are not. Through 
the data other issues of relevance have emerged, particularly in relation to organisational 
structures and the power structures that exist and influence perception. As I go on to 
explore, the clashing powers of biomedicine, psychiatry, organisational and political 
systems and consumerism all serve to complicate the perceptions of the older people, the 
relatives and the staff members.
Having provided a broad background to the research, I conclude this chapter by setting 
out the research questions and describing, very broadly and briefly, the content of each of 
the further chapters. I then move into the more detailed literature review.
1.7 Research Questions
The broad purpose of this research is to examine and explore how mental health problems 
in old age are perceived by those who experience them in the general hospital setting, in a 
culture in which such problems may be perceived as alien. These issues are addressed by 
interviewing older people, relatives of older people and staff members, in two hospitals 
who each employ different methods of mental health input, in order to address the 
research questions: -
• What are the social constructions that are drawn upon and that generate 
perspectives on mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting 
and
• Does the nature of mental health services provision affect and/or influence the 
social constructions?
2 6
I asked these questions in order to inform debate around the future provision of mental 
health care for older people in general hospital settings. I argue that service is currently 
provided in answer to the constructs as perceived by the professions of medicine and 
psychiatry, and due to political and organisational demands, rather than in consideration 
of how mental health and mental illness in old age is perceived by those directly involved 
in the general hospital setting.
1.8 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis consists of an introduction followed by three literature review chapters and a 
chapter on methodology. There follow three chapters of analysis and discussion prior to 
the conclusive chapter that evaluates how the findings relate to the theoretical literature 
as well as addressing the implications of the findings and indications for future research.
Within this, the first chapter, I have provided a broad outline of the thesis. I have 
described my background and the nature of the original source of sociological enquiry. 
The chapter has gone on to examine the historical and contemporary context of services 
for older people with mental health problems who find themselves in general hospitals. 
Although there has been some fluctuating political will to merge hospital services for 
people with general and mental health problems, this has not come into fruition. Service 
divisions between general and psychiatric medicine, and between young and old, 
perpetuate the social exclusion of older people with mental health problems.
I have also examined some theories of ageing and how ageing is viewed from 
biomedical, psychological and sociological perspectives to formulate a contemporary 
construction of old age. I explored the argument that old age has become pathologised 
and marginalised. I argue that the recent focus on ageing well may serve to further 
marginalise older people who have become dependent through ill health and/or disability. 
Lastly I have described my epistemological position as founded in Social 
Constructionism and touched upon detail of the research sites and the methodology.
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Chapter 2 considers the literature around power and its potential relevance within this 
research. I examine professional, organisational, consumer and political power in turn. I 
conclude by considering the potential influence of vying power relationships upon care 
and service for older people with mental health problems in the general hospital setting.
Chapter 3 examines the literature relating to generic perspectives of mental health and 
illness. I seek to examine how a person becomes classified as mentally ill. I explore 
views from lay, medical, psychological, sociological and political perspectives. I include 
a section for the examination of stigma. In conclusion I note that one’s view of mental 
health and illness differs and may vary with one’s position in a culture, as well as due to 
the effect of stigma.
Chapter 4 specifically explores mental health problems of old age and considers how 
these may differ from the broad perspectives discussed in Chapter 3. Again differing 
perspectives are examined and I highlight the lack of research about mental health and 
illness in old age, other than dementia, as perceived from differing perspectives. I 
particularly note the dearth of sociological research examining depression in old age. I 
also consider the lack of political focus on this population group.
Chapter 5 details the research methodology. I consider the theoretical framework that 
underpins the chosen methodology and detail the processes and challenges involved in 
achieving sufficient data with which to address the research questions. The chapter 
content focuses specifically on the sensitive nature of research into a stigmatised 
condition and involving vulnerable people. I explore the ethical issues that such 
sensitivity uncovers.
Chapter 6 commences the analysis and discussion section of the thesis. Here I consider 
the social constructions that influence perceptions of mental health problems in old age in 
the general hospital setting. I return to issues of power and compare the expressed 
perceptions in this setting against lay and psychiatric views. I explore the data as it
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centres around mental health problems in old age as defined by behaviour and perceived 
confusion.
Chapter 7 explores and discusses the findings around those mental health problems 
defined within mental health service circles, but absent in this setting. I focus particular 
attention to the issue of depression in old age and consider how perceptions differ across 
the age ranges. I consider the possibility of structured depression in old age. I also 
examine the data as it pertains to stigma and conclude on the degree of its influence in 
formulating perceptions.
Chapter 8 considers the implications of the research findings on future service structure 
and provision noting a need for radical change. It compares the two service models under 
scrutiny and introduces the concept of osmotic learning as a product of the 
consultation/liaison model of service. The broad political context of mental health 
services for older people is discussed with recommendations for a focus of attention 
aimed at improving recognition and service for this population group.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by recapping on the core findings, reflecting on the 
research experience and making recommendations for the direction of future work.
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Chapter 2
Power
2.1 Introduction
In reviewing literature relevant to my research, I divide consideration into three discrete 
yet interlinked chapters. Given the emerging importance of the influence of power 
throughout this research, Chapter 2 explores issues of power and their possible vying 
impacts on perceptions of mental health and illness. In Chapters 3 and 4 1 move on to 
explore further various perspectives on mental health problems generally (Chapter 3) and 
in old age specifically (Chapter 4).
The nature and purpose of general hospitals necessitate the presence of an organisational 
culture whereby defined processes and procedures ensure that people gain entry, receive 
treatment and are discharged. Such structure can itself exert power and enable 
individuals within it also to wield differing, and sometimes conflicting, degrees of power 
over others.
The relevance of power is apparent in many guises throughout this research and 
influences all aspects of it. It is due to its extreme relevance that I explore it first, both 
here in the review of the literature and, when it comes to examination and interpretation 
of the data, in Chapter 6. Each research participant’s position within the general hospital 
setting, and the interviews themselves, involve power dynamics associated with age, 
health status, competence, professional status, expertise, gender, class and environment. 
Organisational and political power also impinges on the setting’s social structure. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, the professional power of medicine, and of the 
psychiatric branch of medicine, also holds significant influence over how service is 
provided.
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I examine issues of power within research relationships in Chapter 5; Methodology. In 
this chapter I consider professional, organisational, consumer and political power 
individually before discussing how the issues may impinge on, and affect the perceptions 
of people within the general hospital setting. First, however, I consider broad 
sociological perspectives on power.
2.2 Sociological Perspectives of Power
Definitions of power have long been disputed by sociologists. Probably the best known 
of definitions is that of Max Weber (1922, cited by Marshall 1999 p519) who suggests 
that power is “the probability of persons carrying out their will, even when opposed by 
others”. Possession of power, according to Weber, is grounded in the economic, social 
and political dimensions of the person or group. Power, the modernists postulated, is 
legitimised by those who see themselves as subordinate and behave accordingly, 
suggesting a somewhat linear power line from those who possess it, to those who do not. 
Foucault and the post modernists, conversely, suggest that contemporary society can be 
explained by mapping the network of power relations within it. Power is, he suggests, a 
generalised omnipresent resource, exercised rather than possessed (Watson 2001), and 
flowing through a political system. Power exists within all interactions and is apparent 
through inequalities. Power shifts between people and groups and therefore shapes 
reality for those people and groups, dependent on the needs/will of society at the time 
(Hoy 1986, Lupton 1994).
Symbolic interactionlists argue that the organisation of social life, and the power 
structures within it, arise from society itself, there being no theoretical reason why one 
group should predominate. Marxist theorists tend to view power as oppressive and 
unjust, related to economy not prestige, the socially advantaged wielding influence over 
the disadvantaged, causing oppression and conflict.
Within this research I tend towards the philosophies of Foucault although notably his 
position moved with time. In his early work he perceived power as negative, oppressive
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and exclusive (Foucault 1967), vdiereas he later defines it as positive and heterogeneous: 
“Power is an enabling force that permeates the social realm and constraint can lead to 
creative expression” (cited by McNay 1994 p i42). Thus power constrains but is also 
fluid enough to offer opportunity for the expression of freedom (Watson 2001). 
Therefore, in principle, any person or group of people has the ability to be powerful. The 
question that I will continue to raise as this thesis progresses, is whether or not everyone 
can permeate and penetrate every social realm, in this instance the general hospital 
setting. As becomes evident, it may be that certain groups are able to permeate more 
readily than others, and as such have more control over the agendas in the setting.
Considering the concept of power within the general hospital context is complicated. I 
now go on to consider the differing potential sources of power in turn, firstly in relation 
to professional knowledge.
2.3 Professional Knowledge
Sociologists of the structural functionalist view hold that the professions are a stable 
force within society, acting in the interests of their clients and of society, therefore they 
hold legitimate power. Patients readily defer to doctors in order to return themselves to 
usefulness (Parsons 1951). Weberian tradition suggests that health professionals use 
strategies to enhance their social standing, thus ensuring ongoing need for their service. 
Doctors’ exercise enhanced power over three social groups: their clients, those 
subordinate to them and other occupational groups who are considered lower in social 
stature (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999). Thus nurses defer to doctors and health care 
assistants defer to nurses and patients defer to everyone. From a Marxist perspective the 
professions are seen as holding power due to their position within Ihe ruling class.
Nursing has never had equal status with medicine. Medicine is a predominately male 
domain whereas nursing is female. Medicine holds power due to the positivist scientific 
nature of the knowledge it holds. Nursing, and indeed psychiatry, is not seen as factually 
scientific, being interested in people and emotions as well as medical knowledge. While
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nurses may be perceived as agents of the medical profession and thus have vicarious 
power, they, and other health care professionals, are not afforded such prestige in the 
social hierarchy (Nettleton 1995).
Foucault asserts this clear link between knowledge and power (Porter 1998, Watson
2001). He argues that medical knowledge has achieved power through taken-for-granted 
position in assumed factual reality (Foucault 1974). In organising human beings from 
birth until death, it is argued that medicine has replaced religion (Bilton et al 1987). 
Doctors, and other clinicians, exert their power through their knowledge by using 
language that others do not comprehend (Porter 1998) and by use of the “clinical gaze” 
through which patients are objectified, observed and controlled (Foucault 1976). Their 
power is emphasised through the medicalisation of certain life events such as pregnancy, 
ageing and mental illness. Thus they define those who they manage and treat (Prior 
1993) in terms of biological reality that they deduce using positivist methodology 
(Redfem and Ross 2005). Through such definition the patient surrenders his body to the 
expertise of the clinician (Vincent 1999) as is the patient’s expected role on entering 
hospital.
It is also through professional power that policy and service provision has historically 
been defined and organised, professional roles have developed, and systems have been 
put into place (Prior 1993). The dominance of the power of medical knowledge thus 
holds conditions, such as mental illness, within the biological reality paradigm and 
perpetuates its definition as such. Psychiatry dictates the need for separate general and 
mental health services and doctors and nurses, who are educated into one specialty or the 
other, defend their position.
As I go on to examine, there are moves away from the clinically dominated power base in 
health care. In terms of mental health problems in old age the move against the power of 
the clinical gaze is best illustrated by the work of Kitwood and others, as discussed in 
Chapter 4 (p65), in seeking to see the person with dementia and their disability rather 
than their disease state.
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However, a more dominant threat to professional power arises from organisational and 
political power, as I now examine.
2.4 Political and Organisational Power
A major focus of current government policy, with regard to health care and other public 
services, is on standardisation, monitoring and the minimisation of risk, as forms of social 
control (Adams 2001). This focus can be seen, in terms of the organisation of the health 
service, as an extension of the managed health service that emerged during the Thatcher 
years and beyond, following the recommendations within the Griffiths Report (DHSS 
1983). The legislation that followed implanted a clear management structure within the 
NHS and moved the focus of care towards efficiency as well as clinical effectiveness.
The current increasing attention towards standards and monitoring through National 
Service Frameworks (see Chapter 4) lends the sway of power towards organisations that 
must develop systems through which standards can be enacted and developed in order to 
prove their efficacy.
Although similar to medical power, in its ability to lead and shape agendas, 
organisational power differs in that it is based in social and political rhetoric rather than 
in the scientific discourse. Foucault describes the notion of disciplinary power, or 
“panoptic surveillance” (Porter 1998 p218), in terms of the execution of techniques 
aimed at standardising conduct. He used the prison set up to illustrate ways in which 
behaviour of in-mates is regulated, controlled and maintained (Foucault 1979). The 
principle is transferable to schools (Watson 2001) and arguably to any setting where one 
group of people have expectation about the conduct of another group. Thus in a general 
hospital patients are expected to behave in certain ways, as indeed are clinical staff and 
administrators.
Thus the organisations, through territorial and disciplinary power shape what constitutes 
knowledge from a different perspective than that of those who hold professional
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knowledge. Organisational knowledge is about systems and how they should efficiently 
operate. For example, an older person in hospital may be defined by a medical diagnostic 
label or by their position in the organisation as a “bed blocker” delaying throughput in the 
system. One may suppose that such a difference in paradigm has an effect on perceptions 
about elements of and within the environment, for example, interpretation of what 
constitutes an illness.
Organisational power has been said to dominate other social roles. For example social 
workers in the general hospital setting, especially since community care legislation in 
2003 (DoH 2003b), tend to focus on moving people out of hospital rather than examining 
and addressing their social needs as they may affect their health (Simey 1998).
In recent years some of the treatments offered, in the UK, have been recommended by a 
central government body, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE 
2006). This body is tasked with reviewing current evidence in order to make 
recommendations based on clinical efficacy against cost. Such a challenge to individual 
practitioner autonomy and personal prestige can be said to disempower the omnipotent 
position of the prescribing practitioner.
Organisational power is itself shaped by political power and by the guidance and 
legislation that determines how services are provided. Thus the disempowerment of 
older people in society has been moulded both by the medicalisation of old age and by 
the organisational rejection of “bed blockers” but also, and arguably more broadly, by the 
way in which social policy has politically shaped their role. As discussed in Chapter 1 
(pl4), the Disengagement Theory of Cumming and Henry (1961) was widely accepted 
despite it’s methodological flaws. Within their study Cumming and Henry claimed to 
demonstrate that older people disengage willingly by making way for others to fulfill 
their former roles, thereby gaining the opportunity to enjoy leisure pursuits unavailable 
during the years of employment. The conclusions of this research were readily accepted 
despite its small-scale nature, both numerically and geographically, and the inability of 
other researchers to replicate the findings elsewhere (Coleman et al 1993). It appears that
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the theory suited the political need at the time to identify older people as having different 
needs than those in middle age and thus to extract them from the workforce. With the 
influx of baby boomers, bom in die 1950s, youth employment took priority. 
Disengagement then became prophetic in that compulsory retirement age was in place 
and was seen as desirable to all. Also moving older people to special sections of the 
community or into institutions where the expectation for any engagement is minimal is 
readily accepted. Subsequent social policies have ensured the lower economic status of 
many older people, as postulated in descriptions of structured dependency (Townsend 
1981).
The evidence of suppression through political power for older people is mirrored in 
legislation and policy around mental health and illness. Increasingly, from a political 
perspective, mental illness is linked with societal risk. This leads to social exclusion and 
defensive clinical practice (Barker 1999, Social Exclusion Unit 2006). Older people with 
mental health problems are thus potentially doubly suppressed due to the negative views 
on their potential risk to society and their incompetence due to old age.
Having explored professional and organisational power, it is already evident that older 
people and, potentially more so, older people with mental health problems, are unlikely to 
be perceived as powerful in terms of their position as consumers of health care. I now 
move on to explore this agenda.
2.5 Consumer Power
The third player in the potential power struggle is that of the consumer. As well as the 
government intent on standardisation and measurement, current political focus 
emphasises the need for increased consumer choice in health service acquisition (DoH 
2000). This is an extension from the growth in consumer power in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century. Within the health service the shift has been characterised by 
rhetoric about user involvement in many fields, including mental health (DoH 1999),
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whereby the person is considered an expert in their own health experience particularly if 
they have a long term condition (DoH 2005b).
Moves in advancing consumer rights, or patient rights, are enacted in law. For example 
the Disability Discrimination Act (Office of Public Sector Information, OPSI, 1995) 
made it illegal to treat one person, or group of people, less favourably than another by 
virtue of their disability. The Human Rights Act, article 14 (OPSI 1998) calls for no 
discrimination from one human against another. Advocates suggest that this legislation 
should be more readily used to shift the mindset, from illness to disability, in the 
exclusion of people with mentai health problems (Sayce 2001) or dementia (Gilliard
2002).
Within mental health services for younger people there have, since the introduction of the 
National Service Framework for Mental Health (DoH 1999), been significant advances in 
user involvement with many NHS Trusts employing service users as advisors and 
advocates. Such engagement with older people with mental health problems is less 
evident despite it being an aspiration (Killeen 2001). The voice of carers is more often 
heard, particularly through such organisations as the Alzheimers Society (2006).
The patient participants within this research are over 65. They may also be mentally ill 
and they may have dementia. The ability to exert power in old age is said to depend on 
income and gender and arguably intellectual ability, in this “ultra cognitive world” 
(Adams and Bartlett 2003 p5). Those falling within old and mentally ill social groups are 
often not seen as deserving of power or as having any ability to use it.
Within western culture attainment of personhood is achieved in reaching adulthood. In 
exploring experiences of growing old, Hockey and James (1993) suggest that in life one 
is not considered to have become the complete person, capable of independent 
autonomous thought and action, until one has reached arbitrarily allocated chronological 
points. At that time one achieves “personhood”. Defining one’s place in society in these 
terms, the predominant dependent group is children. They are dependent on adults for
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protection, direction and nurture, being naive of the world. Adults interact with children 
in particular ways aimed at meeting their perceived needs. Older people, particularly if 
they have a mental illness, have become classified by society as a dependent group, 
beyond personhood, disengaged and useless to society. As such, older people are often 
treated “as i f ’ they were children, dependent and powerless, as this is the way in which 
society has come to interact with its dependents (children). Childlike attributes are 
attached to older people, to those with disabilities, and to people whose perceived 
dependence is temporary, for example hospital patients. They are expected to comply 
without question, to not assert relevant opinion and indeed to be “seen and not heard”. 
They are powerless.
Such stereotypes diminish the older person’s feeling of control (Sykes 1995). To work is 
good, to be healthy is good, and to be ill is to be a burden. Power is to do with wealth, 
health, productivity, status and independence. It is difficult to assert ones consumer 
power under such constraint. The older person is not seen as an individual consumer, but 
bundled together as part of a homogenous group irrespective of individual and societal 
differences (Walker 1981). At present the predominant discourse around older people, 
and particularly older people with dementia, is that they have no view, cannot express a 
view and, if they do, it is without value. Older people are perceived as passive recipients 
of care, lacking physical, mental and financial resources (Hey 1999).
However, let us return to the Foucauldian belief that any person has the potential to exert 
power. There are means of exerting power through ones membership of a disadvantaged 
social group. Hockey and James (1993 pl67) cite the work of Turner (1974). Turner 
argues that issues around social power are particularly prevalent at times of transition.
He calls this “liminal” power, defined as being that which occurs at times of threshold 
between categories, for example, youth to adulthood, sickness to health, age milestones. 
He refers to two types of power, secular and sacred. Secular power is that granted to 
individuals according to their societal group, class, gender and ethnicity, as we have seen 
in the power of doctors and managers. Sacred power is accredited to those who are 
somehow set apart from the majority. Such power can be temporarily present only in
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transition, for example during rites of passage from youth to adulthood or from working 
life to retirement For the purposes of this work sacred liminal power may be present for 
people whose social role has changed through their hospitalisation. Turner suggests that 
when one is marginalised one is potentially inappropriately held in this limbo position, 
outside the usual being. He argues that this separateness can be powerful. It is from this 
liminal position that the older people can be seen to rebel. Cast as surrogate children 
with nothing to lose a person may become anti-social. An often cited example of this 
ability to exert power through eccentricity is the poem Warning by Jenny Joseph (1974, 
cited in Hockey and James 1993, Box 2.1), although it was written when the author had 
not yet reached old age.
2.6 Discussion
For the purposes of this thesis power is seen as omni-present. It is culturally, politically 
and institutionally embedded. It exists, overtly and covertly, enabling the possessor to, 
consciously or unconsciously, influence, shape or determine their agenda whilst 
minimising opposition. The power struggles in wards for older people in the general 
hospital are arguably predominantly between professional and organisational power, still 
leaving the consumer out in the cold. This struggle inevitably effects both perceptions 
about mental illness and the service provided to address it.
The way in which power structures are acted out in day-to-day life are described by 
Carolyn Baker through each individual’s “membership categorisation” (1997 p i30). 
Within specific settings and situations people behave according to the social rules that 
govern their role in that place, as required at the time. In this way the influence and 
power of individuals, professionals and organisations causes people to behave in certain 
ways: patients are un-assertive, nurses are busy, doctors are knowledgeable, and so on. 
Despite current rhetoric encouraging consumer choice, hospital regimes and 
environments continue to restrict the opportunity for choice and independence. If, as a 
patient, one is assertive, there is a risk of being labelled as “difficult”, because of the
39
violation of membership category. Such execution of power can make one further 
marginalised (Bilton et al 1996).
Box 2.1 Warning
When I am an old woman I shall w ear purple
With a red hat which d o esn ’t go, and d o esn ’t suit me
And I shall spend my pension on brandy and sum m er gloves
And satin sandals , and say we have no money for butter.
I shall sit on the pavem ent when I’m tired
And gobble up sam ples in sh o p s  and press  alarm bells
And run my stick along public railings
And make up for the sobriety of my youth.
I shall go out in my slippers in the rain 
And pick the flowers in other peoples gardens 
And learn to spit.
You can w ear terrible shirts and grow more fat 
And ea t  three pounds of s a u s a g e s  at a go 
Or only bread and pickle for a week
And hoard pens  and pencils and beer-mats and things in a box.
But now we must have clothes that keep us dry 
And pay our rent and not sw ear in the stree t 
And se t  a good example for the children
We must have friends to dinner and read the papers
But maybe I ought to practice a little now?
So people who know me now are not too shocked and surprised 
When suddenly I am old, and start to w ear purple.
Jenny  Joseph  (1974, cited in Hockey and Ja m e s  1993),
There are those who argue that the bureaucratisation of health provision has markedly 
changed the power structures within it. Professionals are now employees of large 
organisations and are, it has been suggested, allied with the proletariats against the power 
of the administrators (Oppenheimer 1975). This position o f loss of power to the 
bureaucracy has proliferated since the 1990s with the introduction of the market economy 
in health care provision. There exists a conflict o f new power over traditional power 
within today’s NHS. Adding to this conflict, recent years have seen the growth in 
consumer power, where the patient is seen as the expert in their condition and needs.
40
Thus a third, potentially conflicting voice vies for power. The traditional roles are no 
longer as clear in boundary, and diversity in interest provokes conflict.
However, although professional power is being challenged with this onset of 
consumerism, and changes in health service management (DHSS 1983), the shift of 
power is not achieved overnight. Barker et al (1999) suggest that the fear of litigation, 
particularly in mental health fields, is pressurising service providers back into a 
traditional paternalistic model, contradicting the will to empower users.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have highlighted and explored issues of power as they impinge upon 
every aspect of this work.
It is apparent that three core potential power bases exist in professional, organisational 
and consumer power. Historically professional power dominated the agenda of health 
care and delivery and arguably the older generation being studied here have formed their 
perceptions at the time when medical power held total legitimacy. However, since the 
1990s both organisational and consumer power have entered into the health care arena 
and potentially serve to complicate and change the traditional constructions of health and 
illness held within general hospital settings. People who find themselves within the 
setting, as staff, relatives or patients, may find conflict in establishing what belongs in 
this social world and what constitutes a legitimate illness therein.
As this thesis develops I return again and again to the areas discussed in this chapter as it 
is clear that perceptions of mental health and illness are intricately linked with the power 
structures within a given culture.
I now move on to examine the literature with regard to perceptions of mental health and 
illness in Chapter 3 from a general perspective, irrespective of the age of the sufferer.
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Chapter 3 
Perspectives of Mental Health and Illness
3.1 Introduction
I have now outlined the broad issues under discussion and scrutiny in this research. In 
these next two chapters I explore the literature around varying perspectives of mental 
health and illness and then specifically that associated with the experiences of older 
people with mental health problems. Notably little non-medical attention has been given 
to mental health problems in old age, other than dementia, as I explore in the next 
chapter.
In considering the differing perspectives I do not aim to suggest any strength of one 
argument over another, rather I seek to emphasise that the concepts of mental health and 
mental illness are not firmly defined and that they differ dependent upon one’s 
relationship to the concept and on the cultural setting. It is clear that the perspectives are 
not mutually exclusive and that they all carry influence on each other.
Here, in Chapter 3 ,1 explore the literature as it explains how a person is classified as 
having a mental health problem using the differing perspectives of the lay public and of 
medical psychiatry. I also consider the psychological, sociological and political 
perspectives and explore how the attribution of mental illness has shifted with time. I 
focus particularly on the pathologisation of depression in Chapter 4.
In concluding this chapter I suggest that current perspectives on mental health and illness 
focus on the construction of a phenomenon that occurs in younger adult life. Mental 
health problems in old age are not considered using the same terminology.
I begin the chapter by looking at popular perspectives of mental health and illness and 
include a section examining the phenomena of stigma. I move on to consider the medical
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viewpoint before considering how these two core constructions fit in with psychological 
and sociological thinking. Lastly I look at the political perspective.
3.2.1 Popular Perceptions
Mental health and illness are nebulous concepts, covering many potential situations. 
Notions of emotional and psychological difference are attributed according to various 
cultural and historical context (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999).
The popular view of mental illness has long indicated a link between madness and 
perceived social badness, criminality and violence. As early as the fifth century BC the 
Greek philosopher Socrates is reported to have stated that a low crime rate in Athens 
indicated a low rate of mental disorder in the city (Gregory 2004). Later Shakespeare 
described the decline into madness, and badness, in Macbeth.
The popular view continues to describe those who are perceived to be mentally ill as 
those who do not conform, those who do not fit into perceived normality; they are 
thought to be bad and dangerous. That the classifications of “bad” and “mad” can be 
synonymous has been charecterised by some high profile convictions for murder. The 
trials of Denis Nilsson and Peter Sutcliffe are examples of this phenomenon. Both of the 
accused were seen to have acted unlawfully as a result of their mental illnesses by expert 
psychiatric witnesses, yet in each case the jurors judged their behaviour as bad and 
convicted them as criminals rather than defining them to be unwell (Pilgrim and Rogers 
1999). This suggests a societal belief, or indeed lack of belief, in the phenomenum of 
mental illness as remediable through medical intervention. The juries for these cases felt 
that punishment for bad behaviour was required and could not accept that an illness could 
exist that was causative of their criminal acts.
More recently attention has been drawn to a case where psychiatry does not discern a 
mental illness, yet the popular view differs. The enquiry into the service responses to 
Michael Stone, who murdered a mother and her daughter after having been in contact
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with Mental Health services, confirms a lack of concensus over what constitutes a mental 
health problem (Independent 2006). In die lay view Stone was perceived to be mentally 
ill and dangerous prior to the crime, and as such should have been incarcerated.
However, in terms of medical psychiatry, and the legal framework of the Mental Health 
Act, personality disorder is not categorised as a treatable mental illness, therefore he 
could not be detained.
Clearly these cited cases are extremes, but many argue that the link, or assumed link, 
between mental illness and badness, particularly violence, is over emphasised through 
media portrayal (Ward 1997, Clarke 2004, Philo 2001). They suggest that media 
influence has the dominant presence in today’s society and underpins much of our culture 
including how we perceive mental health problems. Negative deviant labels, such as 
“psycho” “loony” and “bonkers” are stereotyped to portray badness, and are often firmly 
held and not easily changed (Philo 2001).
In a screening of press coverage of mental illness and related issues, Ward (1997) found 
that 50% of the references linked mental ill health with violence and criminality.
Similarly Clarke (2004) suggests that the ways in which the media reports cases where 
someone has died at the hand of a person diagnosed with a mental health problem, such 
as the case of Christopher Clunis who was killed by a man diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia, serves to create anxiety among the public. Clarke cites articles where the 
media have alluded to the involvement of people with mental health problems, when 
none was present, for example by noting the proximity of the crime scene to a psychiatric 
hospital. Contrary evidence does not receive an equal degree of publicity. For example, 
of the 1048 murders in 2003, in England and Wales, only 50 were committed by people 
with mental health problems, while the public are more at risk from those who are drunk 
than from those who are mentally ill (Gregory 2004).
Anxieties about the perceived risk caused by people with mental health problems, fuelled 
by cases such as Michael Stone, are evidenced in the current political agenda aimed at 
minimising that perceived risk. For example, the Mental Health Bill (DoH 2004) was
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recently rejected and is being re-considered with 1he Mental Health Act Amendment Bill 
(DoH 2006), makes provision for compulsory care orders in the community, arguably 
meeting the public demand for protection. The Bill also seeks to tighten up definitions of 
what legally constitutes a mental disorder and will potentially widen the net of people 
who can be so defined and thus detained and/or compelled to receive treatment. Public 
debate about the rights and wrongs about further socially excluding people with mental 
health problems through restrictive and, possibly over prescriptive legal intervention 
continue as I write. At present it appears likely that amendments will be made to the 
current Mental Health Act (1983) that will address the perceived need for greater control 
over people with mental health problems who, rightly or wrongly, are seen as a potential 
danger.
In contradiction of this apparent social fear of people with mental illness runs a theme 
whereby the media cannot cross the invisible line of political acceptability. An example 
of this was the reporting of the boxer Frank Bruno’s mental health problems. The Sun 
(2003) newspaper headline originally screamed “Bruno is Bonkers” but later that day 
retracted its “inappropriate” remark, moving to a position of pity for the victim of 
circumstance. This apparent division, and ambivalence between bad and pitied, and 
acceptable and unacceptable mental illness, is depicted in a culture of tolerance and 
acceptability of some mental health problems that are seen as being evidence of human 
distress. I explore this further in the next chapter, where I consider the development of 
the illness called depression.
We are currently bombarded with media images about unfortunate people who are 
experiencing depression, substance dependency or dementia. Lineham (1996) believes 
that making mental health problems into light entertainment, by knitting them into soap 
opera story lines and making them the focus of chat shows, is a worrying development. 
This view is shared by Philo (2001,p58) who reports his finding that soap characters who 
had mental illness evoked hostility in the audience, in line with the popular view that 
mental ill health is equivalent to badness. Arguably such focus, “providing cliched sound 
bites and easy solutions to human suffering” (Philo 2001), serves to belittle the
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experience, the distress and the, often lengthy, route to recovery. This latter has recently 
been evidenced in “Coronation Street” (ITV 2006), where a character, Mike Baldwin, 
developed and was diagnosed as having Alzheimers disease only to die within six 
months. Although the depiction of someone with this stigmatised and often hidden 
condition has received congratulation (Alzheimers Society 2006), the course of the 
condition and the social impact over years rather than months was not reflected, arguably 
because the audience could not have tolerated such exposure.
In his work Greg Philo (2001) also examined how media images are more powerful than 
personal experience in shaping concepts of what constitutes a mental health problem. He 
found that even those who had personal or family experience of a diagnosed mental 
illness reported mental illness in terms of social badness rather than through their lived 
experience. This suggests that the way in which the media portrays mental illness as 
dangerous and undesirable somehow enables the public to disassociate any personal 
experiences from being so defined. Hence one is protected from association with the 
stigmatised, socially unacceptable phenomenon.
As I progress through this literature review the dearth of literature on mental health 
problems of old age becomes apparent. Popular perceptions of mental health problems in 
old age have not been explored, even within the extensive work on dementia that I look at 
in the next chapter.
In summary thus far it appears that, in order to be classified as mentally ill, from a lay 
perspective, one is defined as socially bad and/or as a risk to society. However, there 
emerges ambivalence about howto classify mental health problems within one’s own 
experience and/or when people are defined as unfortunate rather than bad.
Before I move away from the popular perspective of mental health and illness, I will 
spend some time exploring the phenomenon of stigma as it influences perception of both 
mental health and old age, not solely from a popular lay perspective. It is the ongoing
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presence and nature of stigma that facilitates caricatures of mental illness as bad and 
dangerous to readily persist and remain embedded within a culture.
3.2.2 Stigma
Stigma is the discreditation of a person due to the stereotypical view of an aspect of their 
social identity, making them “unacceptable or inferior beings” (Scambler 1997 p i73).
The stigmatised person becomes not quite human and is not accorded the same degree of 
respect and regard that the uncontaminated receive (Goffinan 1964). Hence the socially 
bad person, as discussed above, is judged by their negative attribute. According to 
Goffinan there are two distinct types of stigma, the “discrediting” and the “discreditable”. 
A discrediting stigma prevents others from perceiving and treating the person according 
to any attribute other than that of the dominant label. Thus the person diagnosed with 
schizophrenia is determined as bad and dangerous and the person with dementia is treated 
as a diseased object (Kitwood 1997) rather than, for example, as a mother, a teacher and 
an expert chess player.
A discreditable stigma is not visible or known. People try to hide their condition in the 
hope that they will not be socially affected by it, due to the fear and behaviour it may 
provoke in others. Scambler (1997), for example, writes of people who do not disclose 
their diagnosis of epilepsy. Attempts to.hide the stigmatised attribute are also made by 
friends and relatives (Simpson et al 1995) who may use complicated rationale to explain 
away their loved one’s behaviour in terms of anything but a discreditable illness.
The general public hold media portrayals of mental illness, such as those seen in soap 
operas, as more accurate in definition than that of their own experience (Philo 2001).
This potential extreme of definition enables stigma to be avoided. Lindsay Prior (1993) 
described that the patients he studied, in a mental health institution, did not term 
themselves as having a mental illness even though they recognised such problems in 
other people. Rather they used euphemisms associated with a nervous disposition or 
described physical symptoms as if to give credence to their presence in the establishment.
47
A small number of people did acknowledge some sort of mental illness, particularly for 
depression.
“...that they suffer with their nerves, that they come from a nervous family, that they 
are constantly bothered with their nerves, that they feel unwell or just not themselves 
or more likely refer to some general notion of dis-ease. Sometimes they point 
towards specific somatic conditions -  excessive sweating, constipation, pains in the 
neck, stomach aches, giddy spells and sometimes even specific (but imagined) 
organic conditions of the liver, heart or kidney”
Prior (1993 p161)
Description of stigma can be linked with that of the labelling theory in that those 
attributed with a mental illness label are discriminated against (Rosenfield 1997).
The labelling theory suggests that the diagnostic tag of a mental illness is what causes 
certain behaviours to occur. Tomas Scheff (1966) used labelling theory to explain and 
define mental illness in terms of violation from the social norms (Porter 1998). Those 
who do not follow social norms are labelled as mentally ill. In this way the role of the 
deviant patient is identified and maintained within certain structures in society. The role, 
as affected by the stigma, is exhibited both in 1he behaviour of the person attributed with 
the label and also in the response of others to him/her. Thus stigma is both causative of 
and caused by the attributed label.
As with stigma, labeling theory is sub-divided into primary and secondary deviance. It 
claims that a certain degree of deviation (primary) from the norm is denied, in order that 
the status quo is not challenged. For example, a man who has become more forgetful and 
loses his way home is excused this due to ageing or everyday stress. It is only when 
secondary deviation, such as walking down the central reservation of a dual carriageway 
or increasingly losing objects, is construed, that a mental illness “label” is attributed.
Once labeled as mentally ill the person is said to take on certain roles expected of that 
diagnostic label (Goffinan 1961, Scheff 1966), they will never be seen as quite the same 
again. Such defined roles are emphasised by the language and actions of those around 
people with mental illness, undermining the person, as evidenced in Goffinan’s (1961) 
account of thq Asylum. The person is disempowered and socially excluded, arguably as 
society desires them to be.
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In criticism of this perspective is the argument that the attribution of a diagnostic label is 
not always perceived as negative. For example, some take comfort in having feelings and 
behaviour thus explained and find it reassuring to be less unique and extraordinary. This 
has been demonstrated for people diagnosed with dementia who found diagnosis 
reassuring in that they felt less alone and less scared (McKillup 2002). Another 
contention with the theory is that the labels described are those of psychiatric medicine 
rather than reflective of the popular view of mental illness. Pilgrim and Rogers (1999 
pi 5) cite the example of schizophrenia, thus classified by psychiatrists but not by the 
general public. The theory suggests that, through labels, mental illness is socially 
negotiated, yet it seems to apply only from a professional perspective rather than 
reflective of the attributions of the public who may hold a more nebulous generic 
perception of what is socially unusual.
People with mental illness are stigmatised, not only because they do not fit in, but also 
because of associated popular fear. Arguably legislation and the way in which services 
are organised, commencing with the Lunacy Act of 1890 (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999), 
serves to emphasise stigma by controlling the whereabouts of those legally defined as 
being mentally ill. Despite ongoing changes in mental health legislation and the closure 
of large institutions, replaced by mental health care in the community, the stigma of 
mental illness persists. As well as physical exclusion from society, people with mental 
health problems have long been denied involvement in their own care and in 
consulatation about mental health service provision. While recent political direction (e.g. 
DoH 1999) seeks to address these issues the burden of historical exclusion will take time 
to dissipate.
In examining the changes in perception about stigma since the advent of community care, 
Crawford and Brown (2002) conclude that stigma has become less a burden that is placed 
upon institutionalised people who have been given a diagnostic label and more an issue 
of wider social exclusion. In their study, examining community mental health nursing 
visits with people with mental health problems in their own homes, they noted that
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nurses used euphemisms such as “it’s like a friend coming to visit” rather lhan openly 
acknowledging the reasons for their visits. Such covert pretence, even between involved 
parties, arguably serves to ensure that negative attitudes persist. In a similar, single 
centre, study with low participant numbers, Rosenfield (1997), looking at the effect of 
stigma on life satisfaction, suggested that while stigma can be minimised through “high 
quality services”, the provision of such service can perpetuate a social bubble in which 
the person with mental illness exists in exclusion from the wider world that continues to 
stigmatise him/her. Such criticism is often raised against day care facilities for an 
exclusive client group, such as people with dementia.
Older people with mental illness may experience double stigma due to the combination of 
their diagnosis and their chronological age. Ageism, inequality and stigma due to age, 
has been less studied than other inequalities and can often been exhibited through the use 
of professional power (see Chapter 2). Its presence is evidenced within the theory of 
structured dependency, as discussed in Chapter 1 (p i5) and in societal actions such as the 
exclusion from breast screening of women above the age of 65. Older people are denied 
their rights as citizens due to ageist assumptions of homogeneity and assumed infirmity 
(Turner 1989, Higgs 1997).
Negative stereotypes about age abound within our culture. It is difficult to find a 
humorous birthday card that does not allude to the negativity of growing old. The youth 
culture demands that we strive to appear younger than our years and avoid the perceived 
inflexibility and decrepitude of old age (Bytheway 1995). Despite lack of evidence an 
impression that old age is primarily a time for health problems and dependency persists 
(Arber and Ginn 1991, Fries 2002). This is emphasised by, often alarmist, reporting that 
the older population is rising to the extent that society cannot provide financial or 
functional support, as discussed above (pi6). Older people themselves can, due to 
ageism, live with feelings of failure, pointlessness and disintegration (Hazan 2000) as can 
others stigmatised by their pejorative societal label.
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An interesting aspect of ageing and ageism is that, like mental illness, it is always treated 
as something external to oneself. Unlike other campaigns against unjust negative bias, 
such as race, gender or sexuality, and indeed mental illness, those campaigning rarely 
place themselves among the abused (Coleman and O’Hanlon 2004).
As I have suggested, the combination of stigma associated with both mental illness and 
ageing means that older people with mental health problems can experience a double 
stigma. Add to this that the majority of older people in hospital are women and this can 
been seen as triple jeopardy (Bytheway 1995). Golander and Raz (1996) in their 
examination of how older people who have dementia in nursing homes are seen, 
succinctly describe how stigma is attributed differently by different societal groups. In 
attributing dementia to other older residents people ensure that they never quite reach the 
realms of the discreditable (Goffinan 1964).
“If elders are society’s others, then demented elders are elderly peoples’ others.”
(Golander and Raz 1996)
I now move on to an examination of the medical perspectives of mental illness. The 
available literature is huge, but again often lacking in focus with regard to the issues of 
mental health problems in old age other than dementia.
3.3 Medical Models
The psychiatric medical perspective suggests that mental illness comprises symptoms and 
behaviours that are fundamentally biological in origin. However, for some conditions, 
for example schizophrenia, there is a lack of conclusive supporting biological evidence.
In the minds of some, this lack of empirical rigour renders mental illness less plausible 
than medical illness. This presence of less scientific evidence is indicated in the 
Cartesian split (Lloyd 1996, see p5) between general medicine and mental health 
services. The French philosopher Descartes perceived the body and the mind as two 
separate entities, the former being comprehensible in terms of science whereas the latter 
could only be understood through introspection. An illness can thus be defined as either
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somatic, of the body, or psychic, of the mind. Psychiatry has, since the 1940s, been 
defined as separate and different from neurology and general medicine as, although both 
sets of condition originate within brain function, mental illness exhibits through 
behaviour (Prior 1993). Therefore, although mental illness is medicalised it does not 
exist within the same paradigm as physical illness.
Despite political and service rhetoric the Cartesian dualism between mind and body 
divisions exists and perpetuates both in professional education and speciality and in 
service provision (Harrison 2006a) and although we have moved away from the rural 
asylums, services for those with mental and physical illness remain largely separate. A 
gulf between the philosophies and behaviours of general and psychiatric nurses was 
recognised by Peplau (1964). When presented with a patient with a headache, the 
general nurse assumes a physical cause and the psychiatric nurse assumes an emotional 
link, neither readily considers that which is seen to be within the territory of the other.
Those who defend the position of medical psychiatry, as founded in positivist science, 
cite the efficacy of pharmaceutical intervention as evidence that bodily chemistry must 
have been disturbed in order to be remedied. However, critics suggest that suppression of 
symptoms does not necessarily mean that they have been cured through intervention.
The lack of recordable signs of disease, that is bodily markers such as changes in blood 
pressure or skin pallor, rather than perceived symptoms exhibited through what one says 
or does, is seen as a fundamental problem in firmly placing mental illnesses as biological 
diseases. The most notable in such criticism was Thomas Szasz (1966) who defined 
mental illness as a myth. Szasz believed that for an illness to exist it has to be perceived 
as such by both the doctor and the un-well person, and it must have a clear cause and 
signs. He suggested that the attribution of a medical diagnosis to certain forms of 
behaviour, notably hysteria, served to exonerate people from responsibility for their 
behaviour.
This position contradicted that of Charcot who sought this very differentiation in order to 
medically define hysteria (Busfield 2000), thus defining people as unwell rather than as
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malingering. Such an attribute, that is one of medical illness, aligns the “patient” within 
the sick role (Parsons 1951) and, as such in need of treatment and deferring to the 
expertise of the medical profession. Mental illnesses were, Szasz (1966) believed, 
created through moral and political necessity rather than in the presence of scientific 
evidence; physical illnesses are discovered whereas mental illnesses are invented, he 
asserted.
This deconstruction of the biological model of mental illness is clearly extreme and, as 
such has been much critisised particularly due to Szasz’ assumptions that treatment 
always occurs without consent due to the lack of awareness of the problem in the person 
affected. Many people accept treatment for mental illness readily (Prior 1993) and 
organic signs are often present (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999). One can have diabetes 
without clear cause and one can have a headache with no visible signs. However, the 
argument that diagnoses are used as forms of moral judgement and social control is 
evident in changing patterns of psychiatric diagnoses in line with the political and moral 
thinking. For example, neither having children out of wedlock nor homosexuality are 
currently defined as mental illnesses, but they once were. Conversely new psychiatric 
diagnoses emerge, arguably in response to the demands of society. Hence hyperactivity 
(attention deficit disorder) and situation specific stress (post-traumatic stress disorder) 
have become classified as psychiatric illnesses (WHO 1993).
Current services for people with mental health problems are based upon the assumption 
that the identified disease can potentially be cured. Doctors, and other mental health 
workers, seek to identify people and their problems through diagnosis and subsequently 
prescribe a course of action aimed at curing or easing the position (Pilgrim and Rogers
1999). For example Box 3.1 shows the diagnostic criteria for depression as defined by 
the World Health Organisation in the International Classification of Diseases, tenth 
version (WHO 1993). When a person is diagnosed as having depression the practitioner 
may prescribe anti-depressant therapy and anticipate amelioration of symptoms, for 
example, sleep patterns and appetite may improve.
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Much of the research evidence and literature about mental health and illness reflects the 
dominance of the illness framework, for example, a recent publication on depression in 
later life (Manthorpe and Diffe 2005) seeks to provide a broad conceptualisation of the 
condition, suggesting that biological, psychological and social models are not used in 
isolation from each other and, in practice, a combination of approaches are used. 
However, the majority of the text goes on to describe depression and its treatment from 
the predominant perspective of mental health service providers, in absence of sufficient 
evidence from other perspectives to do otherwise. The authors acknowledge that this 
imbalance is due to a dearth o f research into other approaches and perspectives.
Box 3.1 F32 Depressive Episode (WHO 1993)
For more than 2 w eeks, the individual usually suffers 
from dep ressed  mood, loss of interest and enjoyment 
and reduced energy leading to increased  fatigability and 
diminished activity. Marked tiredness after only slight 
effort is com m on. O ther common sym ptom s are:
A -  reduced concentration and attention 
B -  reduced self-esteem  and self-confidence 
C -  ideas of guilt and unw orthiness (even in mild type of 
episode)
D -  bleak and pessim istic view of the future 
E -  ideas or acts of self-harm or suicide 
F -  disturbed sleep 
G -  diminished appetite
Joan Busfield (2000) suggests that the hierarchical position o f medicine in determining 
and dominating the disease agenda is helped by recent advances in science, notably 
genetics, which indicate the likelihood o f biological influences in the development of 
mental illness. She goes on to emphasise the position of doctors as powerful and also 
suggests that, for people with mental health problems and for society, the diagnosis o f a 
disease holds attraction as it suggests that there is a problem in the body rather than in the 
individual or in the wider society. Responsibility therefore lies with neither the 
individual nor the dominant culture. Crossley’s (2000) view o f emotion, psychiatry and 
social order suggests that when emotions are seen as inauthentic, insincere or abnormal, 
they are perceived as a threat to social order. If  the deviance cannot be brought back into
54
line, psychiatry is asked to step in. The “illness” becomes an objective medical reality, 
independent of external influence. It is owned as a mental health problem and addressed 
solely as such. Proposed changes to mental health legislation (see p44) appear to reflect 
this element of social order by aspiring to lock away people who are perceived to be a 
risk.
Up until now I have described a purist medical perspective; however it is currently rare 
for any psychiatrist to claim that explanation for mental illness is founded in biology 
alone. More often practitioners take an approach that encompasses some combination of 
the theory explored below. Although there is now a preference to talk in terms of mental 
health problems rather than psychiatric illness, as I do in this research, the medical model 
continues to hold the dominant power and continues to carry enormous political and 
professional credibility and authority (Beresford 2002) in the way that services are 
legislated for and organised.
Here I have described the historical domination of psychiatric diagnosis as the 
determinant of treatment and of the mental health service provided. In recent years 
however there have been moves towards perceiving mental health problems as more than 
a diagnostic condition that can be medically treated and more as a social condition with 
which one can be enabled to survive.
3.4 New Perspectives in Mental Health Service Provision
There is a growing body of evidence examining alternatives to the medical approach in 
the care and support for people with severe mental health problems, such as 
schizophrenia, as defined within the National Service Framework (DoH 1999). The Tidal 
Model, as described by Phil Barker (2001), encourages practitioners to help those with 
mental health problems to ride the highs and lows of their mental health problems, and to 
develop methods of coping with their disability. Such a “Recovery Model” (Armstrong 
1993, Repper and Perkins 2003) describes a philosophical approach aimed at enabling 
people, who are disabled by a mental health problem and the associated social stigma and
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exclusion. The approach aims to help people to use their capabilities and personal 
attributes in order to become comfortable with their problems, rather than striving against 
the deficits attributed to them through diagnostic definition. Such approaches operate in 
tandem with the use of medication, prescribed in line with medical diagnosis. I explore 
the application of such models, as they relate to dementia care, in the next chapter.
In looking towards the development of these, more social, models of mental illness that 
oppose the dominance of the medical model, activists are engaged in considering the 
applicability of the social model of disability to mental health problems whereby mental 
distress is perceived as something that incurs social barriers, discrimination and 
oppression, as opposed to being seen as pathological and inevitably tragic (Beresford
2002). As described within the recovery model, focus is placed on normality rather than 
difference. The disability movement has facilitated marked improvement in social 
inclusion and it is anticipated that a social model of disturbance of mind and distress 
could do likewise for those with mental health problems. There is currently much 
political activity aimed at promoting social inclusion for people with mental health 
problems (Social Exclusion Unit 2006). In the field of dementia Jane Gilliard (2002) 
suggests that dementia should be seen as a disability rather than a disease as I go on to 
discuss in Chapter 4.
However, despite such efforts, and works by sociologists in the past, for example Brown 
and Harris’s (1978) work on social influences in depression, the field of research around 
mental health and illness remains dominated by pharmacology and genetics. A call for 
more research that incorporates the psychological and the social is needed in order to 
redress this imbalance (Busfield 2000).
Mental health practice trends, with regard to non-medical approaches, change with time 
and dominant theory. Schools of thought vary from the psychoanalytical to the cognitive 
behavioural, to the person centred approaches as described within the recovery model, 
above, and by Tom Kitwood and others with regard to dementia (p95). Although such 
models are growing in influence and application they remain a lesser force than that of
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biological psychiatry. Within National Health Service settings associated therapies and 
philosophical approaches still tend to be adjuncts to medical intervention and 
recommended through a system within which medical psychiatry dominates and 
prescribes. I now move on to look at some of these approaches.
3.5 Psychological Perspectives
There are many streams of psychoanalysis, which I do not explore here particularly as 
such approaches remain the exception rather than the rule in the UK The underlying 
principle of psychoanalytical approaches is that the mind is separated into the conscious 
and die unconscious and that mental health imbalance occurs when the conscious and the 
unconscious are out of alignment. Therapy aims to examine cause, by exploring personal 
history, and thus improve self awareness and ability to cope with one’s inner conflicts. 
The main criticism of these approaches is that, like biomedicine, they assume a single 
explanation for distress. In the medical model this is biological imperfections and here it 
is imperfections of the mind. As well as minimising the impact of biology it also fails to 
account for here and now social pressures that may be causative in distress.
Cognitive and behavioural psychology provides an alternative to the psychoanalytic 
school by viewing mental distress in terms of precursors and response (Lloyd 1991). 
Mental health problems are defined within behavioural psychology, as exhibited through 
maladaptive behaviour, outside the realms of normality for society. This correlates with 
the popular view as discussed above. In using this approach, therapists consider both the 
cause and the inability to cope or adapt, particularly in the presence of life changing 
events, such as bereavement or illness. How one can adapt is examined and treated in 
terms of life experience, thought and behavioural responses. Cognitive behavioural 
therapy addresses thoughts, feelings and actions by examining those thoughts and 
behaviours that provoke the “maladaptive” presentation (Kennedy 2000).
In recent years the use of cognitive behavioural approaches have increased in mental 
health circles with recent innovations focussing on the use of this approach for helping
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people with psychosis address their distress (Kingdon and Turkington 2002). It is 
recommended as the treatment of choice, in combination with medication, for depression, 
and particularly for depression in old age where research studies have shown clear 
efficacy (DoH 2001a, NICE 2004). However, while there is growing evidence around 
the efficacy of cognitive approaches in addressing psychiatric symptoms (DoH 1999, 
2001a) concern centres on die medicalisation of the approach in that treatment is initiated 
following medical diagnosis thus the parameters of normality and abnormality continue 
to be defined within the medical paradigm.
Up until this point in this chapter, it is apparent that there exist, according to the 
literature, two core and diverse conceptualisations of mental health problems: the popular 
lay view of social badness and the medical view of biological disease. However, both in 
the popular and professional views, I have noted some potential for variation and 
ambivalence. For the general public there seem to be some problems, particularly when 
they are within one’s own social network, which are not as bad as being properly 
mentally ill. For professionals, approaches such as cognitive behavioural therapy and 
recovery models suggest that medical diagnosis may not be seen as the sole descriptor of 
the phenomenon.
I now move on to examine how sociological theory fits in with the discussion so far. I 
have already discussed the labelling theory as it pertains to stigma (p48).
3.6 Sociological Perspectives
Sociological theories on mental health and illness vary with the differing sociological 
philosophies. Examining this literature underlines the nebulous nature and lack of clarity 
around what constitutes a mental health problem.
The Durkheimian structural description of mental illness is one of social causation.
Social forces determine social life, thus mental illness is defined as that which is 
abnormal, in order to strengthen the position of the normal (Busfield 2000). The starting
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point, in relation to mental illnesses, is the medical diagnosis with social causes attributed 
to various diagnoses. In their seminal work Brown and Harris (1978) explain depression, 
for women, in terms of socially generated vulnerability and loss, for example with 
poverty and adverse life events being cited as causative. Indeed social disadvantage is 
often seen as causative in mental ill health with Bury (2000) noting that class and gender 
are often cited, with age being less so. Others note race and ethnicity as causative in light 
of the over representative presence of the non-white population in admissions to 
psychiatric services (Blackmore and Boneham 1994).
Alongside this definition and categorisation, a system of social control exists in order to 
aid the smooth running of society. Arguably therefore this is not a theoretical perspective 
of mental illness at all, merely a further examination of an assumed biomedical reality 
and the resultant behaviour of society. The attraction of theories of social causation to 
psychiatry is that it adds empirical rigour to the discipline in the absence of biological 
evidence, as discussed above.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the social constructionist view seeks to identify the taken for 
granted view, and acknowledges that such a view is dependent on context, culture and 
geography. How mental health problems are socially constructed is a product of 
individual perceptions in the presence of wider societal influences; where one lives, the 
specific social setting and the laws that govern the definition and social processes. Thus 
mental illness in England is different to mental illness in another country, and mental 
illness in a general hospital may be different to mental illness in the wider community.
Foucault (1974) talked of the interconnectedness between knowledge and perceived 
reality, defining the two as ever-changing with time and development, with no clarity that 
any one perception is any more real than another. Hence, the social construction of a 
thing, for example mental illness, is necessarily transient and nebulous and cannot 
consistently be construed as the product of society but rather as a combination of biology, 
individual characteristics and societal influences. Foucault, examining “madness and 
civilisation” (1967) described madness in terms of unreason and irrationality, linking it
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with the combination of thought, feelings and behaviour in criticism of those who tended 
to concentrate on either the biological or the behaviour. Such unreason and irrationality 
may be noted in one place but not in another, by one element of society and not by 
another.
In an attempt to untangle the differing views about mental illness within social 
constructionist theory, Pilgrim and Rogers (1999 pl9) describe three core elements. 
Firstly questions are asked about the existence of the phenomena at all, as asserted by 
Szasz (1966, see p52). Secondly examination takes place into the potential creation of 
the phenomenon by psychiatric knowledge and professional interpretation. Thirdly, 
issues of social control and conformity are examined as influential in a similar way to the 
exploration of structured dependency (p36). Hence in seeking to discover what 
constitutes a mental health problem in the general hospital setting, I need to see if such 
problems exist for those in the setting. I need to find out how mental health problems are 
defined and also consider the organisational and political systems that may influence the 
perceptions.
Stephen Hacking (1999) terms the original definitions of social retardation and madness 
as forms of social control, which due to liberalisation and an increasing focus on 
community integration have had to be modified with time in order to enhance 
acceptability, with an arguable aim of reducing societal fear. Such changing definitions 
of what constitutes a mental illness are reflected in changing policy and service 
boundaries, as I illustrate below.
Theories of social realism can be viewed as complementary to the description of 
constructionism, whereby one’s perceptions of reality are influenced by some societal 
facts and structures. Such a position potentially perpetuates the status quo whereby the 
power of influencing societal view remains with professionals who weald scientific fact 
as the major influence. Social realist theorists use the term “social framing” rather than 
“social construction” (Busfield 2000) indicating that the concept, in this case mental 
illness, is placed firmly within a framework of perceived reality dependent upon the
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historical and geographical context of the time. Framing is evident in the classification of 
diseases and within mental health law. Those who argue in favour of framing, rather than 
constructing, suggest that the framing approach is tighter and more precise (Busfield 
2000).
In terms of mental health and illness, psychiatric knowledge and the use of law to manage 
mental illness are seen as the major influence in society’s perception of the phenomena 
and are thus exaggerated and postulated further. Such a position is further embedded 
through research that focuses on the professional rather than the popular perception, as if 
it reflects a wider view. This seems to explain why current political imperatives, in 
health and elsewhere, aimed at lay service user involvement, founded in the philosophy 
of consumer power is finding it difficult to emerge into a position of power. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, organisational and professional power dominate the agenda with 
each reflecting and perpetuating the powerful position of the other. The consumer, 
particularly if they are old and/or mentally unwell and thus defined as having lesser social 
standing, remains submerged under the social constructions of medicine and organisation.
The potential criticisms of this approach are two-fold; firstly there is a danger that the 
realist view focuses too heavily on the macro issues of society, for example on the 
provision of mental health service, with insufficient attention to the micro perceptions of 
those within the experience. Second is concern over the use of the word realism in that it 
does not reflect the essence and fluidity of the changing social world that is fundamental 
within its philosophy. To an extent this research seeks to take on a critical realist stance 
in order to bring together understandings of mental health problems as ‘real’ in that they 
have a physiology and a psychopathology, and the ways in which these underlying 
processes are constructed and reconstructed in medical setting. I seek to discover 
whether the perceptions of individuals, within a specific setting, are a reflection of a 
particular view; that is whether people in the general hospital setting perceive mental 
health problems in old age in the terms of psychiatric medical definition.
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Before concluding this chapter, I consider how the political response to the social 
problem of mental illness, over the years, has been affected by or causative of 
perspectives of mental health and illness.
3.6 Political Perspectives
In Chapter 1 1 described the historical development of mental health services in England. 
In this section I look at some of the political drivers as they are evident in change in 
service provision and thus in defining the political, and indeed legal, description of what 
constitutes a mental health problem. I draw the literature largely from the works of 
Kathleen Jones (1993) and Anne Rogers and David Pilgrim (2001).
Again I start at the time of the development of rural asylums. As I have discussed (p4) 
the establishment of these havens, following the Lunacy Act of 1845, separated the mad 
from other undesirables within society. It was anticipated that the peace, order and expert 
attention, from die emerging medical speciality of psychiatry, would restore them to 
social acceptability. Such separation was facilitated by the emerging definitions of 
mental illness by medical category, which at the time was often associated with immoral 
behaviour such as masturbation (Rogers and Pilgim 2002 p43).
Once the public asylums existed the numbers of those within them, and therefore defined 
as being mentally ill, quadrupled (Scull 1979). Several reasons are cited for this 
escalation ranging from increasing incidence of mental illness to an increase in society’s 
will to be benevolent towards the unfortunates within it. Scull (1979) asserts, however, 
that the most plausible reason is that the new profession of psychiatry expanded the 
definition of what constituted a mental illness and therefore was required to treat more 
people. One may also suggest that medical psychiatry had an interest in developing a 
credible power base.
The descriptions of shell shock, as I further explore in the next chapter, during the First 
World War, served to bring depression within the scope for asylum care. Thus by the
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1920s, the asylums were occupied by those originally defined as lunatics due to their 
socially unacceptable behaviour and those defined since, by psychiatry, as having 
neurotic and psychotic conditions (Jones 1993). In 1930, the Mental Treatment Act 
changed terminology and Asylums became Mental Hospitals, thus emphasising the 
definition of these problems as illnesses. ('■:
With the development of the Nation Health Service psychiatry, as a medical speciality, 
was granted equal credibility with general medicine. Psychiatric services formed part of 
the new organisation. In its inception it was anticipated that mental hospitals and 
psychiatrists would deal with psychosis, leaving neurosis to general medicine, but, as I 
have already noted when discussing the development of mental health services in general 
hospitals (p7), this did not occur. Psychiatric services maintained control of the mental 
health agenda. The Mental Health Acts of both 1959 and 1983 facilitated this broad, all 
encompassing focus, by using very broad definitions of mental illness. The 1983 Act 
excludes people whose condition is felt not to be medically treatable, for example 
alcoholism, learning disability and personality disorder. Those who fall into these 
categories are no longer deemed to be mentally ill. The Act also introduced the concept 
of dangerousness as the reason for compulsory detention, with those perceived as a risk 
to themselves or others potentially subject to compulsory detention and treatment.
Despite the major service changes brought about by the development of community 
models of care, and the resultant loss in service capacity to provide care for so many 
people with mental health problems, it was not until the publication of the National 
Service Framework for Mental Health (DoH 1999) that attention was politically drawn 
again to the differentiation between major and minor mental illness. As I have stated 
elsewhere, this document makes clear that, for adults of working age, a mental illness 
defined as needing specialist service is “severe and enduring”, or to coin old terminology 
psychosis or lunacy.
It is evident that policy dictates what is organisationally defined as constituting a mental 
health problem. Such direction has an influence on society members or, one may argue,
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society members have an influence upon the creation of that policy. That mental health 
services now only provide for the most severely unwell is in line with the general view of 
extremes of socially bad behaviour; however, the descriptors and definitions differ.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined the various ways in which mental illness is viewed from 
differing social and philosophical perspectives. I suggest that it is not possible to claim 
that any one perspective holds more credibility or is any more “real” than any other. 
Examination of the literature suggests that one’s perception of mental illness depends 
upon one’s relationship with it. Thus professionals are likely to favour the dominant 
views integral to their needs in fulfilling their jobs. For health professionals this is likely 
to be a combination of the dominant biomedical assumption that mental illness is founded 
in biological structures, with a combination of the legal requirements of mental health 
law at the time. A popular lay view is more likely to reflect mental illness as unusual 
behaviour and social unacceptability, potentially influenced by images of dangerousness 
from the media. It is evident that perceptions of mental illness change with time and may 
be politically driven. However, the view of any member of society is likely to be 
influenced by the broad pejorative view rendering mental illness highly stigmatised and 
to be avoided.
It is my contention that the biomedical setting of a general hospital is a potentially 
confusing setting in which to work out what constitutes a mental health problem. The 
professionals who work there may work from a different paradigm from staff in mental 
health services and others in the setting. Patients and relatives, may have yet different 
views of what constitutes normality and abnormality in a strictly organised environment.
I also argue that the broad perspectives of mental health problems described in this 
chapter are not inclusive of perspectives about mental health problems in old age. They 
rather define, as is reflected in government policy, perceptions of the severe mental 
illnesses associated with “adults of working age” (DoH 1999).
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In the next chapter I go on to explore specific perceptions, from the literature, around 
mental health problems in old age. I explore the literature around experiences of 
depression, dementia and delirium and consider how they are perceived. I spend more 
time examining dementia and depression, in the presence of a wider literature, 
particularly around dementia. As in this chapter I consider how perspectives have 
changed over time and consider whether or not mental health problems in old age are 
considered using the same criteria as described here.
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Chapter 4
Perspectives of Mental Health Problems in Old Age
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I examine the literature as it relates to perspectives on mental health 
problems in old age. I have already noted that much of the literature on mental health 
and illness does not separate issues as they pertain to older adults and yet policy has 
recently made clear demarcation by being specific about the issues for adults of working 
age. Here I particularly seek to examine potential contradictions between political, 
medical and lay perceptions of mental health conditions in older people as opposed to 
their younger counterparts.
On many occasions in this chapter I allude to the lack of research examining the issues of 
mental health problems in old age. However, within the last 20 to 30 years there has 
been a growing interest in the study of dementia, both from the biomedical and 
psychosocial standpoints. Arguably this focus has started to bring dementia out of the 
stigmatised cold and it is beginning to move towards being accepted as a social disability 
rather than a mental illness, as I go on to explore. The experiences of depression and 
delirium, on the other hand, are under-researched and, I suggest, without a clear place in 
the current state of service and psychiatric organisation. In biomedical terms they are 
both readily defined as illness but not necessarily recognised and addressed as such. This 
lack of attention, particularly of depression, runs counter to an escalation of the 
medicalisation and social acceptance of the stress related, readily diagnosed and treated 
condition in younger adults.
Before I explore further the perspectives and experiences of mental health problems in 
old age I start this chapter as I ended the last, by focussing on political direction in 
consideration of the impact on perceptions. Here I concentrate on the broad current 
political agenda as it pertains to health care and older people, highlighting the nebulous
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position of this social group. Next I look at mental health service provision in general 
hospitals, considering how services have developed, and the literature around experience 
and efficacy. I then move on to consider depression as perceptions about it have changed 
with time, with its medicalisation applying to the general population but maybe not to 
older people. I explore the limited literature on delirium, or acute confiisional states, 
before looking at the large amount that has been written about dementia, concentrating on 
that which pertains to the experience of people with dementia in the general hospital 
setting.
I conclude, as I did in the last chapter, that there is a clear differential in perceptions 
about mental health problems in old age compared with those in younger adults, with less 
clarity about what constitutes a mental illness in old age. Older people with mental 
health problems seem to have fallen out of the mental health agenda and have not yet 
arrived within the long term conditions agenda for older people with general health 
problems. The lack of research in this area, other than on dementia, is very evident. I 
particularly note that die construction of depression in old age is unclear.
4.2 The Current Health Agenda for Older People
I begin this section by examining service and policy direction from the perspective of 
medical psychiatry before moving on to look at policy as it relates broadly to the health 
care of older people. Lastly I consider the impact of these, possibly conflicting, agendas, 
on older people with mental health problems.
As described in Chapter 1 (plO), in the 1970s psychiatrists who sought to specialise in the 
treatment of older people, particularly people with dementia, formed a new specialism 
separate from their colleagues who worked with younger adults. In the years that 
followed clear division developed between these two groups with psychiatric career 
pathways developing consultants into a particular branch of psychiatry (RCP 2006). As 
community care developed in the 1980s and 1990s, discrete mental health services were
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developed for each group with a clear demarcation based on the chronological age of 65. 
Such definition remained in place, largely unchallenged, until 2000.
Since the turn of the twenty-first century the UK government has, as part of its broad 
NHS Plan (DoH 2000) driven forward the programme of National Service Frameworks, 
aimed at prioritising and focusing attention on treatment and standards of care for 
targeted population groups. The National Services Framework (NSF) for mental health 
(DoH 1999) was much heralded as the vehicle to enable mental health services to 
improve into the new century. In line with bio-medically driven practice and the 
separation of services just described, the NSF focused on the perceived core business of 
mental health services, those for adults of working age. Of course this concentration of 
attention can also be attributed to the lay anxiety about societal risk and possibly also on 
institutional ageism.
As discussed in Chapter 3 (p43), popular perceptions of mental illness have long been 
associated with social badness and a fear of violence. As such the group of people with 
mental health problems who receive particular attention are those who, rightly or 
wrongly, are the most feared; that is younger adults with severe mental health problems 
and afforded diagnoses such as schizophrenia.
In arguing that institutional ageism was a feature in the development of the NSF for 
mental health (DoH 1999), I return to the theory of Structured Dependency (Townsend 
1981). Older people have, it argues, through the ongoing direction of social policy, been 
focused into a subordinate social position of dependency and invisibility. I suggest that 
the focus on mental health issues for working adults alone is evidence that such exclusion 
continues.
This overt focus on adults of working age as the population group for whom mental 
health problems and services are an issue has arguably exaggerated the separation 
between services for younger and older adults. As directed within the NSF, services for 
younger people have concentrated their efforts on those with defined severe mental
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illnesses, leaving older peoples’ services unsure of their place in the psychiatric world. In 
a focus against potential ageist bias, there has been attention to ensure that those older 
people who have those mental illnesses, defined by psychosis as severe enough, continue 
to receive mainstream services and are not moved to older peoples’ services as soon as 
they reach their 65th birthday. The questions that emerge concerns older people with 
mental health problems not perceived as severe enough.
Given that older people with mental health problems, and the service for them, do not 
now seem to fit readily into the core mental health service model, I now consider how 
they fit in with the policy direction for older people. I suggest that, in this agenda, it is 
the stigma of mental illness rather than that of age that serves again to exclude them.
The escalation in the population of older people, against a decreasing proportionate 
workforce and increasing health care costs, is, as I have discussed earlier, an issue of 
economic concern and, as such, is being addressed through focus on pension provision as 
well as through radical health service reform (DoH 2000, DoH 2005b, DoH 2006a). 
Reform aims at minimising the need for hospital care by encouraging healthy ageing and 
concentrating on die care of people with long term conditions at home. In terms of 
sociological theory, this political focus follows the work of Fries (1981) and subsequent 
others (e.g. Laslett 1989) who defined a period of “compressed morbidity” at the very 
end of life, preceded by a period of health in retirement, and potential social usefulness 
(see p i8). Current policy seeks to ensure that those who have not yet reached their 
period of compressed morbidity avoid hospital admission, and that those who are 
experiencing chronic disease receive, as far as possible, the care they need at home, as is 
often their preference and as is economically desirable. The chronic diseases described 
include breathing difficulties, diabetes, kidney problems and others. Figure 4.1 describes 
diagrammatically the perceived nature and care requirements of people with chronic 
disease. The majority, at level 1, are able to manage with minimal care and guidance 
from health services. Changes in the provision of community nursing services address 
the needs of those who require higher levels of service, particularly those 5% in level 3
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who have complex needs, who receive intensive specialist care through “case 
management” (DoH 2005b).
Figure 4.1 The Kaiser Permente Triangle. (DoH 2005b)
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intensity u se rs  of unplanned secondary  care. C are for these  patients is to 
be m anaged  using a community matron or other professional using a case  
m anagem ent approach, to anticipate, co-ordinate and join up health and 
social care.
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DoH 2005b
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It is interesting to note that the new service model for those with long term conditions 
replicates the nature of service for people with mental health problems, particularly as 
advocated within the National Service Framework (DoH 1999). That is, only those in the 
severest need require specialist intervention. However, the agendas do not come 
together, nor receive any cross-referencing with regard to approach. Issues of mental and 
physical health are not aligned. As I have already noted (pi 8), the work of Fries (1981) 
failed to define late life mental health problems within the concept o f compressed 
morbidity. Neither are they specified within the policy for the management o f long term 
conditions, even as it refers to neurological conditions. As with the division between 
young and old in the mental health agenda, this exclusion appears to reflect social stigma 
against the inclusion of mental health issues within the general health service paradigm.
It remains something of a conundrum that there exists national and international 
recognition that older people with mental health problems are a priority and yet this is 
seen as completely separate from the greater focus on acute general hospital care, 
emergency care, waiting lists and reducing bed occupancy and delayed discharges, 
although these latter are often older people with mental health problems. (RCP 2005 p40)
Box 4.1 National Service Framework for Older People (DoH 2001a) 
Extracts from Standards 4 & 7
Standard 4
Aim -  To ensu re  that older people receive the specialist help they need  in 
hospital and  that they receive maximum benefit from being in hospital.
Through Providing attention to acute confusion, depression and 
cognitive impairment.
Training of staff in recognising and  m anaging the needs of 
people with behavioural problem s.
Standard 7
Aim -  To prom ote good mental health in older people and to trea t and 
support those  older people with depression and dem entia.
Through Integrating services 
A ccessible expertise 
Educating and guiding non specialists
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The National Service Framework for Older People (DoH 2001 a) went some way towards 
embracing the mental health agenda into mainstream concerns about health service 
provision for older people with mental health problems. It includes specific standards 
with one aimed at improving general hospital care, and another aimed at improving the 
recognition and care of older people with mental health problems. While there is 
evidence of some improvement in some geographical areas (DoH 2003a), the two 
standards (Box 4.1) have not generally been seen as inter-related and thus the intention of 
the integration of mental health provision within mainstream primary and general 
hospital care remains elusive.
In recognition that additional focus is required on the needs of older people with mental 
health problems, “Everybody’s Business” (CSIP 2005), a service development guide, 
again aims towards integration of mental health services for older adults and further 
reiterates the view that the assessment of mental health should be part of generic care.
The message echoes the view that “as long as mental disorder is referred to a 
geographically and organisationally distant mental health service, on a consultation basis, 
it will remain the responsibility of mental health services rather than that of the general 
hospital” (RCP 2005). “Everybody’s Business” intends to encourage services other than 
mental health to embrace older people with mental health problems as part of their 
business and to address the issues that they bring.
“Our aim is to ensure that older adults with mental health problems, and their 
carers, have their needs met wherever they are in the system, without 
encountering discrimination or barriers to access”
(CSIP 2005 p5)
It appears that this, most recent, government guideline is evidence that political efforts 
are being made to determine the right place within a service model for issues related to 
older people with mental health problems to exist. Policy direction seems to be moving 
away from the inclusion of mental health within a psychiatric model yet such issues do 
not feature significantly in general health service provision. As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
this is evidence of the vying agendas of political power and bio-medical power, with
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professionals and organisations seeking to hold onto their sphere of influence. As this 
thesis progresses I continue to explore where this leaves the older person with mental 
health problems, particularly when they find themselves in, traditionally, the “wrong” 
setting.
In this section I have highlighted that the issues of service for older people with mental 
health problems are not readily politically embraced within either psychiatric of general 
health service models at present. I suggest that this lack of focus renders people, already 
vulnerable due to the stigmas of age and mental illness, as even more powerless and 
potentially invisible.
Before I go on to look at specific mental health problems in old age, I will spend some 
time looking at the current models of service in place for those who find themselves in 
the general hospital setting. I make some comparison with equivalent services for 
younger adults;
4.3 Service Models
In Chapter I (p2) I described the differences between the traditional model of psychiatric 
service delivery for people with mental health needs in the general hospital setting and 
the consultation/liaison model. The latter emerged and developed as a service model, for 
younger adults, following the publication of “The Health of the Nation” (DoH 1992).
This document highlighted high suicide rates in the United Kingdom and suggested the 
need for the increased presence of mental health nursing expertise within Accident and 
Emergency (A&E) departments in order to better address issues of self harm. In some 
areas such services have developed into large multi-disciplinary teams who provide 
comprehensive service for younger adults with mental health problems in the whole 
general hospital setting, not solely in A&E. Expertise focuses on the somatic elements of 
illness and the use of interpersonal skills in providing care for patients and education for 
staff. The proliferation of such services has lead to the establishment of a Faculty for
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Liaison Psychiatry, as a sub-specialism, within the Royal College of Psychiatrist in 1987 
(Lloyd and Mayou 2003, Molodynski et al 2005, RCP 2006).
In line with the political and social focus described above, services for younger adults are 
more evident than those for older people. However, this is out of line with die figures 
showing the incidence of mental health problems in general hospitals as being markedly 
higher in the older population who occupy most of the places available (CSIP 2005).
There are several potential approaches in providing mental health service expertise for 
older people in general hospitals. These are comprehensively described within “Who 
Cares Wins”, a Royal College of Psychiatry publication (RCP 2005) advocating for 
increased health service commissioning of such services. Here I concentrate on 
describing the two modes of intervention: traditional consultation and consultation/liaison 
being the modes in use at Glimster General and Chapley Hospital respectively.
“Traditional consultation” (Lipowski 1983a, Roberts 2002, Harrison 2006b) is described 
as reductionalist in theoretical background, based upon the predominant position, in 
medicine, that sees mental and physical problems as different in property and therefore 
requiring separate intervention (Roberts 2002) as discussed above. Using this philosophy 
the process of consultation is initiated by a formal referral from a physician to a 
psychiatrist. “Consultation involves diagnostic assessment and advice on management of 
a patient referred by a non-psychiatric physician.” (Lipowski 1983a). The intervention 
involves little contact with the consultee and is usually followed by a formal written 
report.
This method, of a consultation only approach, is a process with clear parameters. The 
consultee refers for an expert opinion; the consultant assesses and gives that opinion 
answering the question(s) asked, and there the process ends. The underlying theory here, 
as well as being indicative of perceived mind/body split, finds its basis within the power 
dynamics and rules of play between medical practitioners and their “lesser” colleagues.
It thus serves to perpetuate the division and maintain the basis of power through expert 
knowledge.
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The consultation/liaison mode of provision is based on an intergrationalist theoretical 
background (Roberts 2002, Harrison 2006b) whereby the patient is seen as having 
physical, social and psychological needs (Mayou 1991). Such an approach sits more 
easily within the philosophy of nursing, particularly psychiatric nursing, which has long 
subscribed to the concept of holism, a belief that the person is greater than a sum of 
his/her parts and that all behaviour is meaningful (Peplau 1964, Roberts 2002).
Using the consultation/liaison of service provision, referral, formally written or through 
informal discussion is made to the team, or an individual specialist, by any member of the 
referring team, or at the request of the patient/relative. The consultation/liaison response 
involves consultation, collaboration and liaison (Tunmore 1997, Roberts 2002, Harrison 
2006b). Consultation, rather than the traditional once only patient assessment and advice, 
described above, comprises three additional activities as well as the diagnostic, 
assessment and care management advice described above. These were originally 
described by Caplan (1970) and have since been echoed by others (Tunmore 1997, 
Roberts 2002, Harrison 2006b). The liaison specialist may assist the consultee in 
managing difficulties with a case or situation through discussion, without directly 
meeting the patient. Secondly consultation may involve advice on service development. 
Thirdly administrative consultation occurs when advice is sought on howto manage a 
service. The collaborative element of the model is concerned with professionals working 
together, using their joint expertise, with the patient, to improve health and wellbeing. 
This involves an integration of the specialist whereby s/he becomes a proxy team 
member, often of many teams. Liaison is therefore defined as a bridge between services 
involving mediation. It involves a clear educative element, with an aim of sharing 
knowledge and skill and thus influencing the service provided. In terms of mental health 
practitioners, the main increase in service providers has been from mental health liaison 
nurses. Finally, here, I examine this perspective.
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Some suggest that the major impetus, in using nurses to fulfill the liaison role, is coming 
from medicine, due to decreased junior doctors’ hours (Read 1998) or in order to absolve 
an unwanted and unpopular chore (Roberts 1997) saving medical time. This may be 
particularly so in view of the increasing demand, discussed above. Others suggest that 
developments in advanced nursing (Rolfe and Fulbrook 1998) are well suited to a 
speciality where a holistic approach and a readiness to cross professional boundaries are 
embraced (Stickley and Hall 1981, Roberts 1997).
Many claims, mostly unsubstantiated in research evidence, are made in favour of nurse 
led liaison/consultation service provision over the traditional consultation model.
Nursing intervention is said potentially to affect mortality positively following hip 
surgery (Nightingale et al 2001) and reduce violent behaviour (Sharrock and Happell
2000). Catalan et al (1980) had earlier demonstrated that there was no difference in the 
ability of nurses and doctors in appropriately assessing those people who had harmed 
themselves. Various authors claim improved service due to the presence of a dedicated 
enthusiast, rather than a psychiatrist who is not a liaison specialist who may tend to be 
“perfunctory and hazy” with little recourse to the consultee (Lipowski 1983 a, Roberts 
1997, Harrison 2006b). Improved patient satisfaction is also claimed (Roberts 1997, 
Sharrock and Happell 2000). Being approachable and open to requests for advice, from 
professions other than medicine, is said to improve rates and pertinence of referrals 
(Sensky et al 1985). The accessibility of nurses is said to positively influence the 
knowledge and skills of general hospital staff (Roberts 1997, Huyse 2000, Royal College 
of Nursing 2000, Sharrock and Happell 2000) and their attitude towards mental illness 
(Roberts 1998).
In examining two general hospital sites, each using a different model of mental health 
service, I seek to consider any effect on perceptions of mental illness due to the nature of 
the service, particular with regard to education and perceived integration.
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There is little literature on the nature and spread of specific models of service for older 
people with mental health problems in general hospitals. I summarise below two large 
and useful studies and note that they are both led, and draw their samples from, 
psychiatrists, excluding other service providers.
Both Huyse (2000), studying in Europe, and Holmes et al (2002), in the UK, report a 
wide and sporadic variety of services, few of which are perceived to meet demand and 
need. Both studies conclude that the majority would prefer a consultation/liaison model 
but use a traditional model. The barriers to change cited include achieving focus on the 
problems and in overcoming different management and logistical arrangements between 
service providers. As I have highlighted these, and other generated reports (CSIP 2005, 
RCP 2005), are led from the position of medical psychiatry. It appears that psychiatry, 
and NHS Mental Health Trust organisations are keen to dissipate the focus of their 
speciality by providing in-reach services to others, yet they are not ready to let go of 
control over the agenda. This seems to maintain division despite an apparent will to 
overcome it.
Notwithstanding the exclusivity of these studies, they highlight increasing interest in 
mental health consultation/liaison for older people and its focus on the “the 3 Ds”, 
depression, delirium and dementia. Others note that referral numbers are increasing by as 
much as 180% over 8 years (Anderton and Philpott 1991). Yet there remains consensus 
that gross under-recognition of mental health problems in old age in the general hospital 
setting is present (RCP & RCP 1995, DoH 2001a, CSIP 2005). Several studies have 
sought to determine the reasons for under recognition and referral, with suppositions that 
this is because mental illness is perceived as out of place, and therefore not sought as 
rationale for a person’s presentation. Alternatively it has been suggested that depression 
and confusion are seen as inevitable in old age and therefore seen as pointless to pursue 
(RCP 1995, Godfrey and Demby 2004). There is evidence that, despite under­
recognition, under-referral may occur due to lack of co-operation between services and 
poor processes (Scott et al 1988) or because response is slow (Lloyd 1991). Referral may
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be more readily made in order to remove a patient rather than to address need (Brooks 
1991).
Despite a stated preference in favour of a consultation/liaison model for service provision 
for older people (Holmes et al 2002) supporting research evidence remains rare. Those 
studies that have occurred generally centre on the number kid quality of referrals rather 
than on any experience and outcome for the user, their relatives or the service.
There is dispute about whether the presence of a consultation/liaison mental health 
service increases or reduces referral rate (Scott et al 1988, Anderson and Philpott 1991, 
Swan wick et al 1994, Collinson and Benbow 1997, Baheeratha and Shah 1999) with the 
difference probably due to the definition of a referral. That liaison provision improves 
the quality and specificity of referrals is agreed (Scott et al 1988, Swan wick et al 1994, 
Baheeratha and Shah 1999), with a supposition that this is due to the educational 
influence achieved through liaison. Further research is required to support evidence 
suggesting a reduction in waiting time (Collinson and Benbow 1997), improved 
recognition of mental illness, and decreased need to move to long term institutional care 
(Baheeratha and Shah 1999).
Few studies have attempted to calculate cost efficacy of improved psychiatric liaison. 
Most notably Strain et al (1991) demonstrated a reduced hospital stay, of 2 days, for older 
orthopeadic patients who had been seen by a mental health practitioner pre-operatively. 
John Holmes and Alan House have performed similar studies and replicated results in the 
UK (Holmes and House 2000a, 2000b). Baldwin et al (2004) conducted a randomized 
control trial looking at the effect of mental health liaison nursing intervention on 
diagnostic and outcome tool scores and on the use of psychiatric medication. They found 
a marginal improvement in the rates of diagnosis of depression and no measurable 
change around dementia or in outcome scores. There was no difference in length of stay 
or morbidity but there was an increased use of antidepressants. However, some 
methodological problems were noted to have potentially contaminated the findings in that 
it is likely that there was some cross-contamination particularly of the educative effect of
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the role on staff who will have used their new-found skills on the control group. This 
highlights concern about using a randomized control trial as the sole method particularly 
when seeking to consider a quality of service and its effect on practice. These findings 
may begin to support the supposition of a positive educative value in liaison consultation 
models of service and the call for improved education for general nurses in working with 
people with mental health problems in the general hospital setting (Dormer 2004).
Along with limited research evidence there exists, as described above (Huyse 2000, 
Holmes et al 2002), much support for the development of mental health 
consultation/liaison services for older people in general hospitals. Mental health 
consultation/liaison services, for older people in the UK, remain a minority service, they 
are sporadic and often lead by individual champions (Roberts 1997, Holmes et al 2002), 
However, there is a proliferation of interest. As I have already highlighted this is 
evidenced in the course of this work. When I started considering sites that provided a 
consultation/liaison model of service in 2001 1 could identify only two such sites. The 
increase in liaison provision is characterised not only by a marked increase in services, 
but also in research projects and die development of a national interest group.
In die US, despite reported wider provision of mental health consultation/liaison services, 
particularly for younger adults, a recent review was conducted to examine shortfalls in 
mental health service provision for older people with mental health problems (Bartels
2003). While conclusions do not draw comparison between the models of provision 
examined here, the report makes many policy recommendations particularly noting the 
detrimental effect of the fragmentation of physical and mental health service provision, 
recommending more shared services, and financing, and better generic education for 
those who work with older people. These suggestions are echoed by recommendations 
within “Everybody’s Business” (CSIP 2005), where a section is dedicated to advocating 
for improvements in this area.
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In this section I have examined the development of mental health consultation/liaison 
services as they escalated from the agenda of reducing suicide in younger adults. The 
wider spread of services for adults of working age, and thus the investment of resources 
therein, again suggests a difference in political drive in addressing the needs of this 
population group.
I now go on to explore the literature as it considers the experience of mental health 
problems. Here I do not focus on those older people who have ongoing “severe” 
problems such as schizophrenia, as their needs are addressed within the broad mental 
health agenda, as discussed above. First I look at the issue of depression and consider 
how it has become defined as the acceptable face of mental illness, yet maybe not so for 
older people.
4.4 Perceptions about Depression
In this section I consider the historical development of depression as an accepted mental 
health condition noting the influences of both gender and age in the medicalisation of the 
phenomenon. It emerges that, despite vast movement in social acceptability, depression 
in old age barely features within the non-medical literature. It is this literature that I 
consider first, starting with the feminist perspective. I go on to look at the medical 
perspective.
4.4.1 A Feminist Perspective
Here I precis some of the significant literature on the gendered nature of perceptions and 
definitions of mental illness, focusing particularly on that which pertains to the 
medicalisation of depression.
For many centuries hysteria, the social condition that preceded depression, as it was later 
labelled, was “the quintessential female malady” (Showalter 1985 p33). Indeed the word 
hysteria is derived from the Greek for the womb hysterion. In the late nineteenth century
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the condition, and its association with women, was the focus of much attention from the 
male dominated Darwinian psychiatric model of the time. They saw the nervous 
disposition of women as a natural part of the fragility of the female condition. The 
definition of hysteria as merely a gender specific condition was rocked in 1914 when 
World War One soldiers were seen to experience “shell shock” as a response to their 
traumatic experience. However, despite similarities in presentation, differential 
categorisation remained in place in order to perpetuate the perceived “absolute and 
natural” differences between men and women (Showalter 1985 p68).
During the equivalent World War 1 historical period the feminist movement was 
emerging. Women sought and fought for the vote and challenged the accepted role of 
female inferiority. As the twentieth century progressed and tranquilising medication was 
developed, attention towards the nervous disposition of women achieved further scrutiny. 
As I noted earlier (p4), the mental hospital population was predominantly female.
Noting that women continued to be more readily defined as neurotic, research and 
discussion on the reasons for the gender differential became the subject of much feminist 
research in the middle of the twentieth century. Potential explanations suggested that in 
defining women as mad, men continued to place them as second-rate citizens. 
Alternatively women may be diagnosed with an illness because they disclose their 
symptoms more readily than men. It is said that the male population are more likely to 
mask depression with alcohol use, and to exhibit anger rather than sadness/tears. Men are 
more likely to be institutionalised in prison for violent badness as opposed to social 
sadness (Ussher 1991). This is in line with gender and social expectation of the “stiff 
upper lip”. Depression as a diagnosis, Joan Busfield (1996) suggests, has become more 
about gender culture than biology.
In classic feminist research both Betty Frieden (1963) and Ann Oakley (1981) talk of the 
societal bonds that tied women, in the 1950s and 1960s, to the image of a gender-based 
requisite stereotype. Those who felt unable to meet the expectation, as the perfect wife 
and the perfect mother felt incompetent and inadequate, were labeled as neurotic.
Doctors readily diagnosed these women as being depressed and prescribed tranquillising
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medication, or mother’s little helpers (Rolling Stones 1967), to mask their feelings of 
inadequacy and help them get through their intolerable life style. In one study a third of 
all women patients, aged 45-59, of one GP practice were receiving such medication 
(Oakley 1981). This “problem that has no name” (Frieden 1963 p i5) was the bond that 
held housewives into the lives that society demanded of them (Ussher 1991). The 
diagnosis and the use of medication were defined to be a form of social control.
Although anti-depressants continue to be prescribed in large numbers, with prescription 
numbers increasing from 8.9 million in 1991 to 26.3 million in 2002 (Department of 
Health Statistics 2003), I have not uncovered more recent research considering any 
ongoing potential rationale suggesting that such treatment continues to be used as a form 
of social control for women. It is interesting to note that the cohort of older people, 
mostly women, who I have interviewed for this research are potentially of the same 
generational cohort as Frieden and Oakleys’ women in the 1960s.
I seek to investigate the experience and perceptions of depression for older people in the 
general hospital setting, and to consider whether or not it continues to constitute a form of 
social control associated with gender, and also possibly with old age. I consider their 
different social position, as it is now and as it was in the 1950-60s, as I explore the 
phenomenon of depression further in Chapter 7.
Before I examine further the development of depression as a biomedical condition, since 
the recognition of shell shock, I consider depression as a social phenomenon from angles 
other than the feminist. I also consider age related differentials evident within the 
literature.
4.4.2 Depression as a Social Issue
There has been a proliferation of lay interest and acceptance of depression as a life 
experience as evidenced through media coverage in media chat shows, discussions in 
popular magazines and in lay literature (e.g. Cembrowicz and Kingham 2002, Massey
2004). It is acknowledged that more work days, 42% of the total, are lost to stress and
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depression-related issues than any other (DoH 2005a). The social pressure and the 
demands of modem life are cited as causative. As Joan Busfield declared back in 1986 
(p52) “society is the pathology, rather than the body or the mind”. Depression appears to 
have become the acceptable face of mental illness as evidenced by Lindsey Prior (1993) 
in relating that patients in psychiatric wards more readily acknowledged depression, and 
suffering with their nerves, but avoided being associated with stigmatized conditions such 
as schizophrenia (p47). General use of the word “depression”, to describe a feeling of 
being glum or fed up, is disappearing from lay vocabulary as it has developed into a 
medical condition.
I have already demonstrated the escalation in the prescription of anti-depressant 
medications, with a particular increase since the introduction of the newer anti­
depressants, such as Prozac. The escalation has lead to descriptions of a “prozac 
generation” (Marchant 2000) who are readily defined as being medically and therefore 
biologically depressed. There is, however, no evidence of an equivalent acceptance of 
depression in old age as evidenced either in drug prescribing or in the level of social 
attention.
A conceptualisation of depression as multi-faceted and with multiple potential causes is 
shared with those from both sociological and bio-medical persuasion. Notable in terms 
of focus on social aspects are the works of Brown and Harris (1978) and, for older 
people, Elaine Murphy (1982). The latter demonstrated that depression in old age is 
caused by significant life events and that such events are often related to failing physical 
health and material adversity. One could possibly add the adversity of being old within 
an ageist society that has structured the dependency of older people (Townsend 1981) as 
causative of depression. Several other authors allude to ageism as a factor that causes 
under-identification (see Godfrey and Denby 2004, Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005) in 
absence of any more recent research evidence.
Brown’s work was concerned with younger women, in England and internationally. Like 
the feminist authors already discussed, Brown (1996) describes specific examples of
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humiliation and entrapment that he sees as rendering women at high risk of depression. 
Interestingly these can be readily transferred to the experience of hospitalisation due to ill 
health in old age. For example, he talks of people being forced into a subordinate 
position, feeling defeated, of having one’s value undermined, and of having escape 
blocked. Such experiences could be attributed as common with the experience of being a 
patient, trapped within an alien organisation and environment away from one’s friends 
and family. It has also been argued that depression can occur due to lack of stimulation 
within the institution (Pitt 1988).
Like Tom Kitwood, describing the components of dementia (p95), Brown produced a 
formula for depression demonstrating its multiple causes. He included the biological 
element alongside the findings of his research demonstrating that some women are more 
resourceful than others in dealing with adversity:
Depression = significant life event + psychosocial vulnerability + sense of defeat or 
hopelessness (possibly + poor potential to cope) + depletion within brain 
chemistry.
Both Brown and Harris (1978) and Murphy (1982) note the importance of strong social 
and emotional support, in the form of a “confidante”, as protective against depression. A 
confidante is the one person in the world, in whom one can confide and share every day 
worries and concerns. Such support is often received from a spouse or a close friend of 
one’s own peer group and is often lost in old age. Such a confiding relationship is much 
less commonly found between family members from different generations. Relatives 
from another generation tend to offer more practical functional support (Norbeck 1991). 
In old age, particularly if a person is in an institution, contact with friends and peers is 
often lost. Rather older people in institutions are visited by relatives who do not provide 
the level of support that protects against depression (Cutrona 1990, Godfrey and Denby 
2004, Boyle 2005).
It is worth noting here that generally perceptions of well-being are said to improve with 
age (Vincent 1999). However, this is not the case in the presence of health changes,
84
unless aids are provided to minimise the feelings of dependency and associated lower 
morale (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999). Some authors note that abuse may be influential in 
development of depression (see Pilgrim and Rogers1999, Kennedy 2000).
Recently two publications have been dedicated to examine the issues of depression in old 
age (Godfrey and Denby 2004, Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005). They highlight the dearth of 
research in this area and, reflecting the gap in non-medical research, tend towards 
examination of biomedical perspectives. Notably, neither makes reference to depression 
as it may exhibit in the hospital setting, nor have I discovered any such research 
elsewhere.
Godfrey and Denby (2004) in their review of the literature on depression in old age, 
describe stressors and protecting factors in relation to the risk of development of 
depression in old age. Building on the work of Murphy (1982), Prince et al (1998) 
focused on issues of poor mobility and pain as social isolators that remove one from 
social situations in which that essential “confidante” support is received. Neither 
retirement nor being alone increase risk of depression, but self perception of loneliness 
does so. Those who maintain high levels of self-esteem, personal resilience (Zarit et al 
1999) and adequate levels of reciprocal social support, from peers and friends rather than 
family (Coleman et al 1998), are protected, with perceived acceptable quality of life 
being the key.
There is a view that the occurrence of depression is influenced by personality, or high 
neuroticism (Ormel et al 2001). The way in which one adapts to change and stress is 
supported by the assimilation and accommodation model described by Brandtstadter and 
Greve (1994, cited by Coleman and O’Hanlon 2004 p i64). As discussed earlier (p20), 
Brandtstadter and Greve suggest that, in extreme old age, or debilitated old age, there 
comes a time when the results of ageing and illness are accommodated rather than striven 
against. Older people often do not describe the obvious symptom of low mood and may 
talk about death and pessimism in absence of depression (Katona et al 1995).
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Geraldine Boyle (2005) examined the impact of loss of autonomy on mental ill health in 
older people receiving care at home and older people in residential care. She found more 
mental ill health, in the form of depression, at home than in institutions alluding to the 
importance of the social support of one’s peer group. She discovered correlation between 
loss of decisional autonomy and depression. These findings, together with consideration 
of the assimilation model, are interesting and could suggest one of two possible 
explanations, both of which I explore as I move through the data and analysis. Medical 
research suggests that the incidence of depression is higher in institutions than it is for 
people at home receiving care (Godfrey and Denby 2004). However, it appears that 
maybe, in care homes, people are less depressed possibly having found new confidantes, 
as Boyle suggests. Alternatively we may consider that it is possible to cease being 
depressed as one moves towards the end of life. When one is at home the feeling of loss 
of autonomy, in one’s own world, is acute, whereas in a care home one becomes resigned 
to this loss of self. Depression may be different, or not exist so readily, for those in the 
fourth age, as discussed in Chapter 1 (pi 8), which Joan Erikson would argue is part of the 
life resolution towards death. Clearly specific research is required to fully consider the 
impact of these differing social positions. I continue to explore the issues further.
Before going on to consider the gaps within this literature that I seek to explore, I now 
look at the biomedical perspectives on depression.
4.4.3 A Medical Perspective
As I have already suggested, the medicalisation of depression, by psychiatrists, emerged 
following the recognition of shell shock in 1914 (Showalter 1985) and became 
entrenched. Medical intervention, in the form of tranquilising, anti-depressant 
medication and electro-convulsive therapy developed through the twentieth century.
In medical terms depression is described as an illness of biological, genetic and 
circumstantial cause, leading to feelings of extreme unhappiness and hopelessness 
(Katona et al 1995). Depression ranges from “minor degrees of sadness^ to feelings of
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complete dejection and hopelessness accompanied by a gross degree of pessimism” (RCP 
2005). Box 3.1 describes a diagnostic model for depression, defining the requisite 
symptoms which must include either low mood or anhedonia, loss of interest in one’s 
usual pleasures. Depression is said to be the most common mental health problem 
affecting one in five of the population over the life course; it has been noted as the second 
most debilitating international condition, second to heart disease, with incidence 
escalating (Depression Learning Path 2006). The definition of depression is generic 
across population groups. In language, depression has become a medical diagnosis rather 
than a feeling of emotion. It is now owned by medical psychiatry as its own, and is 
therefore within its realm of influence.
Depression in old age occurs at the same rate as it does for younger people, at 10-15%, 
with age itself not causative (Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005). Figures for prevalence and 
incidence of depression differ widely dependent on research methodology. However, 
prevalence increases in the presence of a physical health problem with approximately 
25% of older people in hospital being depressed (Anderson 2001, RCP 2005). Figures 
increase further, to approximately 40%, for those in long term institutional care (Godfrey 
and Denby 2004).
Various research has suggested a higher incidence of depression in the presence of 
thyroid problems, cancer, chronic pain, heart disease, parkinsons disease, malnutrition 
and following stroke (Katona 1994), though clear evidence is sometimes lacking 
(Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005). Conversely depression may be the cause of physical health 
problems because of the poor compliance with prescribed medications, reduced 
biological activity and a weakened immune system (Mayou 1991, Kennedy 2000,
Godfrey and Demby 2004). The presence of depression has a major impact, not only on 
the older persons’ quality of life, but also on recovery rates, rehabilitation potential, 
institutionalisation rates and indeed on mortality. Without treatment, depression in old 
age produces high levels of both morbidity and mortality. A depressed unwell person is 
two to three times more likely to die, having experienced a similar physiological event, 
than a non depressed person and this is not explainable in terms of physical health
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condition (O’Brien and Ames 1994). While the biomedical literature tends to focus on 
symptomology and physical treatment options, it also widely acknowledges clear links to 
pain, disability, loss and poor social support (Godfrey and Denby 2004).
Many papers, for many years, have described the under-recognition of depression in old 
age, particularly when it occurs alongside physical health problems (Koenig et al 1988, 
Katona 1994, Shah and De 1998, Anderson 2001, Kivela 2001) with some going on to 
detail the lack of sufficient evidence of efficacy of treatment once the condition is 
identified (Draper 2001). Holmes et al (2002) suggest that 75% of depressed older 
people in hospital do not have their condition recognised, with others suggesting a 
detection rate at only 15% (Godfrey and Denby 2004) and, an even lower, 8.7% (Rapp et 
al 1988).
Although practitioners claim to have the knowledge and skill to recognise the condition 
(Rothera et al 2002), evidence suggests that they do not do so (Rapp et al 1988, Grout 
1997). Several possible reasons for this under recognition have been cited. For example, 
it is argued that several of the indicators for depression are present in older people with 
physical health problems due to their general frailly, for example poor appetite and poor 
attention, and are therefore attributed to general health rather than mental health deficits. 
Older people often do not describe the obvious symptom of low mood (Katona et al 
1995). Several authors allude to ageism as a possible factor in under identification, with 
a societal assumption of the inevitability of being circumstantially depressed in old age 
(Boyle and Chambers 2000, Godfrey and Denby 2004, Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005).
In terms of biomedicine, proponents note that depression is influenced by the imbalance 
of chemicals within the brain and thus, although social causation is acknowledged, 
pharmaceutical intervention is required in order to redress that balance (Busfield 1986, 
Katona 1994, Phair 1999, Evans and Mottram 2001, Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005). Despite 
empirical and anecdotal evidence of social causation, explored above, physical 
intervention remains the primary form of treatment. Recent government guidelines for 
the treatment of depression, once it is identified as lasting, recommend a combination of
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pharmaceutical and talk therapies (NICE 2004), although it is widely recognised that the 
latter are not readily available (Anderson 2001,Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005).
4.4.4 Concluding on depression
As discussed in considering social policy above (pi2), there exists potential ambivalence 
about how depression is classified and addressed within the scheme of service provision. 
The National Service Frameworks for Mental Health and for Older People (DoH 1999, 
DoH 2001a) do not generally designate depression as a severe mental illness and 
therefore it is deemed the clinical responsibility of primary and non-specialist health care 
services. Referral to specialist mental health services is advised only if  treatment fails to 
address the problem or presentation carries significant risk to the person with depression 
or to others.
The literature suggests that depression has become accepted within the general health 
paradigm for younger people. It is less clear as to whether depression in older people sits 
in a parallel position. The levels of under recognition may suggest that it is less socially 
accepted in old age. The literature and policy direction suggest that depression in old age 
may sit in a limbo position, under researched, under recognised and not clearly 
represented within the social, general or mental health agendas. It is this apparent gap 
that I seek to explore.
I now go on to look at the literature on the second of the three Ds, as described within 
liaison psychiatry circles (Holmes et al 2002), that of delirium. This literature, like that 
for depression in old age, exists almost exclusively within the biomedical field.
4.5 Delirium
In medical terms delirium, or acute confusion, is diagnosed in the presence of impaired 
thinking caused by disruption to normal brain function. It differs from dementia in that, 
once the cause is established, the condition is reversible. However, the condition may
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become permanent if the cause is undiscovered and unattended (Phair 1999). Delirium is 
usually sudden in onset and is accompanied by disturbances in consciousness; attention 
difficulties and marked fluctuation in presentation, none of which are noted in people 
with dementia alone (see Box 4.2). In terms of diagnosis, delirium is differentiated from 
dementia by conducting physiological tests and gaining a clear history about the speed of 
onset and the degree of change from normal health and behaviour. There are a multitude 
of possible biological causes ranging from systemic infection to direct head trauma, the 
most common causes include changes in drug consumption, heart attack, stroke, the 
spread o f cancer, chest infection, urinary tract infection, anaesthesia and alcohol 
withdrawal (Taylor and Shah 2001). Between 10 - 30% of older people admitted to 
hospital either have delirium at the time of arrival in hospital, or will acquire it during 
their stay (RCP 2005). People with dementia, with already vulnerable brain function, are 
at higher risk of developing delirium in response to physical illness, drug intoxication 
and/or psycho-social stressors (Phair 1999).
Box 4.2 Diagnostic Criteria for Delirium
A. Disturbance of consciousness (i.e. reduced 
clarity of awareness of the environment) with 
reduced ability to focus, sustain or shift attention.
B. A change in cognition (such as memory deficit, 
disorientation, language disturbance) or the 
development of a perceptual disturbance that is not 
better accounted for by a pre-existing established or 
evolving dementia.
C. The disturbance develops over a short period 
(usually hours to days) and tends to fluctuate during 
the course of the day.
D. There is evidence from the history, physical 
examination or laboratory findings that the 
disturbance is caused by the direct physiological 
consequences of a general medical condition or 
substance.
American Psychiatric Association DSM-IV 1994
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I have discovered little literature on the subject of delirium other than within the medical 
health field. Non-medical texts on dementia mention delirium rarely (Phair 1999,
Cantley 2001, Adams and Manthorpe 2003, Bradbury et al 2004, Redfeam and Ross 
2005) and solely in a medical context, or not at all (Adams and Clarke 1999, Stokes 
2000, Jones and Meisen 2004) even when they are considering issues associated with 
general medical needs and hospitalisation (Norman 2003, Watson 2003). Similarly 
Anthony Harrison (2006a) in considering how general nurses can provide skilled care for 
older people with mental health problems, describes delirium from a medical positivist 
perspective.
A review of the literature on intervention strategies for delirium was conducted by 
Milisen et al (2005) and uncovered just one qualitative research study into the experience 
of delirium, and no studies that considered the efficacy of interventions from the 
perspective of the people who experience delirium themselves, or from the perspective of 
their families. Irene Schofield (1997) used semi structured interviews to consider the 
experience of older people following an episode. She found that, contrary to earlier 
literature supposition, older people did not fear that they were experiencing the onset of 
dementia or madness although they described feelings of acute transient fear. They did 
feel that others, notably staff, assumed a permanent change and treated them as though 
they could not understand anything. Although there was some evidence of a need for 
greater engagement and information from staff during the period of confusion, most of 
the participants didn’t seek information or search for explanation once the episode was 
over. In one study that involved interviewing family members, it was noted that 
information about the speed of onset and change from usual presentation was not sought 
or noted by clinical staff (Fick and Foreman 2000) despite the acquisition of such 
information being key to diagnosis and treatment. This finding supports the view of 
Irene Schofield’s participants who felt that it was assumed that they had dementia and 
therefore a differential diagnosis was not sought. Several authors suggest that providing 
information to family members about the condition and prognosis is important (Schofield 
1997, Meagher 2001, Milisen et al 2005), yet this recommendation is made in the 
absence of any supporting research data.
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It is interesting to note that while delirium is so prevalent in old age, particularly in the 
general hospital setting, it has received barely any non-medical research attention. It is 
possible that this lack of attention is founded on its precarious position between medicine 
and psychiatry. As a curable condition of clear biological cause, it sits soundly within the 
paradigm of medicine, yet it manifests through behaviour perceived as outside the norm 
and hence, especially in old age where a presence of inevitable cognitive decline is 
assumed, can be seen as coming under psychiatry. Delirium therefore does not fall clearly 
into either camp, and as such may run the high risk of being missed. The lack of research 
data attention has also been attributed to methodological challenges, assumed to be 
associated with gaining and identifying a sample and achieving consent (Meagher 2001). 
It is clear that greater research attention is warranted, especially in the light of findings 
that suggest that this life threatening condition undermines quality of life and is under­
recognised by hospital staff, especially in people with dementia (Inouye et al 1993, Fick 
and Foreman 2000).
I now move on to the last of the mental health conditions of old age that! explore here, 
the well-researched area of dementia.
4.6 Perspectives on Dementia
There is a wealth of literature on the subject of dementia, particularly in the last twenty- 
five years. This increase has been fuelled by several different yet converging drivers that 
have brought research funding for both medical and psychosocial projects. The social 
and political perceptions about population change as discussed in Chapter 1 produce fear 
of the impending cost of caring for the growing population of people with dementia.
Such cost can be counted financially, for the economy, and emotionally, for informal 
carers at home (Wilkinson 2002). This perception is enhanced by the more visible 
presence of people with dementia in settings where they were not previously seen, for 
example, in general hospital wards rather than in long stay institutions.
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Unlike depression and delirium, issues around dementia and dementia care have received 
a great deal of attention. Although medically it continues to inhabit the paradigm of old 
age psychiatry, there is some evidence of a shift towards a position of social disability. 
Non-psychiatric care readily occurs for people with dementia both at home and in the 
care home sector, as reflected in the broad literature (e.g. Cantley 2001, Killick and Allen 
2001, Adams and Manthorpe 2003). My purpose in exploring and targeting the literature 
on dementia is to begin to consider how it relates and may influence perceptions within 
the general hospital setting, an area that has received little research attention to date.
In this section I consider dementia and the experience of dementia first from the bio­
medical perspective and then by looking at psychosocial approaches. I concentrate my 
examination on that which may be transferable to the general hospital setting and 
consider how dementia is perceived.
4.6.1 Dementia - the Medical Context
In medical terms dementia describes a group of illnesses, predominantly occurring in old 
age, characterised by deterioration in intellectual function alongside changes in personal 
and social functioning (McKeith and Fairbaim 2001) in the absence of a diagnosis of 
delirium. There are many different types of dementia, defined by differing causes and 
variation in symptomology, with Alzheimers Disease being the most prevalent, followed 
by Vascular Dementia and Lewy Body Disease. Although medically defined discretely I 
use the generic term both in this chapter and throughout in the thesis. However, it should 
be noted that, in some contexts, the term dementia is seen as interchangeable with 
Alzheimers Disease.
Alongside the increased attention, arguably fuelled by social and political interests, 
dementia has become increasingly medicalised since the 1980s. Post mortems more 
readily show the presence of plaques and tangles within brain tissue, those neurological 
features that Alois Alzheimer noted in identifying the disease early in the twentieth 
century. The ongoing development of the use of brain scanning is also cited as
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fundamental in medicalisation (Adams and Bartlett 2003). Prior to the 1980s, a 
generalised diagnostic term of senile dementia had been attributed to older people with 
failing cognition and, in line with the Latin definition of demens, people with dementia 
were accepted as beings without minds. In 1he past three decades specificity in diagnosis 
has increased. Although some aspects of presentation apply across diagnoses, memory 
changes, disorientation, emotional, behavioural and functional and intellectual change, 
they do so in differing intensity and degree. Alongside the increased identification of 
dementia as a medical phenomenon has been an increase in research examining causal 
factors, genetics and possible pharmacological intervention (McKieth and Fairbaim 
2001).
The focus of medical and health service intervention; for people with dementia is 
threefold. Firstly early identification of problems is encouraged in order that differential 
diagnosis can be considered before introducing cognitive enhancing medication, aimed at 
slowing and deferring the disease process (Adams and Bartlett 2003). This form of 
intervention is not without ongoing controversy with dementia champions advocating for 
widespread use and politicians more reticent in accepting the cost efficacy of these drugs 
(Alzheimers Society 2006, NICE 2006). Early intervention for people with dementia, 
and their families, is also favoured in order to assist all those involved in coming to terms 
with the issues and receiving timely information about options open to them. Such early 
identification rarely occurs in the general hospital setting (RCP 2005).
The second medical focus is on control of behaviour. Medication is often prescribed in 
order to counteract behaviour and emotion perceived as challenging to those who provide 
care. Such behaviour may exhibit in agitation, changes in sleep pattern, frustration or 
aggression. Thirdly focus concentrates on how and where future care should be 
provided, with professionals offering advice and making judgements on the person’s 
ongoing ability to live independently or with the support of their family or other 
supporters. The ability of the person with dementia to express their own view on such 
issues has become an issue with the growth of consumerism, the Capacity Act (OPSI
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2005) and the government driven agenda of ensuring that choice is offered (Taylor and 
Shah 2001, McKeith and Fairbaim 2001).
Despite this latter emerging field of attention, health care for people with dementia is 
generally paternalistic and disempowering. People with dementia are done unto rather 
than involved in their care or their fixture. Several authors consider why people with 
dementia are so socially excluded, even from involvement in issues that directly affect 
their health and well being, and conclude that the exclusion is evidence of intolerance 
within an “ultra cognitive world” (Adams and Bartlett 2003 p5) where those with lesser 
thinking capacity are discarded and seen as valueless. Because they have lost their mind, 
they have lost their place in the social world (Gilleard 1992). In such a world the role of 
a service becomes one of control and curtailment whereby people with dementia are 
removed from society literally in institutions and socially through lost interaction 
(Spicker 2000).
The view of family carers, about whether they perceived their loved ones to be socially 
dead was considered by Sweeting and Gilhooly (1997). They found that perceptions 
were dependent upon the nature of the relationship between the carer and the cared for, 
with those with closer relationships less likely to perceive social death. Perception was 
also noted to vary dependent on the ability to conduct a social conversation, recognise 
significant people and retain good physical health.
A picture is emerging of a medical condition that renders one socially inept, except 
possibly in the eyes of one’s nearest and dearest. I now move on to examine the non 
medical literature to uncover a parallel view of the condition.
4.6.2 Psychosocial Perspectives
Coupled with die assumption of intellectual inability and social ineptitude as features of 
biological disease, dementia is often viewed in terms of behaviour, with a focus on a need 
for control as described in treatment with medication above (Stokes 2000, Wills and
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Dewing 2001, Adams and Bartlett 2003). People with dementia are often seen as a 
problem due to adverse impact on others in the way they interact and demand attention, 
repeat questions, use bad language, display vulgar habits, are noisy, aggressive, rude and 
disruptive (Spicker 2000).
In the 1980s, with the advent of Community Care, much attention was given to the needs 
of informal carers who were now caring for their family member, with dementia, at 
home. The focus was on the burden of the role particularly in the presence of, what was 
described as, challenging behaviour on the part of the person with dementia (see for 
example Nolan and Keady 2001, Soliman 2003). The impact of the behaviour of the 
person with dementia is viewed differently dependent on the setting. In less specialist 
places Middleton et al (1999) discovered a greater tendency to negatively label the 
behaviour, and the person exhibiting the behaviour, and to term it as inappropriate. This 
research took place in dementia specialist and non-specialist care homes with results 
similar to a study that Rachel Norman (2003) undertook in the general hospital setting.
Much of the recent psycho-sociological work on dementia seeks to move the agenda 
away from classifying people with dementia as either bad, due to their behaviour, or 
diseased and socially inept, due to their medical diagnosis. Tom Kitwood and his 
colleagues in the Bradford Dementia Group focused on the problems associated with 
viewing those with dementia as diseased objects, incapable of thought and badly 
behaved, rather than seeing them as people with problems. The focus of “The New 
Culture o f Dementia Care” (Kitwood 1997) and much subsequent literature advocating 
for improvements in dementia care, is to view, and hear about, dementia as a subjective 
experience. The developing view is that dementia is a social disability as much as it is a 
biological illness. People with dementia, it is claimed, are able to retain entity whatever 
their cognitive state, dementia may destroy the brain but it does not destroy the person 
(Hughes 2001) or their ability to integrate from a psychological or social point of view 
(Brooker 1995). This approach can be viewed as attempt to shift power from the 
“clinical gaze” (Foucault 1976) of clinicians who objectify people with dementia, 
towards a position of entity for the people with dementia themselves.
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Tom Kitwood wrote extensively on his theories of dementia and dementia care asserting 
that how a person manages their life with dementia depends on their nature, their social 
support and their ability to cope with adversity. Interestingly these are the same 
phenomena as Brown (1978) and Murphy (1982) emphasised as protective against 
depression (p83). However, whereas research on depression, particularly in old age, has 
not moved on from these works, dementia research continues in examining how the 
nature and the quality of interaction can assist or detract from helping people with 
dementia to live with their condition. Those interactions that may detract from positive 
experience are what Kitwood terms as the prevailing social psychology as it impacts on 
the experience of the person with dementia. The ways in which others act and interact is 
core to the philosophy that focuses on valuing the person with dementia as a unique and 
resourceful person. While acknowledging that neurological brain changes are a feature 
of dementia, Kitwood (1993) suggested that experience is based on a combination of 
factors. He documented his theory using an apparent mathematical formula:
D (dementia) = P (personality) + B (biography) + H (health) + Nl (neurological 
impairment) + SP (social psychology)
He also provides detailed documentation of malignant social psychology through which 
care givers can undermine the basic rights and needs of people with dementia, for 
example, by ignoring them in their presence or by treating them as objects on whom tasks 
are undertaken.
The work of Tom Kitwood has been highly influential in raising the profile of dementia 
and dementia care, and has led to much further investigation. However, it has been 
critisised for its lack of academic evidence and rigour (Adams 1996). Others are 
concerned that the sole focus on the person with dementia excludes others, such as formal 
and informal carers (McKee 1999, Nolan et al 2004, Adams 2005). Indeed it is a 
criticism of much research around dementia over the years that the perspective of one key 
group of player has been examined to the exclusion of others. Early research took the
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view of medicine and of formal carers. In the 1980s informal carers took centre stage.
At present there is a danger that the voice of the person with dementia is heard to the 
exclusion of others intricately involved in the person’s life. There is also a lack of 
evidence about how the lay public perceive dementia.
In reflection of this concern, current thinking around models of dementia care and 
research focus needs to consider all those involved, with all views considered to be valid 
and not interchangeable (McKee 1999, Adams 1998). In the work on Relationship 
Centred Care (Box 4.3) Mike Nolan and his colleagues (2004) describe the prerequisites 
for appropriate care as being founded in attention to the needs of people with dementia as 
well as those of their formal and informal carers, arguing that if the needs of one party are 
not met, the rest of the relationship will be off kilter. For example, Nolan argues that 
people with dementia and their formal and informal carers all need to feel a sense of 
purpose in their relationship. It is not solely for the person with dementia to feel satisfied 
in this respect, but also for those who support him/her. There are suggestions that the care 
triad of the person with dementia, formal and informal carer, described by Trevor Adams 
(1998) needs to be further expanded in order to consider the broader needs and demands 
of communities and society as a whole, with particular focus on the politics of dementia 
care (Adams 2005), but this work has yet to be fully explored and articulated. My own 
methodology, whereby I seek opinion from older people, relatives and staff members, as 
well as considering the organisational influence, may serve to develop this school of 
thought.
As I have suggested, there is an emerging philosophy of dementia as a social disability. 
Social gerontologists believe that the over-medicalisation of dementia, and the perception 
of it as a social problem, would be better addressed if it became viewed as a disability 
rather than an illness (Kitwood 1997, Manthorpe 2001, Gilliard 2002, Adams and Bartlett 
2003). In this way the oppression and social disengagement bestowed on people with 
dementia could be challenged on a disability rights platform. In the same way that 
independence is not seen as equivalent to self care and autonomy for many people with 
disability, people with dementia, by being seen as disabled, could regain feelings of
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control in their lives. This correlates with the similar recent change in focus for people 
with learning disabilities, which has moved from an illness to a disability model of 
service arguably creating greater degrees o f social empowerment.
Box 4.3 Requisites for Relationship Centred Care
❖ A se n se  of security of feeling safe  and receiving or delivering 
com petent and sensitive care.
❖ A se n se  of continuity - the recognition of biography using the 
p as t to contextualise the present.
❖ A se n se  of belonging -  opportunities to form meaningful 
relationships or feel part of the team .
❖ A se n se  of purpose -  opportunities to engage in purposeful 
activities or to have a clear s e t  of goals to aspire to.
❖ A se n se  of fulfilment. Achieving meaningful or or valued 
goals and feeling satisfied with o n e ’s efforts.
❖ A se n se  of significance to feel that you m atter and that you 
are valued a s  a person.
Nolan e ta l  2004
This move from an illness to a disability model is reflected in the current political 
guidance with regard to the care and treatment of people with long term conditions (DoH 
2001b) as it seeks to empower people with other long term conditions, such as chronic 
breathing difficulties, diabetes and arthritis, with moves aimed at ensuring that the person 
with the condition is accepted as the expert and at the centre of discussions in ensuring 
how their needs will best be met. However, as I have already noted (p70) dementia does 
not feature as one such long term condition. The exclusion seems to suggest a lack of 
political and policy clarity about where dementia fits in with health and social care 
provision, as I have noted with depression and delirium above. With regard to dementia 
the confusion may be perpetuated by the presence of two clear and potentially opposing 
views; dementia as an illness versus dementia as a disability.
Before I conclude this section I explore the limited literature on dementia as it exists in 
the general hospital setting. It is interesting to note that although there is a large and 
growing literature on dementia and dementia care, other than bio-medical research, little 
focus is given to the needs of people with dementia as they exist in the bio-medical
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world, either within mental health or general services. Again this demonstrates division 
and, in the case of dementia, two diverse paradigms with little examination of how the 
two worlds may meet when they converge in one setting.
4.6.3 Dementia in the General Hospital
People with dementia are frequent occupiers of acute hospital beds with figures 
suggesting that, in 2000 in the United Kingdom, in an average hospital of 500 beds, 330 
occupants are over 65 and 31% of them (103) have dementia (RCP 2005). The care and 
treatment of people with dementia is dependent upon the dominant culture and the social 
construction of the place in which they find themselves (Adams and Bartlett 2003). If 
this is the case it follows that care in the general hospital, a bio-medical, clinical 
environment, will differ from that found elsewhere.
Although there have been various concerns raised, notably by the Health Advisory 
Service (1998), in the popular health press (Dewing 2003, Armstrong 2002, Burgess 
2003, Bush 2003) and by voluntary organisations (Alzheimers Society 2006), very little 
formal research has taken place in the general hospital setting other than bio-medical 
examination of prevalence and missed medical attention (Holmes and House 2000b, 
Holmes et al 2002). Published material on dementia care focuses on how to handle the 
problems associated with care for people with dementia in the acute setting based upon 
scant empirical data (Archibald 2003, Harrison 2006a). Many generic texts on dementia 
care do not provide focus for staff working in this setting, for example, Caroline Cantley 
(2001) provides a chapter on care settings for people with dementia (Marshall 2001) in 
which acute hospitals barely feature.
Rachel Norman (2003) reports on her research findings conducted in the general hospital 
setting. She sought to examine the experience of people with dementia and subsequently 
developed practice guidance for nursing staff. Using a combined methodology involving 
observation of and interview with people with dementia and staff focus groups, she 
concluded that nurses do not readily connect with these patients and thus do not achieve
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understanding of them. In line with the earlier findings in care homes (Middleton et al 
1999), Norman found that staff define dementia in terms of the presenting behaviour, 
seeing it as non-directed, irrational and purposeless and as such staff seek to override 
and/or constrain it. The research discovered that when nurses could attribute meaning to 
actions, both levels of engagement and quality of care improved. The subsequently 
developed practice guidance encourages engagement through which people with 
dementia and their actions can be better understood.
4.6.4 Discussion on Dementia
In this section I have examined the literature around dementia and the understanding of 
dementia as a medical and psychosocial entity. Research has been undertaken, over the 
last thirty years, from differing angles. Historically, like other medical diseases, research 
has concentrated on bio-medical positivist science with opinions and views on the 
condition and its management sought from health care professionals. With the advent of 
community care, the focus of attention moved to examine the perspective and needs of 
informal carers, with much research conducted in this field in the 1980s and 1990s. More 
recently, arguably in line with consumerism, attention has become more focussed on to 
the person with dementia, hearing the voice (Goldsmith 1996) of the person experiencing 
the problems and attempting to see the world through their experience. The most recent 
opinion suggests that dementia should be viewed as a social disability rather than a 
medical illness.
Although there is a wealth of literature on dementia, like depression and delirium its 
place within the scope of health services is unclear. Currently dementia appears to 
inhabit two parallel paradigms as both an illness and a social disability. Arguably this 
mirrors the developments in mental health services for younger adults towards a recovery 
model (Anthony 1993 p21) but in dementia such focus does not both sit clearly within 
psychiatric service provision. I am interested in considering how these potentially 
opposing views are evident in the perceptions of people in the general hospital setting.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined perspectives on mental health problems in old age from 
political, bio-medical and social perspectives and compared these perceptions with the 
broad perspectives discussed in the previous chapter.
It is clear that mental health problems are perceived differently when they are 
experienced by older, rather than younger, adults. Politically and organisationally 
definitions of what qualifies as a mental health problem is clearly defined for adults of 
working age (DoH 1999) yet not explicit for older adults. Similarly medical services for 
older people with long term conditions have received specific government focus without 
consideration of those with long term mental health conditions. This appears to leave the 
older person with mental health problems out in the cold, with attention lacking both in 
service requirements and in research attention, particularly when such issues arise within 
the health service. Where older people with mental health problems present in the 
general hospital setting, little research has occurred examining their experience or the 
impact of the service they receive. There is supposition that consultation/liaison services 
are preferable to a traditional model, but without any clear evidence of support.
In examining the literature on depression, delirium and dementia, the evidence suggests 
that each sits outside the core mental health agenda, each in a different way. Depression 
has become a medical rather than an every day word. It is accepted as a common ailment 
among the general population and has moved from the realms of psychiatry into that of 
general medicine. In old age however, depression has received little attention. It is less 
frequently recognised and treated.
Delirium also is under recognised and under researched. It is unclear where delirium sits 
within the medical world, and therefore in terms of service provision. Lastly in this 
chapter I looked at dementia and its possible positioning as either a biological illness or 
as a social disability.
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In the course of this work I have sought to discover where people in the general hospital 
setting position mental health problems in old age. I do so against a literature, little of 
which is specific to the setting, which emphasises a nebulous position due to differences 
between political, medical, psychiatric and social views.
I am interested in the broad perceptions about mental health problems as they are 
perceived by those in the general hospital setting. I have noted that, in such a rigid 
setting, power relations are highly influential and will affect how people perceive 
phenomena therein. As well as comparing views with those described in the literature I 
want to specifically address the gaps in the research about depression in old age, 
particularly as it impacts on very old and ill people. Lastly I seek to consider the health 
service needs of this group of people; not only in consideration of whether different 
models of mental health service impact on the way that people perceive mental health 
problems in old age, but also on the place of mental health problems in old age within 
services generally.
I argue that mental health service is currently provided in answer to the constructs as 
perceived by the professions of medicine and psychiatry, and due to political and 
organisational demands, rather than in consideration of how mental health and mental 
illness in old age is perceived by those directly involved in the general hospital setting.
I now move on to consider the methodology used in achieving the data through which to 
consider these issues.
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Chapter 5
Methodology
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters I have outlined the background to this research and explored the 
available literature that informs the subject of perceptions of older people with mental 
health problems in the general hospital setting and the services provided for them. I have 
highlighted the following particular strands of research interest in die absence of current 
evidence.
I am interested in the broad perceptions about mental health problems as they are 
perceived by those in the general hospital setting. I have noted that, in such a rigid 
setting, power relations are highly influential and will affect how people construct 
phenomena therein. As well as comparing constructions with those described in the 
literature, I want to specifically address the gaps in the research about depression in old 
age, particularly as it impacts on very old people who are chronically physically ill.
Lastly I seek to consider the health service needs of this group of people; not only in 
consideration of whether different models of mental health service impact on the way that 
people perceive mental health problems in old age, but also on the place of mental health 
problems in old age within services generally. As I have highlighted in Chapter 4, this 
position is currently unclear.
The presence of older people with mental health problems in general hospital settings 
impacts upon many people and groups: the older people themselves, other hospital 
patients, relatives and friends, health and social care workers and service managers. The 
social actors all have thoughts, feelings, behaviours, beliefs, communication methods and 
memories associated with, and influenced by their experience (Williams and May 1996). 
As well as the personal and experiential influences carried by each person, further
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influence occurs due to the setting itself, an institution carrying history, administrative 
structures and mechanisms.
Within this research I have sought to hear the voice of people with mental health 
problems who are not usually given the opportunity to be heard. I have encouraged 
people to speak on the subject of mental illness which, potentially, they may not have 
wished to consider. I conducted the data collection within the structure of powerful 
institutions which have long been driven by a perception that those with mental illness 
and those in old age do not have a valid voice. The parallel tradition is that the medical 
voice holds implicit power and validity, yet this too is now challenged by political and 
bureaucratic power. These vying challenges emphasise the need for stringent attention to 
methodology in order that voices are heard and that vulnerability is not exploited.
Within this chapter I explain, explore and discuss my chosen methodology and the 
associated challenges, building from the information gained through my literature review. 
Initially I return to my research questions and revisit the underlying theoretical principals 
employed. I go on to explain the nature of the data and how it was collected. I explore 
the research design, the research sites and the issues and challenges considered in 
achieving a sample. I then examine the potentially contentious issue of consent, given 
that some of the sample group had diagnoses of dementia. I examine both the nature and 
content of the qualitative interviews, and the method of analysis employed. The process 
of conducting this research brought many challenges as I discuss throughout the chapter.
I focus specifically on that of achieving ethical approval and suggest that the favoured 
concept that necessitates the use of informed consent requires challenge. I finish the 
chapter by again focusing on power, this time within research relationships, as it is 
pertinent to the methodology.
Before moving on to future chapters, in which I analyse and interpret the data, I provide 
detail of the research participants again noting that participants names, as well as the 
setting names, have been anonymised
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My research questions ask: -
• What are the social constructions that are drawn upon and that generate 
perspectives on mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting 
and
• Does the nature of mental health services provision affect and/or influence the 
social constructions?
5.2 Theoretical Framework
I asked these questions in order to inform debate around the future provision of mental 
health care for older people in general hospital settings. I argue that service is currently 
provided in answer to the constructs as perceived by the professions of medicine and 
psychiatry, and due to political and organisational demands, rather than in consideration 
of how mental health and mental illness in old age is perceived by those directly involved 
in the general hospital setting.
As I set out in the introductory chapter of this thesis, my epistemiologicai position is that 
the way in which one conceptualises phenomena within the world is the result of how we 
interpret data from within it. Thus different people will make different interpretations of 
a thing, dependent on their current and past experience and the context in which they 
experience the thing. Theory about the world is thus interpreted rather than deduced. 
With regard to these phenomena, mental health problems in old age in the general 
hospital setting, one persons view will differ from another’s particularly if  they are 
playing a different role within the setting. Differences are also likely in different 
hospitals. I hold that no one view has more credibility or validity than another.
I draw particularly on the theories of Interpretive Interactionism and Social 
Constructionism, as I now explain.
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5.2.1 Interpretive Interactionism
My research methodology draws on a Grounded Theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 
1967) which suggests that theory is developed from observation of the world. Using this 
premise, theories about the world are built inductively from the data itself rather than by 
testing a hypothesis against data, as in the positivist model. Whereas empiricism in 
positivist approaches emphasises the collection of facts and observations, an inductive 
approach focuses instead on conceptual reflection and theoretical enquiry (Marshall 
1999). In order to understand a social situation the researcher needs to see the world 
from the perspective of those within it, to consider their actions and interactions in order 
to discover how concepts are sustained (Porter 1998). Or, as Howard Becker (1963) 
suggests in his work examining concepts of deviance, the meaning that we give to an 
object is not the result of its innate qualities but of our active interpretation of it.
I draw also on the work of Denzin (1989) in his description of Interpretive 
Interactionlism. This places focus on the relationship between “personal troubles” and 
the policies and institutions created to address those troubles. As he states: -
In social life there is only interpretation. That is, every day life revolves around 
interpreting and making judgements about their own and others’ behaviour and 
experiences. Many times these interpretations and judgements are based on faulty 
or incorrect understandings. Persons, for instance, mistake their own experiences 
for those of others. These interpretations are then formulated into social 
programmes intended to alter and shape the lives of troubled people, for example 
community services for the mentally ill...But often the understanding that these 
programmes are based upon bears little relation to the meanings, interpretations 
and experiences of the persons they are intended to serve.
(Denzin 1989 p11)
I am examining mental health and illness, as a “personal trouble”, within an institution 
able or not to address the issues arising. I look to uncover underlying assumptions in 
order to interpret the phenomena and to consider how service may best be provided.
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5.2.2 Social Constructionism
In this research I am seeking to discover the taken-for-granted perceptions about what 
constitutes a mental health problem in the general hospital setting. By conducting the 
research in two sites, each using a different model of mental health service provision, and 
by interviewing people from across the range of social actors, I seek to compare those 
perceptions and consider any differences. In doing so I am mindful that the social 
construction of a concept, such as mental health problems, is affected by all sorts of 
influences such as differing power relationships, local practices as well as internal and 
external cultural, political and legal positions.
The ontological position that I adopt for this research is basically described within the 
following assertion from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, who developed the theory 
of Social Constructionism. However, notably I do not exclude the biochemical existence 
of mental illnesses as defined within the biomedical literature (see Chapters 3 & 4).
It is our contention, then, that the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with 
whatever passes for “knowledge” in the society, regardless of the ultimate validity 
or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such “knowledge”. And in so far as all human 
“knowledge” is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, the 
sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is 
done in such a way that a taken-for-granted “reality” congeals for the man in the 
street. In other words, we contend that the sociology of knowledge is concerned 
with the analysis of the social construction of reality.
(Berger and Luckmann 1991 p15).
The theory of Social Constructionism was bom out of Symbolic Interactionalist theory 
and focuses on uncovering the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the 
creation of their perceived reality. Social Constructionists suggest that society, and 
concepts within society, are actively and creatively produced by human beings and that 
the social world is made up of the product of such constructions. Such knowledge is not 
static and is influenced by the culture and history of the micro setting and the macro 
environment (Burr 1995). It is appropriate to use this position for research that is 
conducted within an environment of varying and conflicting power relationships, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.
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Social Constructionism was adopted in the 1960s and is fundamentally based on the 
Weberian suggestion that the task of sociology is to try and gain interpretive 
understanding of social action in order to understand why such action happens and what 
the effects are. This is achieved by understanding the subjective meaning held by the 
people involved. Sam Porter (1998 pi 12) describes how such approaches draw 
significantly on the work of Alfred Schultz and his descriptions of social 
phenomenology. Schultz suggests that from our varying experiences we construct the 
objects, and our common sense knowledge of those objects, that we take for granted in 
our everyday life. We see the world through typifications or conceptual frameworks, 
which he calls “recipes”, and slot events and activities that we experience into a “recipe” 
in order to make sense of them. We take these typifi cations for granted, assuming that 
they are objective reality and that others share the same concepts, not always realising 
that different people have different realities.
It is important to note that, while I am working from a social constructionalist position, I 
do not adopt an extreme standpoint and assume that no material definition of mental 
illness exists. In approaching the work from a softer or contextual constructionalist 
position, I acknowledge the existence of the phenomena of depression, dementia and 
delirium as having material biochemical basis, and also the definition of mental illness 
within the legal framework of the Mental Health Act. The ability of social 
constructionalist researchers to embrace some elements of a critical realist approach 
(Connelly 2001) is defended by Burningham and Cooper (1999). They demonstrate that 
constructionalists often acknowledge that socially problematic phenomena exist, before 
moving on to explore perceptions around that subject by certain social actors in specific 
circumstances.
In his work “The Social Construction o f What?” Stephen Hacking (1999) cautions social 
constructionist researchers against being critical of certain perceptions of knowledge, 
particularly those that may be seen as the status quo, while attempting to discover 
alternative ways of describing the phenomenon. He describes six grades of Social
109
Constructionism (Box 5.1) ranging from historical to revolutionary construction. In this 
research therefore I do not discard the historical positivist view of mental illness as held 
within psychiatric circles. Hacking’s work points towards the importance of reflexivity 
in research process, as I discuss below.
In guarding against potential bias, I note the perspective of social realists (Bhaskar 1989, 
Pilgrim and Rogers 1999) who argue that it is inappropriate to claim that mental illness is 
a purely a product of society or the intent of those within it. Examination of constructs of 
mental health and illness must, Bhaskar asserts, include reference to both natural and 
social sciences: the biology of conditions, the delivery of mental health care, the history 
and geography of mental health. Thus concepts change with time and changing 
influences with the importance of one perspective holding no more “reality” than the 
others, as I have already demonstrated within the literature review. An appropriate model 
for mental illness therefore lies in a combination of the medical, psychological and social 
(Goldsmith 1996). The person with depression, for example, has biological brain 
changes that combine with elements of personal and social history, personality and 
current physical, psychological and social factors, internal and external to the person, to 
culminate how s/he thinks, feels and behaves (p83). How the person reacts to the 
depression depends on the impact and action from oneself, professionals, relatives and 
friends and the wider society.
A social model approach argues that social relations between people 
and within society are fundamental to the experience of disabled people.
Rather than focussing on medical problems or deficits, this approach 
highlights the impact of social and environmental barriers, cultural 
processes and policy frameworks that actively and systematically disable 
people.
Wilkinson 2002 p11
The methodology employed therefore needs to elicit the perceptions of the social actors, 
not only about mental health problems in old age and their experiences thereof, but also 
about the social setting and the influences within it.
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In considering how to gather and examine the relevant data, I have also noted the 
literature concerned with evaluation research in using two sites, each using a different 
mode of service, in order to make some comparison about the potential influences of the 
differing modes o f service provision. The aim of evaluation research is to contribute “to 
the best possible knowledge designed to help people make wise decisions about future 
programming” (Clarke 1999a p20). As well as being useful in comparing two modes o f 
intervention, the use of two sites helps “to overcome the idiosyncratic characteristics of a 
given institution and of particular case mix” (Strain et al 1991). Using more than one site 
also allows comparison o f social structures whereby one may look at the range of 
generality and pin down conditions under which the findings will occur thus providing 
greater explanatory power (Miles and Hubermanl984)
I now explore the essential process of reflexivity as fundamental to the methodology.
Box 5.1 Six grades of Constructionism.
1. historical -  X has been  constructed out of social 
p ro cesses
2. ironic -  X is here , not a lot I can do about it / 
cannot e scap e  it
3. reformist -  it’s bad, let’s  do som ething about it
4. unm asking -  stripping of false appeal, 
uncovering other interests/ functions it se rv es . 3 
& 4 m ay go together
5. rebellious -  such a s  those  who say  there  is no 
such thing a schizophrenia
6. revolu tionary- such as RD Laing and the anti 
psychiatrists
Hacking 1999
5.2.3 Reflexivity
As discussed above, social constructionist theory is based on the premise that knowledge 
about the social world is formulated through ones interactions with the social world. 
Perceptions are influenced by culture, history and politics and the meaning that one 
attaches to the experience. In the research context, the presence of a researcher and the 
occurrence of a research interview itself may have an effect on the phenomena under
scrutiny. It is therefore implicit within the research process to consider, reflexively, what 
the impact of such presence may be. Tim May (1998 p i57) describes this process as 
referential reflexivity, whereby the researcher considers the consequence of the meeting 
of the social actors in the setting and the researcher “as part of the scientific community”.
Such referential reflexivity is particularly pertinent in this work due to my dual existences 
as a mental health nurse and a researcher. These two diverse positions within the general 
hospital setting potentially rendered me at risk of influence due to each role and also 
because of the dominant positivist framework within which mental health problems are 
largely viewed in psychiatry.
The purpose of reflexivity is also key in considering how research material is interpreted. 
This May (1998) describes as “endogenous reflexivity”. This process enables the 
researcher to check and counter check the typifications drawn from the data by 
considering patterns and the justification of those patterns.
In this section I have explained my ontological position as framed within the 
epistemology of Social Constructionism, whereby knowledge is seen as structurally 
designed, socially learned and fluid. I have considered how the nature of my enquiry, 
into mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting, can be examined by 
eliciting the views held by the various social actors and considering how those concepts 
converge and diverge, given the influence of local and wider contexts. I have also 
touched upon the importance of reflexivity in research. I now move on to provide detail 
of the research design.
5.3 Research Design
As discussed, the ontological starting point for my research generally follows the views 
of Berger and Luckmann (1991 pl3) who suggest that knowledge is “developed, 
transmitted and maintained in social situations” and that social reality is that which is 
taken for granted by people within specific social settings. My research methodology
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therefore needed to access that taken-for-granted knowledge and, from it, generate 
understanding of the social constructions in play. I assume that all expressed values 
beliefs and knowledge systems have equal importance and validity (Stacey 1986).
In order to capture this complex phenomenon I gathered data from a sample of all those 
involved within the setting in order to compare how the concepts converge and diverge. 
As Weber suggests, in his description of “verstehen” (German for - to understand), we 
can only hope to explain people’s actions by knowing the meanings that are attached to 
them (Williams and May 1996 p60), and we can only understand how a phenomenon 
exists within a social setting by knowing the attached meanings of the variety of people 
involved. Too often services are shaped around what those not in receipt of the service 
perceive service users to need, without reference to the views of the users themselves. 
This has particularly been the case for those who have not readily been given the 
opportunity to be heard.
The beliefs and views that I sought could not be accessed through observing the setting in 
which they take place, as they are not overtly expressed. I needed to hear how people 
attribute meaning and, therefore required verbal data. I chose the method of qualitative 
interview for several reasons. As stated I want a broad perspective of thoughts, feelings 
and beliefs, and to encourage people to self-express freely. Through a qualitative 
interview I used strategies for discovery (Fielding and Thomas 2001). This could not be 
achieved within the confines of closed questioning, for example in structured 
questionnaire, which preclude disclosure (Lee 1993 a). I wanted to allow the person to 
choose where to take the conversation, without being prescriptive, thus giving greater 
power to the participant than is possible within a survey, where direction is clearly 
defined and confined. Dougall et al (2000) sought to compare questionnaire and 
interview methodology when examining patient experience of a service providing an 
invasive clinical intimate investigation. They found that while patients reported 
satisfaction within the questionnaire data, interviews revealed richer data and particularly 
uncovered negatively perceived aspects of their experience. The authors claim that this 
differential is due to the explorative and flowing nature of the conversational interview
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which allowed respondents to move beyond a general perception of satisfaction to a 
closer scrutiny of less satisfying elements within it.
Other reasons for the choice of interview methodology centred on the sample group and 
on the sensitivity of the subject under examination. As discussed above, mental health 
and illness are taboo subjects and carry social stigma as discussed in Chapter 3. Older 
participants may be particularly troubled by the subject matter. The cohort of older 
people here may recall experiences or family stories about the workhouse and asylums as 
images of insanity. Also people with mental health problems may have difficulty 
sustaining concentration and focus. Within an interview, adjustments and time can be 
given to facilitate response. It has been my experience, working as a mental health nurse, 
that disclosure on sensitive topics takes place more readily in a situation perceived to be 
non-censorious, such as a conversational interview. Using such methodology, 
emphasising privacy, confidentiality and a non-judgmental attitude, I could access 
sensitive material (Lee 1993a). Indeed Lee (1993b) suggests that, especially when 
concerned with subjects which may provoke high emotion, complexity and contradiction, 
data cannot be achieved other than through explorative interview.
As discussed, I needed to gather data from a variety of social actors in order to examine 
the perspectives of all those involved in the service. Although there is a wealth of 
research examining health service/care provision, data is often collected from one section 
of the population involved in the particular activity. For example, Wiles and Higgins 
(1996) examined doctors’ relationships with private patients solely from the patient’s 
perspective and McKevitt and Morgan (1997) looked at doctors’ experience when they 
are patients and did not seek the perspective of the doctors providing the treatment. Thus 
comparison of compatibility and conflict in perspective is not considered. One 
qualitative study (Boyle and Chambers 2000) was concerned with medication 
compliance, and sought the views of seven family carers rather than asking the people 
with depression. No explanation is given as to why those involved were defined as carers 
or why the people with depression were not asked to participate. Such exclusion appears
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to suggest that the authors perceive those with depression as invalid, without a valid 
voice.
Recent literature focuses heavily on the need to engage service users in research and to 
hear their views (DoH 1999, McClymont 1999, Clarke 1999b, DoH 2000, DoH 2001a). 
Nevertheless there is a danger of hearing the user view to the exclusion of other 
influential voices. The view of the insider expert does not replace that of the outsider 
(Brown et al 2001). As suggested within the literature on Relationship Centred Care 
Nolan et al (2004), to take the service users context to the exclusion of that of his/her 
family and of those who are providing the care could be said to be as negligent and 
exclusive as it has previously been to exclude the service user. Adams (1998) notes that 
views may notably differ, between user and carer, but that both are valid.
In gathering data from older people, relatives and staff members, I draw also on the work 
of Kevin McKee (1999) who suggests that, in dementia, there exists a care triad (Figure 
5.1). One’s perspective of a given situation is dominated by where one fits into the 
picture. In the community the carer perspective has predominated; in institutions the 
professional carer perspective dominates. For example, the National Consumer Council 
(1990) sought to examine services for older people with dementia living at home. While 
they included both people with dementia and their carers in the sample, the results 
published refer solely to the views of the carers. Although this can be seen as a move 
towards inclusion, exclusion remains the result.
Similarly I argue that Dementia Care Mapping (Kitwood and Bredin 1992), developed as 
an observational tool for measuring the well-being of people with dementia, focuses on 
care staff practices to the exclusion of the person with dementia, who is passively 
involved only as the peripheral article of scrutiny. Well-being, or ill-being, is interpreted 
from how a person with dementia expresses how they feel, non-verbally, without the 
additional validity of hearing the person with dementia verbally express their feelings.
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While I welcome the will to improve patient care through such examination, I suggest 
that the methodology could be said to marginalise people with dementia.
More recently two studies have used three sample groups in dementia research (Cohen- 
Manfield et al 2000). The findings suggest that using three sample groups enriches the 
quantity and scope of data achieved and also highlights both consensus and lack of 
agreement among the groups. Particularly the people with dementia placed emphasis on 
the need for aesthetic quality o f life, enjoyment, creativity and appreciation of 
surrounding, and on the importance of interactional capability, social participation, 
whereas carers and professionals did not feel these to be so pertinent for the person with 
dementia.
Having considered the research design, I now move on to consider its application.
The Care TriadFig. 5.1
Older
person
Relative
Staff
Member
5.4 The Sites
The research took place within two sites, both district general hospitals, where the local 
population is provided with medical services for all within the same premises. The 
hospitals are both in the south of England and serve equivalent population groups, 
covering both rural and urban population groups. Three comparable medical wards have
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been selected on each site, where the patient population was largely made up of people 
over 65. Staff members refer patients to psychiatric/mental health services using one of 
two modes of service, as set out in Chapter 4. I use pseudonyms to ensure anonymity.
• Chapley Hospital
Uses a mental health consultation/liaison nursing service whereby any member of the 
staff team could refer for an opinion and/or advice. Response involves an assessment, 
discussion and, often, ongoing intervention with the patient, family and team.
• Glimster General
Uses traditional psychiatric consultation, whereby physicians seek formal diagnostic 
assessment and advice from a psychiatrist. Consultation is followed by a formal written 
report and is a single event.
5.5 Inclusion and Exclusion
Engaging people with mental health problems in research produces challenges in both 
ethical and pragmatic terms (Clarke 1999b, Hubbard et al 2003). Not to overcome the 
challenges would negate the purpose of the research. Some authors have suggested that 
people with dementia have “lost their mind” and are unable to comment on subjective 
states (Wilkinson 2002); others have sought to define ability to respond through cognitive 
measures such as MMSE (Mini Mental State Examination. See Box 5.2), usually 
excluding those who score under 17/30. Mozely et al (1999) cited these anomalies and 
sought to discover whether people with dementia can answer questions about their quality 
of life. Using a combination of cognitive scoring and subjective interviewer view on 
confidence ratings on the face value of the interview, the findings suggested that over 
75% of those older people with MMSE scores of 10 could provide effective information. 
Interestingly the research design was such that those who scored less than ten were 
excluded from interview, without a clear and apparent rationale. Cohen-Manfield et al 
(2000) felt that “the MMSE score is not always a good predictor of ability to participate
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in research. Therefore, given evidence that people with dementia have a lot to say, if  only 
we listen to them (e.g. Goldsmith 1996), I did not use a cognitive measurement tool.
I excluded only those who, I ascertained through conversation around potential research 
participation could not engage either due to attention, hearing or language deficit. 
Although it is possible to communicate with people, other than verbally, such is not 
suitable for research involving taped interview. In practice exclusion on these grounds 
occurred only once, for a woman whose speech was barely discemable. Unfortunately
1a. What year is this? 1
1b. What season is it? 1
1 c. W hat month of the year is it? 1
1 d. What is today’s date? 1
1e. What day of the week is this? 1
2a. What County are we in? 1
2b. What Country are we in? 1
2c. W hat city/town are we in? 1
2d. What is the name of this building/the address of this house? 1
2e. What floor are we on/room are we in? 1
3. I am going to name three objects. After I've said them please repeat 
them to me,Remember them because I will ask you to name them 
again in a few minutes.(repeat up to five times ) BALL, CAR, MAN 3
4. Spell WORLD backwards, or subtract 7 from 100 and keep 
subtracting 7 Max 5
5. Recall the three objects from 3 above 3
6a. What is this called? (show a pen) 1
6b. What is this called? (show a watch) 1
7. Please repeat this phrase after me "no ifs, ands or buts” 1
8. Read the words on the page and do what it says,
"CLOSE YOUR EYES” 1
9. Take this paper in your (non-dominant) right/left hand, fold it in
half and place it on the floor. max 3
10. Please write a complete sentence. 1
11. Please copy this drawing (of two interlinking pentagons) 1
Box 5.2
Folstein’s Mini Mental State Examination
SCORE
Maximum score 30
Adapted from Kennedy (2002 p53)
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two of the interviews that I did conduct were difficult to comprehend on communication 
grounds. One man was inaudible and one woman was very hard of hearing. No 
exclusions were made due to gender or ethnicity. My intention was to exclude non 
English speakers but, in practice, such exclusion was not an issue.
The potential problems with attention and language are not, of course, exclusive to the 
potential participants with dementia. Although recently much research has focused on 
accessing die experience of people with dementia, similar emphasis has not been placed 
on hearing the voice of older people with depression. Its presence often leads to the 
person becoming withdrawn, uncommunicative and of low self-esteem. My experience 
suggests that people, at Chapley Hospital with identified depression were more likely to 
decline involvement in die research. In Chapley Hospital, seven people, who I knew to be 
depressed, declined involvement when approached by the gatekeeper (see below pi 19). 
One woman later voluntarily told me “I don’t know why you want to talk to me; I haven’t 
got anything interesting to say.” Another woman diagnosed with depression initially 
agreed to participate in the research. When, having gained permission, I telephoned her 
relative to ask whether she too would consent to participate, she declined participation 
and also said that her mother had told her that she didn’t really wish to participate but 
was doing so because she wanted to please and could not assert herself. This, the woman 
confirmed when I returned to her. My clinical knowledge suggests that declining 
involvement was, at least partially, due to depression and an associated sense that their 
view was unworthy of attention. Without negotiation, which may have been viewed as 
coercion or the inappropriate use of our clinical relationship, I could not engage many 
people with identified depression in research. This may explain, to an extent, the dearth 
of research in this area, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 7.
In contradiction to my experience achieving participation from people with depression in 
Chapley Hospital, die converse seem to be the case in GHimster. Although I was not 
aware whether the participants had been diagnosed as having depression I knew that they 
had not received attention from mental health services. Yet, I found six of them to show 
signs of depression. This brings into question issues of the effect of diagnosis of
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depression on esteem, which of course, due to lack of participation, I can merely 
speculate about. I go on to explore this further in Chapter 7.
It is also interesting to note that, whilst much of the concern within the methodology of 
this work centred on the need to protect the vulnerability of people with dementia who 
may not be able to give hilly informed consent, as I go on to explore, it is the people with 
depression who remain unheard.
5.6 Sampling
The proposed sample size for interview was sixty: twenty service users, twenty 
relatives/informal carers and twenty health care professionals, with ten of each group 
from each site. This size of sample was chosen in order to provide sufficient comparable 
data using the principle, laid down by Lofland and Lofland (1995), which suggests that 
one must have a reasonable sample size in order to enable a “range of versions” of the 
phenomena to be captured. Had saturation not been achieved with these sample numbers 
I would have sought further participants. By this I mean that, had I not been able to 
generally predict what themes would arise within interviews 9 and 10 from each cluster 
group, I would have sought more participants. This did not occur.
Prior to, and during the data collection process posters detailing the nature of the research 
project were exhibited on each ward (Appendix 7)
The criterion and rationale for inclusion in the research sample was as follows. The 
research subject gave consent or assent, as discussed below. Subjects were able to 
communicate verbally reasonably audibly and to hear conversation. The patient 
participants were over 65 and in hospital and on one of the wards involved in the study.
In order to minimise the effect of any previous experience subjects were asked to confirm 
that they have no previous experience with mental health services. In addition the staff 
sample excluded those with a specific mental health qualification.
Purposive sampling was used. In Chapley Hospital the patient sample was identified 
from those who met the inclusion criteria and who have received mental health 
intervention during their hospital stay. A gatekeeper was used in order to minimise any
1 2 0
risk of feeling an obligation to participate, particularly as they have met me in my clinical 
role before. The gate keeper approached potential participants and provided them with 
the relevant information sheet (Appendix 1) and returned later for a decision on whether 
or not the person wished to participate. If  s/he agreed to do so I subsequently met the 
potential respondent for further discussion. The timescale for this process was 
necessarily short in order that data related to experience may be readily recalled and the 
person would not go home prior to the interview being conducted.
Figure 5.2
Establishing a Research 
Cluster.
1. IDENTIFY AND
CONSENT
PATIENT/USER
2. SEEK 
CONSENT 
FROM 
RELATIVE
3. PATIENT 
PICKS THE 
STAFF 
MEMBER
In Glimster General, a similar process occurred, except that referral to mental health 
service was not required. A gatekeeper approached the person most recently admitted 
and provided the information sheet. Only when agreement was achieved was I given the 
person’s name and enabled to meet with them.
My initial intention was that the samples of relatives/carers and associated staff would be 
generated following the agreement of a patient to participate. Permission would be 
sought to approach a relative, and the subject would pick an unseen card to indicate
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which professional would join that cluster (Figure 5.2). The professional sample 
comprised doctors, nurses, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, service managers 
and social workers. The aim of this approach to generate samples is to keep the patientit 
the centre of the research. Although this process sometimes worked, it became apparent 
that some patients wished to participate but either had no relative or a relative who did 
not wish to participate. The formation of clusters of three, comprising a patient, their 
relative and an associated staff member therefore was not uniformly achievable. 
Reflecting on this finding I noted also a possibility that the relatives of those patients 
excluded from participation due to communication difficulties may wish to contribute. 
Thus I achieved equality in sample group sizes. Although clusters were being used for 
the purpose of sampling, there was no intention to analyze by cluster; therefore 
introducing unassociated participants did not affect results.
5.7 Consent/Assent
Considering the ethical dilemmas around achieving consent or assent, in as informed a 
way as possible, from people who are vulnerable to being misled or used for research 
without their knowledge, was a major challenge. My focus on this issue, although 
initially focused on the older people sample groups, expands to all participants. In many 
research studies ongoing consent and grasp of information are assumed, though possibly 
not present, throughout the data gathering process merely because the subject is assumed 
competent and is implying consent through participation. The presence of disability or 
illness, or being within an alien environment where one may feel disempowered, surely 
impinges on decision making and the ability to give informed consent for anyone. Such 
rigour, as I now describe, should be afforded to all research candidates.
There has been a recent increase in involving people with dementia in research. However, 
often little or no attention is evident on how consent from participants is achieved and 
sustained (e.g. Berlowitz et al 1995, Spector et al 1999). For example, within a report on 
an action research project examining the efficacy of a home support scheme for people 
with dementia, Askham and Thomson (1990) detail interviews with clients with dementia 
making no reference to the issue of consent. Consent, in this context then appears to be
1 2 2
taken as implicit in that the person is speaking with the researcher and not objecting.
Such assumptions could be seen as exploitative given the vulnerability and powerlessness 
of the sample group. Some researchers have used proxy consent in accessing people with 
dementia in studies (Berghams and Ter Meulen 1995). I rejected this approach as being 
disempowering to the person with dementia.
It is recognised that competence and capacity are context and time specific (British 
Medical Association, BMA 1995, Office of Public Sector Information (OPSI) 2005, 
Harrison and Williams 2006), for example, a person may be able to make decisions about 
what to eat for lunch but not about how to organise the purchase of the ingredients one 
day, but be able to achieve both the next day. Capacity can fluctuate with time of day, 
medication, physical health and stress (Moody 1992, OPSI 2005). However, protocols in 
place for research participants tend to assume an all or nothing concept of capacity to 
give informed consent. To make a competent decision a person must be able to 
comprehend and recall the information, consider the potential risks and benefits, and 
subsequently to weigh up the options before making their choice voluntarily (Lord 
Chancellors Office 1997, Gilhooly 2002, OPSI 2005, Harrison and Williams 2006). If a 
research participant is fully informed s/he knows that s/he can withdraw at any time, how 
the data will be used, that they are being interviewed, interpreted and analysed with intent 
to publish (Mason 1996).
I have already said that historically, those who have been perceived as unable to give 
informed consent have been excluded from gold standard research. However this is 
changing. If one cannot be sure that consent is informed, the bio-ethical model suggests 
that die research can progress if, in the utilitarian tradition, it is for the greater good. If 
potential benefits exist without risk this is termed as “non-therapeutic research” (Box 5.3) 
and may proceed, if  the person expresses willingness to participate and a proxy for diem 
agrees (Melnick et al 1984, Resau 1995). This research fulfils the described criteria. 
Because of the elements of forgetfidness and difficulties with judgement, I suggest that 
people with dementia cannot give consistent and ongoing informed consent. I therefore 
do not claim to have achieved informed consent from any participant who has cognitive 
impairment, or memory change caused by another problem, such as depression and who,
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Box 5.3
Non therapeutic Research
*1* The principal intention is to extend knowledge to 
benefit future patients (British M edical 
Association 1995)
❖  such research... is concerned with the condition 
from  which the person without capacity suffered 
and the procedures involve minimal risk and  
invasiveness... (Lord Chancellors Office 1997  
5.35.)
❖  ... it is desirable to provide knowledge of... the 
care o f  people affected by the incapacitating 
condition with which the participant is affected,
♦> the object o f  the research cannot be effectively 
achieved without the participation o f  persons who 
are without the capacity to consent,
*1* the research will not expose the participant to 
more than negligible risk, will no t be unduly 
invasive o r restrictive... and will not unduly 
interfere with the participants freedom  o f  action 
o r privacy (Lord Chancellors Office 1997 5.36.)
*+* "the person concerned does not ob jec t”
(Lord Chancellors Office 1997 5.37.)
at the time of my second appointment, could not recall the content o f our first meeting. 
Rather I sought ongoing agreement to participate and considered the assertion that 
“Testing the competency o f a person with dementia is ultimately a test o f our own 
competency as thoughtful, judicious humane human beings” (Sabat 1992 p334). I 
adopted an assent, and significant other assent, approach with those people who could not 
give fully informed consent. I judged assent to be present when the person verbally 
agrees to participate in an interview. Withdrawal o f assent was to be taken verbally or by 
non-verbal evidence of unwillingness to participate/continue, although in practice this did 
not occur.
In practice I effectively used this approach on five occasions in Chapley Hospital. This 
model o f assent complements the views of Jan Dewing (2002) who considers person 
centred approaches for achieving consent in her study into the meaning of wandering for 
people with dementia. She describes “inclusional consent” as a process, rather than a 
single bureaucratic act, achieved through the ongoing research relationship.
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5.8.1 Interviews
Through the consent/assent process, participants were asked to permit interviews to be 
taped, in order to ensure the accurate recording of data. The interviews generally lasted 
between half an hour and an hour but there was no time limit. I anticipated that people 
who had dementia may take longer (Goldsmith 1997). Interviews were loosely 
structured around key topics (Mason 1996) (Appendix 5). With the participant’s 
agreement, interviews took place in a confidential area of the ward, an office or therapy 
room. I largely conducted the interviews within the institutional setting of the general 
hospital sites. This was done for practical reasons given the feasibility of gathering the 
amount of data required within a time scale. I also felt that the potency of the hospital 
experience may be more validly expressed as it occurs, rather than in retrospect.
While I tried to make the interviews as informal as possible by conducting them away 
from the ward area the subject could be perceived as disempowered, being out of his/her 
own environment. Pinkney (2001), writing about children’s ability to participate in 
decision making, suggests that participation is not truly achieved when a person is invited 
to comment whilst in an environment and with “experts”, alien to their normality. What 
is said may be differently articulated dependent on the setting (Goldsmith 1999). Several 
authors have reported a more assertive and authentic response when hospital patients are 
visited and interviewed after their discharge from hospital (e.g. McClymott 1999). 
However, the hospital setting is the focus of this research, thus I argue that was both 
pertinent and practical to keep within the presenting context. Three of the Glimster 
relative interviews took piace in private homes as the older person had been discharged 
from hospital and this venue was preferred. The timescale was limited to within three 
days of the experience and did not appear to influence the content of the data.
I aimed to make the interview process comfortable by being conversational, thus 
achieving rich data (Oakley 1981). The power dynamics (pl33) of interviews could not 
be wholly overcome and, no doubt, judgements were made on what the interviewee 
believed that I wanted to hear (Koch et al 1995). There is no magical device for
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dissolving such inequalities. Whilst Oakley (1981) suggests that women can share power 
in interviews because of shared gender, this rather suggests that no other power dynamics 
exist, such as professional/lay person, class, knowledge etc. The most effective way to 
overcome issues around power is found in the skill of the interviewer in using personal 
style and adjusting to the position required by each interviewee as well as being non- 
judgmenta! even in the face of offensive material (Lee 1993 a).
As described above, I sought to uncover thoughts, feelings, behaviours, beliefs, 
communication methods and memories associated with mental health provision in 
general hospitals. I also needed to access participants interpretations associated with old 
age and hospitalisation generally as influencing concepts. My guide covers the areas I 
wanted to explore (Appendix 5). I encouraged focus on perception of mental illness and 
on how service may best be provided. I also looked for interpretation of any experience 
they have had in hospital, direct or indirect, and the extent of their involvement and 
power within any such involvement. For the staff sample I also sought information on 
what and how they learn about mental health problems in old age. Analysis of the 
content of the early interviews demonstrated that interviewees often did not identify 
depression as a mental health issue. Whilst this was interesting and worthy of further 
comment alongside overall findings, I wanted the subjects to discuss their views on 
depression even if they had not identified it. Thus I decided to introduce the topic 
myself, if necessary.
Throughout the data collection process I kept concurrent field notes. As well as detailing 
my immediate perceptions of the “gut” feel and content, verbal and non-verbal, of 
interviews, the notes ensured that I remain focused on die importance and risks involved 
in using myself as the tool with which to access information (Hedelin and Strandmark 
2001). I considered how I performed in the interview and whether I exerted any undue 
influence on response. Inevitably, as a nurse and as a post graduate student, I carry 
various agendas and history which influence the way I conduct interviews, which 
questions I choose to ask, howl, verbally and non verbally, attribute importance to
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particular questions and responses. In persistently reflecting on my own performance and 
the potential rationale for it, I sought to maximise objectivity.
5.8.2 Interview Content
Although I had considered my interview technique, with particular attention to my dual 
role as clinician and researcher and the associated power issues, I had anticipated a 
relative ease in interview style given my clinical ability to rapidly achieve therapeutic 
rapport. In theory I was aware that research interviews are “different”, due to the 
changed power dynamic (Hockey and James 1993, Oakley 1999), particularly given the 
sensitive topic under discussion (Lee 1993a). In practice it took a few interviews for me 
to adjust to a more personal interaction. Particularly I had to allow more time and effort 
in easing people into information giving by initially asking general questions allowing the 
topic of the research to emerge as the interview progresses (Brannen 1988).
Part of considering methodology for research is to contemplate the foreseeable “what 
ifs”, particularly so when potentially distressing the person with a mental health problem 
has been cited as rationale for not involving them in research (Moyle 2002).
Prior to starting the field work I considered that, during the course of an interview, a 
participant may become distressed due to the nature of the content, for example by 
focusing on the feelings of depression, hospitalisation or by highlighting the presence of a 
mental health problem. Lee (1993b) suggests that both interviewers and interviewees are 
likely to feel discomfort about sensitive topics. Therefore researchers should be trained 
and experienced in managing distress (Froggatt 1988, Gilhooly 2002). I felt that as I am 
a skilled clinician risk was minimised. The ability to handle distress and elicit 
information on sensitive issues from those who may not readily engage in conversation is 
central to my expert clinical role and transferable to the research interview situation. 
Similarly, the ability to manage emotion in the presence of distress can be transferred. Of 
course an interview could have been terminated due to distress. In practice this did not 
occur. There was an occasion when a woman became physiologically distressed.
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Although she declined termination of the interview, I am aware that I shortened the 
length of it.
I also considered that during an interview, information may come up that has not been 
shared with any member of the care team and which causes concern for the safety and/or 
the well being of the participant. I planned to seek agreement to act on such information, 
only if  the person is unwilling to share the information with others him/herself, and if I 
feel there is significant risk to die person, her/his health or others. In considering the 
action to take, I relied on the British Sociology Association Statement of Ethical Practice 
(1994) and on the Code of Professional Conduct (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2002). 
For example, if a participant had expressed that s/he was hoarding medication with a 
view to future overdose, and was unwilling to share the information outside the research 
interview, I would divulge the information. If a person informed me that s/he was not 
taking medication as prescribed, but with no intent to self-harm, I would encourage the 
sharing of the information but not do so myself. In practice such a situation occurred just 
once. I felt that Selina, a patient in Glimster General, was depressed and that her 
depression was potentially adversely affecting her ability to progress in rehabilitation.
She had not shared her feeling with the staff and did not wish to do so, despite my 
suggestion. In absence of significant risk, I respected her wish.
5.9 Patient Confidentiality/anonymity
I have taken various steps to ensure that the confidentiality and the anonymity of 
participants are protected. I have a safe in which I store interview tapes and data upon 
which “real names” appear for example consent forms. In transcribing data any 
information that could make the information attributable, either through names or places, 
is removed prior to being saved on pass-worded floppy discs. Pseudonyms are used in 
transcripts, in research papers and in this thesis.
In analysing and reporting on data I ensure that material is written up in such a way that 
participants will not be able to identify any specific individual.
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5.10 Analysis
For qualitative analysis I transcribe each interview verbatim, with any names used being 
substituted with the participant’s research number or, in the case of a third party name, by 
a pseudonym. The data is then analysed using N Vivo, a computer package, allowing 
rigorous and systematic retrieval in order to test relationships. Thus varying experiences 
can be constructed into meaningful social structures and become typifications (Williams 
and May 1996) and theory can emerge.
Before closing this chapter, I now spend some time contemplating my experiences in 
achieving the necessary ethical approval in order to carry out the research. Lastly I return 
to issues associated with power, particularly as they pertain to the research relationship 
and my dual roles.
5.11 The Challenge of Achieving Ethical Approval
While considering the ethical issues within this methodology, I became aware that my 
view was, by procedural necessity, being influenced by the demands of the bioethicai 
model that surrounds clinical research. In seeking approval to proceed, from the Local 
Regional Ethics Committees, I had to become involved in a power possessing procedure 
in order to access and empower the vulnerable society members within the sample 
groups. The whole process was both personally and theoretically challenging. Although I 
agree that achieving the approval of ethics committees is necessary in order to safeguard 
those being researched, I became frustrated by the process and on several occasions could 
have disempowered the potential sample by giving up the research. I will explain my 
experience of the process before arguing that changes could appropriately be made 
without compromising the need to protect the vulnerable.
The system for achieving ethical approval for research is steeped within the traditional 
bureaucratic hierarchical systems that typify the National Health Service. Due to the 
inability of such systems, at the time, to talk to each other I had to overcome two 
committees, as the two research sites were in different NHS regions. This process has
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now changed. Each Local Regional Ethics Committee (LREC) has its particular quirks 
that I had to learn, through trial and error.
The first task was completion of the LREC form, itself designed with positivist 
randomised control trials in mind. To achieve completion of the form I had to gain the 
agreement, often including a signature, of a number of representatives from the involved 
hospital trusts. I had to seek out these people and explain my plans to them, thereafter 
gaining their consent to proceed. Some were interested and readily engaged and several 
seemed to view me as an unnecessary chore that could readily be delayed. I came across 
a couple of people who I perceived as actually hostile to my intent. I left one meeting 
feeling battered, belittled and ridiculed by someone who, on reflection I felt, could not 
fully grasp the concepts I was trying to explain.
The role of an ethics committee is to prevent exploitation, consider scientific merit and 
ensure voluntariliness (Gilhooly 2002). I discovered that there was a tendency to prevent 
exploitation through exclusion of the vulnerable, a perception that scientific merit is 
present only in quantifiable data, and wanting participants to be able to consent. Both 
committees had a predominant medical presence. Each demonstrated limited 
understanding of grounded theory and theory development through induction. More than 
once I was asked how I could numerically validate my findings, how I would prove my 
hypothesis and why I couldn’t perform the research without involving vulnerable people. 
In contradiction, given the desire for valid data, I felt that too much concern was 
expressed about my sample size and how I could hope to achieve it. On a positive note, 
the experience facilitated close scrutiny of my methodology and therefore met the 
objectives of the committees as well as ensuring my confidence that ethical standards 
were being met.
As I have described, the process for achieving ethical approval is based on positivist 
medical methodology. The principles of bio ethics emerged in the 1960s and 70s with 
consumerism and the developing new technologies e.g. heart transplants. A system was 
required to address maximising benefit, minimising risk and involving people in decision 
making, while being just and fair. Bio ethics is driven around the principles of autonomy,
130
beneficence and justice; it is concerned with legal principles and the power of the law. 
This process, that is now inappropriately generalised for all research, was designed for a 
perceived need for an individual to make one off decisions, for example whether to have 
an operation, and assumes competence in giving informed consent.
Such principles are of questionable value for older people in hospital with chronic health 
problems, and particularly for older people with mental health problems. Moody (1992 
p21) describes the approach as one of “academia and professions removed from everyday 
politics and culture”. He argues that it is not fair to exclude anyone from involvement in 
decision making on the grounds of being unable to give wholly informed consent. In old 
age, autonomy is not an absolute. People are often co-dependent and choose to make 
shared decisions or, indeed, to defer to another. This interdependence, paired with a 
belief that consent is not a once and for all event (British Sociological Association 1994) 
but a subject for negotiation, suggests that alternatives to the bio-ethical model are 
needed. This particularly in research aimed at including those who cannot meet the 
definitions in achieving autonomy, yet need to be heard and not exploited.
To move from the bio-ethical model, old age and mental health problems in old age need 
to be seen in a context separate from that of acute medicine and rather as disability, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Within disability forums user involvement and credibility is 
established, shifting power from medicine to the person in the situation. Ethical 
principles can thus be developed from the historical “virtue ethics” perspective which 
centre on moral obligation. Moody (1992 p37) talks of negotiated consent (Box 5.4) as 
informal justice, involving die person in communication with all those involved in order 
to reach decisions. The ethical principle of social justice is seen as more pertinent than 
autonomy or benefience.
Although Moody describes the subject of negotiated consent in the context of decision 
making around care and treatment and end of life decisions, I suggest it is applicable in 
considering research participation in using models of assent described above and by 
Dewing (2002). In attempting to achieve my sample, I have come across specific 
problems that could potentially be overcome using this approach. Firstly, due to the
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demand for absolute confidentiality and risk of coercion, at the request of the ethics 
committees, I had to use a gatekeeper to make initial approach to potential participants. 
Given that those who make the approach are not skilled in communicating with people 
with mental health problems, I suspect that some potential participants are lost 
particularly those with the most subdued voice.
Bartlett and Martin (2002) describe similar concerns in using a gatekeeper. They felt that 
candidates were selected using the gatekeepers’ personal judgements about the ability of 
people with dementia to participate rather than their potential against the research criteria 
Secondly, there have been occasions when a proxy has declined to allow a relative to 
participate despite the person’s initial will to do so (see p i 19). Using a negotiating 
approach I could explore the issue, with both parties. Of course such a communicative 
ethics approach does not obliterate the risk of paternalism either from staff members or 
from a relative; however, it does give scope to explore and challenge such positions.
If we are to move forward with the philosophy of hearing and responding to the view of 
the service user, the power and the assumed generic applicability of the bio-ethical model 
in considering research participation requires challenge. However, I feel somewhat 
ambivalent in making this argument as, despite my concerns about the hierarchical 
structure and process of Local Regional Ethics Committees, I know that the discipline has 
enabled me to find an appropriate path between not involving those who cannot consent 
and merely assuming consent through compliance. There is a balance to be achieved 
between the health service model of LRECs and the less stringent concern for attention to 
ethics evidenced elsewhere. To not give due attention to ethical concerns around 
involvement, especially with a vulnerable group, is to abuse vulnerability by unknowing 
inclusion rather than by unknowing exclusion.
5.12 Power
As discussed in the previous chapter, the relevance of power is apparent in many guises 
throughout this research, and indeed within the process of ethical approval just described. 
The interviews themselves as well as each participant’s position within the general 
hospital setting, involve power dynamics associated with age, health status, competence,
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professional status, expertise, gender, class and environment. Here I specifically address 
issues of power within the research relationship.
Although inequalities in power are “politically unacceptable”, in a research relationship 
(Oakley 1999), they are inevitable. In holding the purpose o f the interview, setting the 
date and venue and sometimes even physically assisting the person to the appropriate 
room, the researcher holds power (Hey 1999). Inequalities also occur due to any number 
of social differences between the parties involved, such as gender, ethnicity, age and 
professional status. Feminist discourse suggests that women are more effectively 
interviewed by women and the majority of subjects in this research were women, in each 
cluster group (Oakley 1981, W olf 1996). In contrast Hockey and James (1993 pl67) 
suggest that the research interview potentiates the use of “liminal” power in the 
participant (see Chapter 2 p38). Contrary to their submissive position within the hospital 
setting, the interview afforded participants the opportunity to be powerful, to critique the 
dominant order. This may have been exhibited through refusal to participate, by being 
controversially outspoken, overtly frank or subversive.
Box 5.4
NEGOTIATED CONSENT IS CHARECTERISED BY
1. The clash and balancing of competing interests: 
there are multiple, legitimate views to consider with 
com prom ise a typical result.
2. S hared or dispersed authority for decision making: 
no single party h as  exclusive pow er of decision 
and specific attention m ust be given, for exam ple, 
to the structure of team  decision making, or conflict 
or concensus am ong family m em bers.
3. Negotiation is not governed by strict deductive 
rules; it is heuristic [uses trial and error] in its 
cognitive style, implying less reliance on codes of 
ethics and more attention for opportunities for 
discussion and discovery.
4. Negotiation is appropriate for situations w here the 
ideal outcom e is not attainable and making the 
b es t of a bad situation is the m ost tha t can be 
reasonably  expected.
Moody 1992 p37
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Interestingly in practice I found no such exhibition of liminal power from within clusters 
of older people. Rather it occurred among the relatives who were often critical of the 
system in ways that they had not overtly expressed elsewhere. This particularly occurred 
in Glimster General where I, the interviewer, sat wholly outside the powerful and rigid 
organisational structure (see also Chapter 6).
In examining 1he power dynamics within research participation I give particular attention 
to my role in Chapley Hospital where I performed the dual roles of clinician and 
researcher, and met research subjects in both capacities. Ideally I should have used 
independent hospitals, however, as I have explained in Chapter 1, when I commenced my 
research this was not possible due to realistic geographical consideration. Provision of 
established mental health service for older people in general hospitals using models other 
than medical referral was rare when this work was started in 2001, the nearest known site 
with a similar service being some 200 miles away. As with the issue of consent, 
described above, I have found that the necessary scrutiny, because of the challenge of 
being a clinician and researcher, has led to the development of approaches that can 
readily and appropriately be used in other situations.
Although within the realms of evaluation research the skills of the internal evaluator, a 
technical expert in the field, are acknowledged as being of value (Clarke 1999a) there is 
potential influence from the insider. Due to our clinical relationship potential participants 
may have been over-influenced to become involved in the research. Literature on service 
satisfaction data recognises that when users evaluate a service in which they are/have 
been involved, their response is likely to be falsely positive if they need to continue using 
the service or they know and like the staff working within it (Edwards and Staniszewska 
2000). I had to minimise the risks of appearing to empower people by virtue of my 
position in the health hierarchy and by my knowledge of them and of the system. Older 
people may be particularly vulnerable to agreeing to participate in research, through 
paternalistic influences (Barraclough and Fleming 1991). In achieving a sample, undue
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influence has been eliminated through the use of gatekeepers, as described, and indeed 
critisised, above (pl21).
Within the research interview, I adopted various techniques aimed at minimising the 
“clinical” influence. Interviews were never conducted on a day when I was also working 
clinically on a ward. I emphasised that the research was about mental health problems 
and mental health service generally, not about my ability or their specific issues. I 
conducted interviews as conversations, adapting to the needs and timescale of the subject, 
attempting to take on the role of the “interested stranger” (Hey 1999), or therapeutic 
listener (Oakley 1981) who can achieve intimacy and then vanish. Professional language 
was avoided in line with Foucault’s theories on the power of discourse. On the two 
occasions when a relative referred, during interview, to clinical issues unrelated to the 
research, I answered direct questions and confirmed that we would address the issue later 
(Clark and Keady 1996). Alongside these strategies I made concurrent field notes in 
which I reflect on any perceived influence or role conflict
In practice, although I made conscious attempts to personally feel different on the days 
when I was a researcher rather than a clinician for example in my dress, my work 
colleagues failed to notice my changed attire and continued to ask clinical questions. As 
a fellow practitioner I continued to be viewed as an ally (Bloor 1997). Usually I could 
swiftly respond and return to role but on one occasion, I had to remove my research 
“hat”, for a clinical emergency, and simultaneously lost a research subject. Indeed such 
role conflict also occurred at Glimster General where I was known to be a clinician as 
well as a researcher. This raised concern as I did not want to contaminate the data by 
providing mental health liaison clinical expertise to potential participants. I therefore 
avoided any such professional discussions until after any research interview had 
occurred.
Once within the interview situation clashes of role with clinical colleagues become 
unproblematic. The staff I have interviewed do not discuss “cases” at all, apparently
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using a professional role boundary to do so. In the extreme one nurse referred to me, in 
the third person on several occasions:
Nurse Fiona: I refer to Gwyn Grout for advice...
My conflicting roles were oftenthe subject of my field notes and reflections. In relation 
to interaction with colleagues, particularly fellow nurses, the presence of two, potentially 
conflicting role categorisations (Baker 1997) was again apparent when they, during 
interview, extolled the perceived advantages in having a nurse mental health expert rather 
than one of other professional discipline, notably medicine. Within analysis I had to 
consider how much of this was a message of solidarity between allies and how much was 
*due to other factors such as approachability and scope of practical functional expertise 
(see Chapter 8). I found myself constantly on my guard to remain within the, less 
familiar, researcher role, while not becoming so distant as to lose the conversational 
interview style fundamental to my methodology.
In considering my dual roles in relation to the older people and relative clusters, my 
reflections centred on my clinical versus my research eye. Due to my years of experience 
I am embedded within my membership category (Baker 1997) of mental health nursing, 
and as such work within the dominant culture of bio-medicine. Moving from a stance of 
listening followed by action to listening alone was a challenge. For the majority of 
interviews focus and insight into the potential pitfalls was effective. However, 
particularly for those older people in Glimster Hospital who I felt to be depressed yet to 
have had this unnoticed, was a major challenge (see Chapter 7). As I write about it I 
continue to feel the conflict between listening and not acting.
In terms of role conflict issues on the part of older people and relatives I had met before I 
found that the older people did not stray from the research topic to seek clinical 
intervention. In most cases this is due to memory impairment such that our previous 
encounters are not recalled. Relatives, however, return repeatedly to the specificity of 
their relative’s situation, often lacking an ability to generalise, maybe because of their 
current stress within the hospital situation. This latter occurred in both Chapley and
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Glimster indicating that it was not my role that caused this focus. I will explore this more 
fully in Chapter 8 and consider whether relatives had more difficulty conceptualising the 
whole setting because they are not embroiled within it in the same way that patients and 
staff are. Older people in hospital take on the expected role as hospital patient and 
become part of a social world that their relatives view solely as outsiders focused on the 
piece of interest to them, i.e. their relative.
In considering the ethical issues surrounding this research I have contemplated my own 
position in conducting this research as a relatively younger person who, in our ageist 
society, may hold more power than the older participants. Such focus, by the powerful 
on the less powerful, could itself been construed as pejorative and ageist. Such 
arguments are often aimed at Gerontology particularly when researchers are examining 
their subjects from a “job” perspective with a potentially political agenda. I counter such 
a possibility by emphasising the inclusion of all the social actors in the setting and by 
asserting that to exclude older people would certainly be unjust.
5.12 Participant Detail
Before concluding this chapter and moving into analysis and discussion, appendix 6 
provides detail of the anonymised research participants, by site, cluster group and, for 
staff, profession. I provide each participant with an imaginary name. I found potential 
relatives very challenging to recruit and eventually, in the knowledge that saturation of 
data had been achieved and in absence of further time, I remained with the sample as 
detailed. The majority were of white British origin with the exceptions having lived in 
the UK for many years.
In quoting responses I will detail my speech, as “Int”. Respondents are given a 
pseudonym, their cluster status (if not an older person in hospital) and a “C” for Chapley 
or “G” for Glimster, Chapley being the consultation liaison method site and Glimster the 
hospital using the traditional model of mental health service provision. For example,
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Selina is a patient in Glimster General; therefore she is quoted with G. Selina. Fiona is a 
nurse in Chapley Hospital and is quoted with C. Nurse Fiona.
5.14 Conclusion
In this chapter I have described and explored my chosen methodology. The use of 
qualitative interviews across six cluster groups from two hospital sites ensures an 
adequate and diverse range of views of the social world; the general hospital. Such scope 
of data is required in order to utilize the theories of Interpretive Interactionalism and 
Social Constructionism and to interpret the data, in considering how mental health 
problems in old age are socially constructed in the setting.
I have examined the ethical challenges involved in the research. I discuss my rationale 
for not excluding people using arbitrary test scores, rather on their communicative ability. 
Maybe surprisingly it was more difficult to recruit people with depression than dementia.
I also explain my rationale for not insisting on informed consent. In using an accent 
process I both facilitate participation and avoid the risk of exploitation. I afford much 
attention to the process of achieving ethical approval, challenging the methodology of 
bio-ethical committees in favour of a process involving negotiation.
Lastly I explored the concepts of power, influential in many guises, both empowering and 
disempowering, in the research. Particularly I explain the strategies used to minimise 
risks associated with my dual role as clinician and researcher.
I conclude that all research subjects should be afforded the same scrutiny to detail and 
that my attention is to the potential benefit of all potential subjects, all of whom hold a 
place within the complicated power dynamics of a general hospital setting.
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Chapter 6
The Visible
In this, the first of three analysis and discussion chapters, I address the question:
“How are mental health problems in old age conceptualised in the general hospital 
setting?” This chapter forms a foundation upon which the subsequent chapters and 
theories are built.
Here I examine the power dynamics that dominate each site and, through their presence, 
impact on the formation of perceptions of mental health problems in old age as overtly 
visible and socially bad behaviour. I suggest that this construction is an emphasis of the 
popular perception of mental illness described in Chapter 3.
In Chapters 7 and 8 respectively, I examine those mental health problems that are 
invisible in the setting and the nature of service provision. Although I have divided these 
chapters, the subject matter and discussion within each is not mutually exclusive and 
much of it is cross influential, particularly given the impact of the power dynamics that 
affect perceptions. In concluding the thesis, Chapter 9 brings together for further 
argument and discussion the issues as they converge.
Throughout the examination, interpretation and discussion, in this and future chapters, I 
particularly examine the language people use to define the issues. Evidence from each 
site and cluster group is examined for comparability and difference. In quoting data, 
participants are identified by a pseudonym and the site and cluster group, as explained in 
Chapter 5 (pi 3 8).
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, various forms of power impinge on the social actors, the 
social settings and inevitably on the research matter within this work. Given that Social
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Constructions arise out of local practices and beliefs as well as from wider cultural and 
social contexts, it is necessary to explore the influences that impact upon those practices 
and beliefs before delving into the generated data.
The power dynamics that might typify the setting became apparent during my experience 
with the ethics committees (pi30). I became increasingly aware that I was entering a 
world of positivist, bio-medical dominance within which people with mental health 
problems were not seen as capable of engagement with any decision making. The 
imbalance between the vying powers of medical knowledge and organisational politics 
became increasingly evident as I progressed through data collection to analysis and 
exploration. These competing powers serve to ensure the exclusion of the consumer 
voice, particularly when the consumer is not readily warranted a valid voice.
As I was collecting data, meeting people, seeking research subjects and conducting 
interviews it became apparent that, although the sites are comparable in demographic 
make up, they were different in culture and organisation. In his study of a psychiatric 
hospital Lindsay Prior (1993) points out that each ward is different in culture, supporting 
Foucault’s suggestion that power flows through systems and that it can move differently 
between groups and within systems (Hey 1986, Lupton 1994). It is therefore unsurprising 
that Chapley and Glimster hospitals differ. The wards in Glimster General, where the 
traditional model of psychiatric consultation was used, seemed calmer and quieter, with 
more order than those in Chapley Hospital. I began to consider that there were 
differences in the understandings of the norms and expectations that govern being a 
patient in each site and also in the organisational goals and agendas that concern the staff. 
This feeling was emphasised as I became immersed in the interview data. While it is not 
the subject of this research to scrutinise these aspects of the settings, such differences 
potentially affect how those with mental health problems are defined and responded to.
As I discussed in Chapter 2, traditionally, patients have been expected to defer to those 
seen to have legitimate power, the health care professionals, and this renders them 
invisible as individuals and merely part of the group (Hockey and James 1993).
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However, since the 1980s with the bureaucratisation of the NHS and the subsequent drive 
towards maximising consumer involvement and choice the direction of the flow of power 
is changing.
In examining the organisational differences I explore these three potential areas of 
difference traditional, organisational and consumer power before going on to consider 
how they may affect the perceptions of mental health and illness. In considering the 
differences between Chapley and Glimster Hospitals, in terms of power and influence, I 
conclude that there exists traditional bio-medical power in both sites with Chapley 
Hospital showing signs of movement towards a more consumer, person centred focus 
while Glimster General exhibits strong organisational power. Such differences do appear 
to influence the view of mental health problems in old age by the staff working in the 
hospital.
Having scrutinised the data around power, this chapter moves on to explore how the 
participants describe and view those older people in the general hospital thought to have 
mental health problems. I note that references almost exclusively define mental health 
problems in old age as being characterised by confusion and a presentation that does not 
fit in with the demands and anticipated norms of the social setting. Deviations from 
perceived normality are described in various ways, generally emphasising the nature of 
behaviour that does not fit in.
Before exploring the specific descriptors I examine the use of diagnostic terminology 
around confusion, concluding that this is not generally how mental health problems in 
this setting are defined. For the remainder of the chapter I scrutinise and discuss data 
suggesting that people with mental health problems do not fit into, and indeed are a threat 
to, the social world generally and specifically to that of the highly structured general 
hospital setting.
In concluding the chapter I argue that mental health problems in old age in the general 
hospital setting are defined, across sites and cluster groups, by the extent to which the
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confused person fits into the social setting. The person seen to have a mental health 
problem does not fit in by virtue of their socially unacceptable behaviour. The divisions 
between normality and abnormality in this setting are emphasised by the power 
dynamics, the stringent organisational structures and the bio-medical focus that exist. It 
is to these issues of power that I now turn my attention.
6.2.1 Traditional Medical Power
In concurrence with the literature (Morgan 1997, Pilgrim and Rogers 1999, Vincent
1999) among the older people in both sites there is an expectation that, when in hospital, 
one must behave in certain ways and defer to the routines and direction of those in power. 
Carolyn Baker (1997 pl30; see p39) explains how people attribute themselves and others 
with “membership categorisation” dependent upon specific role. In this way deference to 
professional power is readily accepted as the required state of mind and body for a patient 
in hospital. Selina, a patient at Glimster Hospital, comments on the perceived need to 
conform and disappear in to die group. She is aware that she has lost her individuality to 
the hospital routine, yet appears powerless to assert her uniqueness from within the 
prescribed patient role. She whispers her response that she dislikes being in this position, 
apparently signifying that she dare not contravene her expected position for fear of being 
found to be rebelling.
You’re given a new life; you know what I mean...You’re 
leading your life under a new name. It’s all I can say 
Is it completely different to what you are used to then?
Yes, yes. In fact I don’t like it...(whispered) Doing things 
differently; you know what I mean, getting up at funny times 
and going to bed at funny times, that’s terrible. Quarter past 
eight, that lot that I am with. Sound asleep and I’m wide 
awake wondering what to do.
The expectation of conformity is also strong among the relatives with only Malcolm 
expressing that he dares to challenge the view of the hospital. He insisted that his wife, 
who has Alzheimers disease, would go home despite contrary advice. Here he speaks of 
another family in an extremely sad situation who feel powerless against the medical 
recommendation that she should go into a nursing home. Like others, particularly in
G. Selina: 
Int:
G. Selina:
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Glimster General, the family do not feel able to “stand up” and express their will to take 
their mother home. As Lesley, another relative asserts: “You feel very much in their 
power, a lay person can’t argue with them. They are the experts, they ought to know, 
they do know what is best, I can’t argue with that.” Such exclusion from decision 
making, around the future care needs for someone with dementia, correlates with the 
assertion of Cotter et al (1998) who discussed the lack of consultation with people with 
dementia about long term placement.
G. Husband Malcolm: Now I found outfrom a patient opposite, she had two
daughters and they came and said to me one day “Mum’s 
got to go in a home” I said “why?”[they said] “because 
they’ve told me she’s got to go in a home” and they said to 
me “we wish we could be like you and stand up for Mum, but 
we’re not built that way” and it’s very sad.
Among the staff group at Glimster evidence of a historically based traditional service 
expectation is seen in several staff members who suggest that there are people in their 
wards who should never have been admitted. They feel that those seen to have mental 
health problems, in perceived absence of a “bad enough” physical illness, do not meet 
their expectation of category membership for a general hospital patient. Such a view, 
suggesting that problems with physical and mental health are mutually exclusive, was 
challenged back in 1924 in the Macmillan Report that suggested that demarcation 
between “ordinary parlance and derangement of conduct” was inappropriate (Jones 1993 
pl31, (p7), and is recently emphasised in “Everybody’s Business” (CSIP 2005). 
However it appears that in Glimster General the Cartesian psych/soma division remains 
clearly defined with the entry of inappropriate patients seen to disturb the traditional 
equilibrium.
In the following quote Nurse Trish clearly separates physical from mental illness, seeing 
the latter as not hospital business. In his quote Consultant Peter suggests that those who 
are a challenge within the setting may be physically contained, to retain social order, 
using medication and cot sides (rails on the bedside that prevent a person from getting 
up). This may explain why Glimster General appears to be so ordered and why the staff 
there are less troubled by extremes of challenge in behaviour than their Chapley Hospital
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counterparts as I explore as the chapter progresses. While there is evidence of a lack of 
willingness to accept caring for older people with mental health problems as core to the 
general hospital role among other cluster groups, and indeed the Chapley Hospital staff, 
there is not the emphasis on a clear definition about what conditions are proper to the 
setting. In Glimster General there appears to be a stronger belief that medicine and 
psychiatry are mutually exclusive specialities.
G. Nurse Trish: Often they don’t have medical problems. Often with the
elderly we get patents; they don't come in because they are 
ill, they come in because they are not looking after 
themselves... I think there are a lot of people who come to 
us because they are depressed because they have got 
mental health problems, not medical problems.
G. Consultant Peter: Dementia has always been at the bottom of the pile and it
would be expensive to change it, for example to provide one 
to one nursing, rather than putting the cot sides up or 
increasing medication.
Coupled with this concept of bio-medical power from the general medical perspective is 
the macro power that psychiatric services hold in being the experts in the field of mental 
health and illness. Each group of professionals has a vested interest in sustaining the 
exclusivity of their knowledge and thus their power (Foucault 1974). I go on to explore 
this perpetuation of division further in the next two chapters noting here that it is highly 
influential in the way that mental health problems in old age are perceived in the general 
hospital setting. In both sites, issues of mental health and illness are seen as the business 
of external experts and not within the tradition of general medical knowledge.
6.2.2 Organisational Goals
As discussed in Chapter 2, the power within the NHS is shifting from medical to 
political/bureaucratic power (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999) with government targets 
focussing on waiting times and delays in hospital discharges. There is some suggestion 
within the data that the staff at Glimster General are more politically process focussed 
than their colleagues at Chapley Hospital, implying that Glimster has a power base within 
management whereby older people, who do not follow the expectation of the system to
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come into hospital: receive treatment and go home; are more likely to be deemed as 
medically untreatable; in need of nursing care only and “not the responsibility of their 
budgets” (Vincent 1999 p52). The person with mental health problems therefore meets 
neither the traditional expectation of a patient (above) nor the organisational expectation 
that they will get better and be discharged. It becomes evident, as we move through the 
data, that such inability to fit in with general hospital expectation actually becomes the 
definition of a mental health problem.
Referral to mental health services, in Glimster, is more driven by the organisational 
agenda to move people through the system than that of their counterparts in Chapley 
Hospital, where referral appears to be more focused on the needs of the individual patient 
using a more person centred approach (Kitwood 1993). Although Val suggests that a 
psychiatrist is called to consider a person’s safety, her emphasis is that the decision about 
whether or not this person requires specialist care underlines her perception that the 
person is socially inept (p95) and unsafe to go home.
G. OT Val: We have one [psycho geriatrician] who comes, basically if
she is requested to. She doesn’t come all the time. It's 
basically for people who come in, come in with a mental
health diagnosis and the query is whether they are safe to 
go home or not. She’ll get involved then to see whether they 
need EMI [elderly mentally ill] placement or whether they’ll 
be fine in an ordinary placement.
As discussed above, Val defines the person as not being proper for hospital business due 
to the mental health problem and therefore in need of being systematically moved on. I 
go on to explore the definition of such older people as “poor things”, who are perceived 
as incapable and not attributed with a voice, in Chapter 7.
The apparent organisational positioning of Glimster General appears to mirror the 
description from Gilleard and Hill (2000 pi 01) who suggest that older people are seen as 
a sub class of consumers unable to exercise choice, even though they are the ones who 
most often use the services.
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Old people are hurried in and out, their physical and social status assessed and 
their frailties noted and attended to as efficiently as possible within the law: or they 
lie, waiting to be claimed by some citizen consumer, a.k.a. carer, where the health 
service can discharge its responsibilities...And yet ironically at the point where the 
body becomes the defining element in a person’s life, the health care professionals 
re-orientate themselves. They construct disembodied packages of care in which 
the fourth ager becomes a series of categories of response, a new cultural text of 
met or unmet need.
Within structured organisations there are expected standards of behaviour, monitored and 
controlled by panoptic surveillance (Foucault 1979 p34). The general hospital setting, 
apparently particularly Glimster General, is a tightly controlled system whereby any 
observed deviation from the rules is either extremely apparent and frowned upon, or 
subdued, as Consultant Peter, above, suspects to be the case.
The relatives of older people with dementia in both sites are aware when their relative has 
moved beyond the boundary of the hospital’s organisational purpose. They know that 
those termed as “bed blockers” do not fit in, with Daughter Lesley using the 
organisation’s language that defines those who are “medically fit” as no longer having a 
rightful place. Malcolm suggests a political driver for such action in saying “possibly it is 
league tables”. The use of hospital colloquial language is evidence of the power exerted 
by professional staff whereby they control the agenda (Hewison 1995) ensuring that what 
they perceive as excessive and inappropriate length of stay is interpreted in the same way, 
and acted upon, by the relatives who are left feeling guilty.
Int: So, is this the right place for people like your Mum, who are
ill?
G. Daughter Lesley: No. In a way it is because we’ve taken too long, trying to get
her out. When she was stable, medically, as they said, then 
we should have been starting to move her out but, I mean, 
thafs 5 weeks ago.
6.2.3 Consumer Power
With the Governments of New Labour in the 1990s and 2000s, emphasis is currently 
placed on the agenda of consumer choice (DoH 2000) with the recommendation of a shift 
in power from the traditional and organisational to that of the NHS service user. There is 
some evidence of movement in this direction within responses at Chapley Hospital.
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Cathy, like her counterparts in Glimster General expects to have her future determined by 
the “powers that be” irrespective of her wish to return home. The nature of the power 
dynamic for an older person in hospital, render her, in her perception, inevitably 
subservient. She believes that, by courtesy of their powerful position, they have the fight 
to take her house away from her if they deem it necessary. However, Cathy was due to 
go home shortly after the interview, but had forgotten that it was happening.
Int: So who did you think would make the decision about you
going into a home then?
C. Cathy: Well, the powers that be...the sort of people ...who are
people that knew all about that. I am not making that up 
...that is the one thing that worries me so you know that 
they will say I can’t go home... well I have got my own house 
that I live in I mean, well they can take it from me of course 
they can, but I mean it is my house.
Among the staff sample from Chapley Hospital, unlike their counterparts at Glimster, 
there is no suggestion that any older people are inappropriately occupying hospital beds. 
Contrary to Consultant Peter’s suggestion above (pl45), Fiona explains the explorative 
efforts she makes in trying to avoid using restraint. Many, like Dianne, describe their 
role in addressing complicated presentations. The Chapley Hospital staff seem less 
inclined to make traditional differentials between issues of the mind and body, while they 
establish “what’s going on” and how best to provide care.
C. Nurse Fiona: I have had several experiences of very disturbed people...
...Yes, and howto deal with them. The basic stuff, keeping 
them quiet, talking one to one, for any confused patient, we 
have absorbed and we can do it but we don't always know 
what triggers them back up. I mean it might be a single 
word, or it might be an action. In one case it was a blue 
dress [that triggered the agitation] but it took us about 3 or 4 
days to figure it was a blue dress....if we can’t find it we have 
really got to do something more constructive than one to 
one.
Int: And what would that be?
C. Nurse Fiona: Well unfortunately the duty doctors usually suggest drugs to
sedate them or to put them in bed asleep for a few hours 
which I think is counter-productive, it doesn't solve the 
problem, it just alleviates an immediate crisis.
C. Dr Dianne: Well, confusion is a big problem and then that could be just
because of infections or, you know, simple things causing it,
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but it then also can be gradual confusion from dementia or 
that kind of thing. We have had a number of psychotic 
patients as well that have obviously had problems 
throughout their lives that are just exacerbated further by 
them being elderly or then having other infections on top of 
that and then again that can be acute psychosis. We have 
to find out what’s going on.
Such examples may suggest an organisation which focuses more on hearing the voice of 
people in hospital. Equally such differing focus, particularly towards those who 
traditionally do not belong, may result from differing modes of mental health service. It 
will not be possible to wholly untangle the route of these differences, in absence of 
comprehensive exploration of the organisations, but I further the analysis and discussion 
in Chapter 8.
Although there may be some evidence of a more person centred approach in Chapley 
Hospital, consumer power has a long way to go before it truly influences the power 
structures that exist in these settings. As becomes evident as we progress through the 
data, there is more visible assertive consumer behaviour from the relative clusters, who 
focus on the needs of their loved one rather than on the whole system, particularly in 
Chapley Hospital. I suggest that this may be because the relatives do not, so readily, 
become embroiled within the organisational system and the subservient role expected of 
patients. Equally, however, it could be because the relatives are mostly of a different age 
group who have existed in die world as consumerism has developed.
6.2.4 Site Comparison
Examination of the data suggests that there is little difference in the perception of power 
structures and hospital organisation among the older people and some of the relatives 
across the sites. However, differences in staff views are clear. The variety and instability 
of power influences in these two hospitals reflects the current power struggles within the 
NHS between clinicians, who traditionally held the reins, managers, politicians and the 
growing power of the patients themselves, as consumers.
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In Glimster a traditional model of hospital care exists, with problems outside the 
perceived boundaries of the organisation, for example mental health problems, 
“overlooked, ignored and assumed not to exist” (Parker and Penhale 1999 p203) except 
when they affect the environmental order and organisational goals. There also appears to 
be a high focus on the current political drive to move people through the acute hospital 
system. Chapley Hospital feels more chaotic and is possibly moving towards a more 
consumerist and person centred approach with greater emphasis on individual choice.
Due to the more rigid organisation structure at Glimster General, mental health problems 
are potentially more readily described in terms of those who do not fit in with the 
perceived service criteria and focus on rehabilitating people who are able to conform. In 
Chapley a more fluid response is apparent. It is only those with extremes of deviant 
behaviour that are perceived as out of place. I continue to explore these apparent 
differences further in this chapter and also in Chapter 8 where I look at the impact of 
differing models of mental health service.
6.3 Perceptions of Mental Health Problems in Old Age
I now move on to consider perceptions of mental health problems in old age in the 
general hospital setting as described by the research participants. I consider the impact of 
the power differentials just described, as well as considering other influential factors.
I explore how the participants describe and view those older people in the general 
hospital thought to have mental health problems. I note that references almost 
exclusively define mental health problems in old age as being characterised by confusion 
and a presentation that does not fit in with the demands and anticipated norms of the 
social setting. Deviations from perceived normality are described in various ways, 
generally emphasising the nature of behaviour that does not fit in.
Before exploring these descriptors, however, I examine the use of diagnostic terminology 
around confusion concluding that this is not generally how mental health problems in this
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setting are defined. For the remainder of the chapter I scrutinise and discuss data 
suggesting that people with mental health problems do not fit into, and indeed are a threat 
to, the social world generally and specifically to that of the highly structured general 
hospital setting.
I argue that mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting are defined, 
across sites and cluster groups, by the extent to which the confused person fits into the 
social setting. The person seen to have a mental health problem does not fit in by virtue 
of their socially unacceptable behaviour. The divisions between normality and 
abnormality in this setting are emphasised by the power dynamics, the stringent 
organisational structures and the bio-medical focus that exist as explored above. The 
presence of such rigidity in organisation serves to exaggerate the presence of socially 
abnormal behaviour. Constructions of mental health problems in this setting are, I 
suggest, an exaggeration of those of the wider lay public, as examined in Chapter 3.
All participants were introduced to the research subject in the following way:
Int: This research is about mental health problems in old age
in the general hospital setting. What do you think I’m 
talking about?
Going on to use the further probe if necessary:
Int: What would you see as a mental health problem here?
How could you tell?
6.3.1 Defined by Medical Diagnosis
I explained in Chapter 1 that the underlying question which led to me undertaking this 
research was that I suspected that people in die general hospital setting do not use the 
language and definitions of psychiatry in conceptualizing mental health problems in old 
age. As discussed in Chapter 3 both literature and psychiatric service provision around 
mental health and illness have long been dominated by the perspective of psychiatric 
medicine, this despite significant advances in sociological and psychological study of
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mental health problems in old age, particularly dementia as discussed in Chapter 4.
Given this historical and dominant model, alongside the dominance of the bio-medical 
perspective in this setting, I here consider whether this position, taken for granted in 
psychiatry, is replicated by those in the general hospital setting.
In this section I first examine the responses as they appear to pertain to dementia. I go on 
to examine any differentials made between dementia and delirium. The diagnostic 
category of depression is notable in its absence. I explore this apparent omission in 
Chapter 7. Lastly, in this section, I explore any possible influence due to my position as a 
researcher whose professional background is within the field of medical psychiatry.
6.3.1.1 Confusion
In concurrence with the literature that suggests that professionals use diagnostic categories 
(Pilgrim and Rogers 1993, Prior 1993) all the staff from Chapley Hospital and the 
majority from Glimster General assert that mental health problems in old age are defined 
by the words dementia, cognitive impairment, cognitive problems or chronic confusion, 
used as medical diagnoses. They demonstrate a construction of dementia as the mental 
health problem in old age that they encounter, and are challenged by, day-to-day. Few use 
other diagnostic descriptions.
C. Nurse Fiona: Onset early dementia, dementia, Alzheimer's, cognitive
problems, perceptual problems - the whole range.
G Discharge Well I guess, short-term memory loss, you know, as we
Nurse Ruth: say, perhaps Alzheimers, those sorts of conditions really.
Interestingly although most of the staff members made reference to diagnostic identifiers, 
to describe dementia, as the interview progressed they all moved on to describe mental 
health problems in old age in terms of the impact of those perceived to have such 
conditions, have on the social setting. They did not use the diagnostic language of 
psychiatry. Such lack of sustained focus on the medical categories of psychiatry begins 
to suggest a lack of concurrence between the medical and the psychiatric position. It is as 
though the practitioners know, and can reel off, the language that is anticipated of their
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professional position yet do not buy into the whole concept as it is defined by psychiatry. 
Using the terminology of Carolyn Baker (1997; see p39), they use the diagnostic 
language that becomes their status as members of the health professional category, yet 
they readily stray from it.
The patient and relative groups broadly do not use diagnostic terminology. Mary is the 
only patient participant to suggest that “senile dementia” is a mental health problem of 
old age. Mary is the youngest of the “older people” at 65, and clearly does not define 
herself as old in any way making no association to her own cognitive abilities. Olive and 
Pru are typical of the older old participants who define their own memory changes in 
terms of a phenomenum of normal ageing. Indeed consideration about whether or not 
memory problems constitute a mental health problem brought general consensus that 
some deterioration in cognition is to be expected as one grows older.
I know forgetful is a thing of old people, I mean I forgetthings, 
people younger than me forgetthings don’t they?...And 
especially words. Oh and it comes instantly after a few 
seconds doesn’t it? When you’re not trying.... I’ve got all my 
marbles, but they get moved around sometimes.
Some people in old age get problems with their memory, don’t 
they?
So. Is that mental illness?
No, no, that’s old age.
That’s normal old age?
Yes, I mean I forgetthings at times.
Such definition of relative normality, in the presence of ageing, suggests that older people 
themselves support the positioning of dementia, or at least memory loss, as a disability 
rather than a disease, in line with the suggestion of Jane Gilliard (2001) and others 
(Beresford 2002, Kitwood 1997, Manthorpe 2001, Adams and Bartlett 2003). The 
difference here however is that Olive and Pru are not using the word dementia to define 
their memory changes. They do not wish to tag anything that smacks of abnormality to 
their own experience. Here we begin to encounter some of the difficulties experienced in 
differentiating age related memory loss from dementia, a disease. As I go on to explore 
in this chapter it seems that the lay view, including the view of staff who do not work in
G. Olive:
G. Pru: 
Int:
G. Pru: 
Int:
G. Pm:
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psychiatry, is that the attribution of the mental illness, dementia, only occurs in the 
presence of exhibited unusual behaviour. I also go on to explore in the next chapter the 
power of stigma in preventing people from acknowledging the presence of anything that 
may be construed as a mental health problem.
There is however something of a contradiction arising once a person has been given a 
medical diagnosis. Lesley, who has recently been told that her mother has dementia, 
demonstrates differentiation between disease and ageing, deferring to the knowledge of 
the superior medical standpoint. Vera too suggests that the attribution of a diagnosis 
turns an age related memory problem into a mental health problem.
G. Daughter Lesley I thought, you know, that this was old age, that my mother 
was getting forgetful sometimes, said strange things and 
lied, but..but it didn’t occur to me that it was mental illness, 
as such.
What about people with memory problems, would you call 
that a mental health problem?
I’m all right. I remember too well, that’s my trouble.
Oh yes, I’m not suggesting that you have a memory 
problem, but some older people do have a memory 
problem. Would you call that a mental illness or not 
No, I wouldn’t, I think it’s all part of growing old.
You mentioned Alzheimers disease earlier?
Oh yes. I’ve known several people who’ve had it
And would you call that a mental illness or a mental health
problem?
It is really isn’t it, because they seem to get worse, not 
better.
In what way?
More confused, more and more confused.
The attribution of the diagnostic labels appears to exaggerate the confusion and make it 
worse. This differentiation may demonstrate the power and influence of medicine over 
the lay view and indeed the medicalisation of old age and dementia (Vincent 1999,
Adams and Bartlett 2003, Redfem and Ross 2005). Alternatively Vera’s differential 
perceptions, characterised by medical diagnosis of Alzheimers disease, may suggest that 
in her eyes, mental illness is present when one is “worse” and “more and more confused”
Int:
G. Vera 
Int:
G Vera: 
Int:
G Vera: 
Int:
G Vera: 
Int:
G Vera:
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than one is in normal old age. Such presentation is evidenced by the behaviours I explore 
below.
In Chapley Hospital all of the relatives had had contact with mental health services and 
spoke of the diagnosis of dementia. As John Keady and Jane Gilliard (1999 p248) found 
in their study on experiences in Alzheimers disease, they seem to find that being given a 
diagnosis and information about the condition helps “to place retrospective and current 
events in context”. Angela appears to find support in having a diagnostic tag with which 
to associate her mother’s problems. Helen however demonstrates her preference to 
minimise the impact of the dementia diagnosis by adding “age” to the diagnosis, therefore 
somehow cushioning the blow. This distinction between old and ill again underlines the 
societal power of bio-medical diagnosis and the “Alzheimerisation” of dementia (Gilleard
2000). Older people who have memory problems that may be seen as usual in old age 
become something different, and potentially something more frightening, as I go on to 
explore, when a diagnostic label is attributed.
Their brain capacity has diminished. They have got older.
That’s how I understand it. It’s an illness isn’t it, dementia 
or Alzheimer’s or however you like to label it.... it seems to 
be mostly dementia. It seems to me that they are that sort 
of age group that you could put it down to age dementia 
really.
And when you had an [mental health] assessment, what 
do you think was the value for you and for your Mum, or 
was there any?
Well I think it was good for me because I am now aware of 
her condition and how it is labelled in some way and it is 
treated and in what way it can’t be treated. You need ter 
be aware of it so that if she goes back home, you need to 
adjust maybe her home environment to accommodate that
The older people in both sites and the relatives from Glimster, who have either had no 
contact with mental health services or do not recall their contact, did not tend to use 
diagnostic terminology. Rather, as I go on to explore, they describe what they see and 
what they hear as defining their understanding of mental health problems. As with the 
attribution of a diagnostic label, what they see, hear and experience changes their 
acceptance of diminishing memory in old age.
C Daughter Helen: 
Int:
C Daughter Angela:
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However, before I go on to consider the non-diagnostic descriptions of people with 
mental health problems I consider the diagnostic category of delirium.
6.3.1.2 Delirium
As discussed in Chapter 4, delirium is a medical diagnosis describing temporary signs of 
confusion due to reversible medical cause(s). It is estimated that up to 50% of older 
people entering a general hospital setting will experience an episode of acute confusion 
(Phair 1999) either at the point of admission or during their hospital stay. Many of the 
behaviours and assumptions discussed below could be attributed to someone with 
diagnoses of delirium and/or dementia, particularly those of aggression, noisiness and 
sleep disturbance yet few participants made any differentiation in diagnostic terms.
In comparing the interview data from the staff samples in Glimster General and Chapley 
Hospitals it is notable that the majority of staff at Chapley, the liaison site, consider the 
potential presence of a diagnosis of delirium, whereas there is minimal such emphasis 
from within the Glimster cluster.
C OT Elizabeth: When I get somebody referred who is confused, the first
thing I do is ask why? Have they got a UTI [urinary tract 
infection] ...and ask questions that are suitable that might 
explain the reason for it. ...Why are they confused? Can 
we have a look? Is it something physical? Is it that they 
are deaf?
C Dr Dianne: Confusion is a big problem and then that could be just
because of infections or, you know, simple things causing 
it?
That Glimster staff do not readily differentiate could be seen to concur with the limited 
medical literature (Inouye 1993, Fick and Foreman 2000, Milisen et al 2005) and Irene 
Schofield’s (1997) discovery, among her sample of older people who had experienced 
delirium, that staff interact with people with delirium as if their brain damage was 
permanent. The ability of some of the Chapley staff to make the separation between 
delirium and dementia as psychiatric differential diagnoses may be an indicator of an
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educative effect of the consultation/liaison model of mental health service (see Chapter 
8). However, it could equally be argued that in Glimster General, where there seems to 
be a clear focus on medical categorisation, delirium is seen as a biological medical 
condition and thus not categorised as a mental health problem. Sue’s comments appear 
to suggest this to be the case.
G Service Manager Sue: I think there are actually patients with dementia but also, 
which aren’t strictly mental health problems but who are a 
problem on the wards, acute confiisional states.
As the rationale behind the perceptions of participants was not explored in relation to 
delirium, it is not possible to fully explore the reasons for these differences in response. I 
concur with others in suggesting that much more research is needed into the subject of 
delirium. This is required both in examining recognition and appropriate attention, and 
also in considering perceptions of the condition and responses to it, from the view of the 
sufferer. All that I can infer from the data here is that it is possible that the style of 
mental health consultation liaison provision has influenced the Chapley Hospital staff 
into excluding delirium before dementia is assumed.
Among the non-staff cluster groups, only Rose alludes to her delirium at the time of the 
trauma of her fracture.
G Rose: It’s all a lot of sudden shocks you know as, in a way, it was
to me when I broke the femur. I wasn’t quite there either 
for a day or two. My mind was gone.
As with the differentiation of delirium and dementia, among staff there is no evidence of 
specificity with regard to differential dementia diagnoses, such as Alzheimers disease or 
Vascular Dementia as readily occurs among mental health professionals. Nor is there any 
emphasis on early diagnosis and therapeutic treatment options in line with the political 
drivers at the time of data collection (DoH 2001a). Indeed, nobody mentions any 
possibility of medical treatment for older people with dementia, other than to suppress the 
behaviours I explore below.
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6.3.1.3 The Biomedical Position of the Researcher
In examining perspectives on mental health problems in old age from a biomedical 
perspective, I have considered how my position as a researcher may have affected the 
nature of the response with regard to diagnostic categorisation. Some of the participants 
were aware of my dual role. As discussed above there is evidence that the staff in the 
Chapley site were more likely to consider differentiation between delirium and dementia. 
However, given that the staff in Glimster Hospital also knew of my professional role I do 
not feel that the difference can be attributed to any Hawthorne Effect, whereby a research 
participant is said to respond in the way that s/he feels that the researcher would desire 
him/her to. In terms of diagnosis of depression and dementia, there are few site 
differences with regard to diagnostic terminology used, indeed the staff at Glimster 
hospital mention depression more readily, as I note in the next chapter.
The relatives cluster group at Chapley hospital use diagnostic terminology readily, due to 
information that they have received during mental health intervention. Although they 
knew me, the researcher, from our clinical encounters I did not feel that they were giving 
the diagnostic answers because they thought they were the right answers. Rather I felt 
that they reflected the knowledge achieved through a clinical mental health encounter, 
irrespective of who that was with. The older people’s cluster groups are comparable in 
that all but one of the Chapley older people had no recall of having met the interviewer in 
any context other than as a researcher.
In this section I have considered how the participants conceptualise mental health 
problems in old age in the general hospital setting in terms of medical diagnosis and note 
that such usage varies between the cluster and site groups. The staff tend to list 
diagnoses, but not necessarily elaborate further on their medical meaning and any 
associated medical actions. There is some difference in perceptions about delirium, 
whether it is noted or whether it is defined as outside the boundaries of mental illness. 
Relatives and older people do not generally use diagnosis to define mental illness until a 
condition has been thus defined by a health practitioner.
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Already it appears that the language of medical psychiatry, as definition of what 
constitutes a mental health problem in old age, is not shared by those within the general 
hospital setting. I now go on to explore how the social actors explain their perceptions in 
terms of what they see and hear from those who they determine to be mentally unwell.
6.3.2 They Don’t Fit In
In this section I explore how the respondents perceive mental health problems to be 
present, in older people in the general hospital setting, by virtue of some aspect(s) of 
overtly visible behaviour which is seen as not appropriate, and not fitting in, within the 
environment. As discussed in Chapter 3, mental illness has long been defined, in lay 
terms, by behaviour outside the realms of social normality within the dominant culture 
(Pilgrim and Rogers 1999). Unsurprisingly this view is reflected in die perceptions of the 
older people and relatives in the general hospital setting. Maybe more surprisingly is that 
this lay view, rather than a bio-medical view, also dominates the perceptions of the staff 
members in both Chapley and Glimster Hospitals. Older people with mental health 
problems in this setting are seen as inauthentic, insincere and abnormal and a threat to the 
social order of the setting (Crossley 2000). Here we again note the power of the social 
setting from both professional and organisational perspectives, as it indeed becomes more 
and more apparent as we move through die data. The tight professional and 
organisational regime of a general hospital makes those who deviate from expectation all 
the more noticeable.
Before looking at some of the ways in which inappropriate and deviant behaviour is 
described, I examine the use of some nouns to describe people with mental health 
problems and reflect the detachment of these people from the broader “normal” society 
members. The use of such language defines the person as morally different, deficient and 
deviant. I go on to explore how mental health problems, in this setting, are defined by the 
way in which a person speaks before looking at aspects of perceived adverse behaviour.
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6.3.2.1 Derogatory Descriptors
Several participants, though few staff members, used specific derogatory societal 
descriptors to define people as having mental health problems. This reflects a view, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 as emphasised in the media, that focuses on difference and depicts 
those with mental health problems as being socially bad, dangerous (Ward 1997, Philo 
2001, Clarke 2004) and morally weak. The use of disparaging language, such as that 
used by The Sun (2003) when describing Frank Bruno, a boxer who became mentally 
unwell, as “bonkers”, serves to belittle the person with the mental health problem, 
rendering them powerless. They become insignificant and disabled in a social world 
where there is an expectation for conformity and control. I suggest that, in the powerful, 
ultra-controlled environment of a general hospital ward, deviation from expected 
behaviour may be even more stringently noted and frowned upon.
Nora’s remarks encapsulate many aspects of her perception of mental ill health by 
attaching both behaviour and a derogatory descriptor in the following quote. She sees 
people with mental health problems as behaving strangely because they are “barmy”.
She suggests that such people are not up to the anticipated moral strength of a “normal” 
member of society and nor are they able to perform meaningful, sensible activity. Such 
definition is in line with Graham Scrambler’s (1997 pi 73) suggestion that people who 
behave badly become “unacceptable or inferior beings”.
Int: So when I say problems with mental health, what do you
think I’m talking about?
G. Nora: Well, a bit barmy in many ways.
Int: And how can you tell if somebody’s a bit barmy? What
would they be doing, what would they be saying?
G. Nora: Well they wouldn’t be up to the strong strength would
they? ...They’d be flicking about with one thing and 
another
Int: flicking about?
G. Nora: urn, yeah
Int: what walking about or...
G. Nora: no, sort of doing different things
Int: unusual things?
G. Nora: I’d say.
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The use of derogatory terms is further demonstrated with references to people with 
mental health problems suggesting a faulty personality and badness. Janet describes this 
in terms of “weakness” and being “naughty” on purpose due to a “wicked streak” in 
them. Felicity suggests that people with mental health problems are “in trouble”, making 
clear links with perceived unlawfulness. Olive sees herself as having been extremely 
fortunate not to have come across anybody characterised by these alien, and potentially 
dangerous, qualities while Pat confirms that if you are not displaying any of these 
negative attributes, such as losing your marbles, you are “good”, clearly implying that 
those with mental health problems are “bad”.
C. Felicity: Well I don’t think I know many people with mental problems.
Not really I haven’t known anybody that was in trouble.
G. Olive: I don’t know. Fortunately I’ve never met it. ...Fortunately,
I’ve not met anyone like that. You know.
G.Daughter Pat: Her shortterm memory, and in fact, she and the lady sitting
next to her, she was a lovely lady, and she was 91 but she 
had all her marbles, she was very good.
Presentation that is defined as morally inappropriate is further mentioned, by some of the 
relatives at Glimster general, in terms of stealing. The dementia care literature defines 
such behaviour as rummaging (Armstrong 2002) yet here it is clearly seen as indefensible 
with the use of strong negative language associated with fear. As Bender and 
Wainwright (2004) suggest, behaviours that are not actually under the control of the 
person are perceived as “deliberate, obstinate and bloody minded.”
G. Daughter Rachel: My mum is constantly worried because she thinks that [the
woman in the next bedl will steal her things from her 
locker.
Others use derogatory descriptors such as “daft”, “dotty”,“doollally”, “mad” to define 
those who do not fit in, with Christine defining those with “behavioural problems” as 
“dumps” because she feels that her ward is seen as a repository where such people are 
“batched together” (Prior 1993 pl51). Not only does this description depict a notion that
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people with mental health problems are the rubbish of society, or in this case the rubbish 
within the hospital system, but also that Christine does not feel it appropriate that she, 
and her colleagues, are dumped upon in this way.
C.Nurse Christine: Yes. I think the majority of people that we get have got...
behavioural problems. I think we are the repository for 
people that other wards find difficult to manage 
...I think generally they come to us because the rest of the 
hospital have this perception that we take the dumps and if 
you don’t know what to do with this person, put them [on 
this ward].
...Yes, well we don’t get young, well we have had.a few 
people who have been younger than we wouldn’t 
traditionally take and you hear “oh we are going to get 
someone in their 60’s” and you automatically think “well 
what’s wrong with them then, what mental health problems 
have they got?" and 9 times out of 10 they have got one.
The data explored in this section emphatically describes older people with mental health 
problems as a breed apart from the majority of older people in hospital. They are 
constructed, through the language of the derogatory descriptors used, as outside the 
expectation of the setting. The perceived attribution of a mental health problem creates 
judgements about their morality and their existence as a valid entity in this social world.
I now go on to explore how those with mental health problems in the general hospital 
setting are noted by the research respondents by their overt behaviour. I divide this into 
descriptions about speech and perceived threat.
6.3.2.2 Abnormal speech
Several of the older people and relatives in both hospitals suggest that not using 
appropriate language is a sign of “being doollally”, as Helen, the daughter of a woman in 
Chapley hospital, terms it. Those with mental health problems “talk silly nonsense” and 
“go off on a tangent.” Lesley describes how her mother “lives in a dream” thus 
underlining that, as someone with a mental health problem, she does not exist in the 
same world as the rest of us. Oliver, the husband of a patient in Glimster General, 
suggests that the staff treat his wife differently, and as if she were mentally ill, because
1 6 1
she has difficulty with verbal communication following a stroke, even though Oliver 
does not perceive her to have a mental health problem.
G. Daughter Lesley: Now she spends a lot of time in imaginary dreams,
dreaming away. And she’ll say strange things. The other 
day I came in and she was obviously preparing for some 
sort of church fete, well, school fete it might have been, 
and “go and get that bench from over there and we’ll put 
these two together and make an angle, and then we stack 
these tins up on them” you know, and getting annoyed if I 
didn’t do as I was asked.
G. Husband Oliver: My wife has had a stroke and can’t express hersejf
properly. Some of the nurses treat her as though she is 
daft.
6.3.2.3 Threat to Social Order
I will now explore further how conclusions are drawn, through the presenting behaviour, 
that someone is mentally unwell. As discussed in Chapter 3, mental illness has long been 
associated with demeanor and abnormal, unusual behaviour which does not fit in, and 
which may be socially harmful (Szasz 1963, Scheff 1966, Prior 1993, Pilgrim and Rogers 
1997, Crossley 2000). Most of the older people interviewed describe mental health 
problems in terms of the behaviour that they observe. They ascribe the behaviours to 
people who are confused, without (with the exception of Mary above, p i 51) terming the 
mental illness as dementia. This broad definition of dementia as “behavioural 
disturbance” concurs with Adams and Barletts’ (2003) assertion that because dementia 
does not fit in with the general medical paradigm of disease, it can be defined through 
behaviour. Descriptions of dementia as challenging behaviour also correlates with the 
findings of Rachel Norman (2003) who found that staff working with people with 
dementia in a general hospital setting defined dementia as a thing that impacted on 
behaviour, and is particularly charecterised by behaviour that is seen as meaningless, as 
Nora (pi 60) noted in talking of “flicking about”.
Paul Spicker (2000) suggested that people with dementia “are seen as a problem due to 
adverse impact on others in the way they interact and demand attention, repeat questions, 
use bad language, display vulgar habits, are noisy, aggressive, rude and disruptive”. It is
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also noted in the literature that definitions of behaviour, in dementia, as troublesome, 
occurs more readily outside of specialist settings (Middleton et al 1999). This view is 
reflected across the cluster groups and by almost all of the participants, to a greater or 
lesser extent.
The combination of the medical and organisational vying power bases in this setting 
serve to emphasise boundaries between what is acceptable and not acceptable in this 
social world. Again I suggest that the very controlled nature of the general hospital 
setting makes deviation from a strict norm highly noticeable and all the more intolerable 
and as a threat to the smooth running of the system. Those who are perceived to have 
mental health problems are thus potentially more visible in this environment than 
elsewhere.
A variety of behaviours and perceptions which have an adverse effect on the cultural 
expectation of the clinical environment are described. Those who impact on staff time, 
those who do not follow advice, who are seen as causing risk and those who are thought, 
through their presence, to adversely affect the health prospects of others, are all cited as 
having mental health problems. All these can be defined as a threat to the social order of 
the setting.
The issue of the time spent providing care for people with mental health problems in this 
setting, is a particular concern of the relatives at Chapley hospital, whose relatives have 
mental health problems. Their responses suggest feelings of guilt that their relative 
should take up time inappropriately, stopping staff from performing their “real” nursing 
duties. While they do not overtly suggest that their relative does not belong and is 
undeserving of a place in the hospital, the implication is present.
C. DiL Ellen: Yes and I don’t think it is fair to expect the nurses to have
eyes in the back of their head thinking oh I wonder where 
so and so’s got to and apart from anything else if they 
have got to keep running and bringing them back, running 
and bringing them back it is detracting from the nursing 
isn’t it?
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The risk of older people wandering, that Ellen alludes to, is an issue noted by members of 
each group with the exception of the patients from Glimster General. The language used, 
particularly by staff members, emphasises the anxiety that this behaviour causes due to 
the perceived risk that the older person may get lost. However, as with the Chapley 
Hospital relatives, this is overlaid by a message that the presence of people who wander, 
and who thus require additional nursing time, prevents staff from attending to the proper 
general hospital business. Christine stresses that she is “trying to go in and do things for 
other people” and both she and Linda emphasise the strain that nurses feel at being 
diverted from their real work.
C. Nurse Christine: I mean we have our lady at the moment who is just
wandering all the time and we are trying to go in and do 
things with other people and we are having the same 
conversation over and over again, I mean she can’t help it 
at all, it’s just really not a great environment for her, there 
are people rushing around and she wants reassurance 
and things explained to her. You start thinking, “Oh I’ve 
told you, I’ve told you!"
G. Nurse Linda: You do hear in people’s voicps the strain of caringi for them
sometimes. “Oh please, sit down”.
As well as taking up inappropriate amounts of time, participants across the cluster groups 
and sites mention that those who have mental health problems do not behave as they are 
expected to and do not do as they are asked. This tendency is often perceived as 
purposefully bad. Powerful words and terms such as “refuses” “non-compliant” and 
“unco-operative” emphasise an assumed intent at disruption of the equilibrium of this 
environment. Tom is particularly emphatic in describing his belief that the man in Ihe 
next bed to his “ought” to behave in the expected way, and do as he is told. He described 
how he argues and tries to fight when nurses are trying to assist him to have a wash and 
get dressed in the morning.
G Tom: well, [it’s his] attitude to staff really, you know, he doesn’t
co-operate and all that sort of thing. In my opinion 
anyway. I don’t know, maybe he can’t help it. I don’t 
understand...You can listen to it all and it’s urn, to me he’s 
very unco-operative and puts on this stuff. I would never 
be able to; I would never have done that.. He doesn’t co­
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operate with them, as he ought to be. That’s my personal 
opinion.
Similarly Olive and Malcolm suggest that people with mental health problems perform 
certain acts in order to achieve undeserved attention. Such attention seeking behaviour 
could be described as the exhibition of liminal power, as described by Turner (1974, see 
p38), that is the exhibition of power from ones subordinate and transient traditionally 
disempowered position. It is already clear that people with mental health problems in the 
general hospital are not viewed as having equal validity to those not perceived to have 
such problems. They are generally seen in terms of a derogatory descriptor and/or in 
terms of the behaviour they present, a wanderer, talks rubbish etc. Thus they are not 
afforded a voice with which to have their needs heard, and possibly receive no attention 
unless they exhibit that very behaviour, powerful deviant behaviour, that defines them as 
mentally unwell. This is something of a Catch 22, but, as Olive describes it does achieve 
recognition.
I think its about attention...probably, well that’s my 
opinion...I think a lot of it is to get attention. Rather like 
the lady in the ward who keeps pulling her skirt up. She 
did it this morning and nurse said “ don’t keep pulling your 
skirt up”.
And, you think she did that for attention?
I think so.
A further way, in which people with mental health problems are seen, is through the 
attribution of negative impact from them upon the well-being of other older people in the 
setting. In both sites relatives anticipate that they will “fiddle with things and be 
dangerous” “because they are not aware of what actions they are doing, they are not 
responsible for their own actions and therefore they could touch something... ”
Noisiness is, according to older people and relatives at Glimster General, a clear 
indication that mental health is a problem, particularly when it occurs at the wrong time 
of day, is seen as inappropriate, sounds distressed or is demanding. Although Louisa 
attributes meaning, pain, to the behaviour she still classifies it as a sign of mental ill 
health because it is disruptive to her sleep and to social order.
G. Olive:
Int:
G. Olive:
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G. Louisa: Well the lady opposite screams and screams and
screams. I know she’s in pain. But she makes the most 
awful racket and about ten o’clock at night they give her a 
pill...she’s ill because of her mind is gone because of her 
illness.
This attribution of a mental health problem, even when another explanation is possible, 
correlates with Oliver’s assertion above that his wife is seen as having such a problem. 
Because she exhibits an abnormal behaviour, inability to communicate verbally, she is 
seen as mentally ill even though the reason for her lack of speech lies in her physical 
illness. This tendency to define mental illness as opposed to physical illness, particularly 
at Glimster General, mirrors the comments made by some of the staff members, reported 
earlier (pl45), suggesting that older people were inappropriately being admitted to a 
general hospital in the presence of a mental health problem. This suggests that the 
presence of a perceived mental health problem obliterates the possibility of any other 
concurrent health problem, wholly overshadowing it. The person becomes the problem.
Others, particularly older people in Glimster General, feel distressed that they have to 
share their experience with those who cause them distress. Mary asserts “It is just so sad 
to listen to...it’s horrible, how does anyone cope with that?” Selina’s distress is such that 
the presence of people with mental health problems makes her fear for her own sanity.
She wonders if she will become tainted by them if her exposure to them continues. Ellen 
talks of how some family members avoid visiting the hospital for fear of observing the 
behaviour of those who are mentally ill.
G. Selina: I don’t agree that they should be in with other people.
Because it makes other people think that they are the same.
Int: It actually makes you worry about your own sanity does it?
G. Selina: Yes, you do worry about what’s going on and are you
thinking like they are...urn...you know... because it’s playing 
on your mind like that?
C. DiL Ellen: Well no I think that is off putting. I mean, I know for a fact
that my son they will come up but they will find it very, very 
hard to cope with that as a visitor. I mean I can sit there and 
I can steel myself to it but I know they won’t they will be in 
and out in 5 minutes; they just can’t cope with it.
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These expressed worries provide powerful messages about the fear associated with 
mental illness, a phenomenon that people do not want to see, for fear of being 
contaminated by the stigma that it would bring to them. In the next chapters I explore 
further the potential drive for an “out of sight, out of mind” approach to mental health 
problems which seems to be attractive in order to distance oneself from any contact with 
people with mental health problems.
Several participants from the older people and relative clusters at Glimster General 
believe that the presence of people with mental health problems disrupts the progress of 
other patients. Natalie feels that this is particularly so when one is at a low ebb due to the 
effects of illness.
G. Daughter Natalie: But it feels a bit unfair that, yoii know, their problems and 
that are impacting on the other patients. Because, you 
know, they’re not getting any sleep...Obviously everyone on 
the ward has their own problems, thafs why they are there.
It’s not like normally when you are more tolerant aren’t you, 
of things, but if you are not well, or whatever, your tolerance 
levels are going to be low.
The views and perceptions of both relative cohorts differ from the other groups in that 
they are more influenced by and focused upon their own experience, and its perceived 
influence on their loved one, than on the perceptions as influenced by the nature of the 
powerful social setting that is a general hospital. It is noticeable that the relatives from 
Glimster General noted noise and distressing behaviours that would disrupt their 
relative’s progress, much more than their counterparts at Chapley Hospital. Throughout 
the analysis I noted that while older people and staff were able to generalise about the 
issues under discussion and explore possible potential solutions, the members of the 
relative cohorts rarely did so. It seems that they are less embroiled within the power 
struggles that exist in the social setting. Unlike the staff and die older people they do not 
have such a fixed hospital membership category to fulfil (Baker 1997), although they are 
expected, as demonstrated by Malcolm above (pi44) to conform to medical and 
organisational recommendation. Their focus, and probably their anxiety, is centred round 
their relative, to the exclusion of generalities. Despite this difference in focus however,
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they concur with members of all the other cluster groups that mental health problems in 
old age in this setting are characterised in extremes of behaviour.
So far in this chapter I have explored the data as it presents that mental health problems 
in old age in the general hospital setting are noted in the presence of behaviour that 
disrupts the equilibrium of the environment. There is however evidence that those 
broader influences, from wider society and the media (Philo 2001, Clarke 2004) impinge 
on these perceptions. Participants from across cluster and site groups see aggression as a 
potential indicator of a mental health problem. There is some suggestion that violence is 
viewed differently by the staff groups, with potentially greater understanding and 
tolerance at Chapley Hospital where Christine feels that they “handle it fairly well” and 
refers to mental health services only when problems are “huge”, whereas in Glimster 
General “people don’t like it”. The assertion from Christine appears to be in 
contradiction of her earlier reference to the “dumps” (pi 62). I will explore this apparent 
ambivalence towards her role in caring for these people, and general difference in 
approaches to care and treatment, further in Chapter 8.
C. Daughter Geraldine: mental health would be very much urn er aggression it
may be but not always. Aggression and frustration. I think 
those are the headings I would put mental health under.
G OT Val: Memory wise it is easy but not if they have end stage
dementia and are a bit aggressive to the staff, people don’t 
like it.
C Dr Hannah - I prioritise some [referrals to mental health services] as
particular urgent and that is usually when there are huge 
features of aggression say and my strategies have failed.
6.4 Discussion
As recognised in the literature (Schofield 1997, Fick and Freeman 2000) there is an 
assumption that deviant behaviour in old age in the general hospital setting is 
characterised by confusion, and moreover by a confusion that is permanent. Although 
some of the staff at Chapley Hospital elude to the possibility of delirium this is not the 
focus of much attention. Dementia, as exhibited in challenging behaviour, is the mental 
health problem of old age in this setting.
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The data presented and explored clearly suggests that perceptions of mental health 
problems in old age in the general hospital setting are similar to, and exaggerated from, 
the perceptions of the wider lay society, concurring with the literature (Prior 1997, 
Pilgrim and Rogers 1999, Crossley 2000). The view is arguably magnified within this 
rigid microcosm of the wider society where any deviation from “normality” is perceived 
as more extreme.
Scheff used labelling theory to explain mental illness as violations of social norms (Porter 
1998, see p48). Those who do not follow societal norms, which he calls “residual 
norms”, are labelled as mentally ill. The older people defined here as having mental 
health problems are those who do not follow the residual norm of being a hospital patient. 
Older people in hospital are expected to behave in a defined and subservient way. They 
are expected to conform to the organisation of care and treatment and not to disrupt the 
focus of the system. They are thus categorised as “patients” who should conform (Baker 
1997). Those who do not meet the expectation of their category, through behaving 
unusually or by being out of line from expectation, are assumed to be mentally ill. Along 
a similar line of argument, the societal categorisation of mental illness, as explored in 
Chapter 3, is that mental ill health is associated with badness and violence. It appears 
that for some there is a double categorisation leap from older person in hospital who does 
not conform, to mental health problem, to potential risk and intentional badness. Older 
people with mental health problems are not seen as “good” patients as becomes further 
evident in Chapter 8 when I examine the service that is sought for these people.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the current focus among those who study and work with 
people with dementia is that care needs to focus on a belief that dementia destroys the 
brain but not the person (Brooker 1995, Kitwood 1997, Hughes 2001). It appears that the 
broad general hospital perception is that mental illness, dementia, does produce a 
damaged and disruptive person. It may also be argued that, because of the ageist 
invisibility of old age as I explore further in the next chapter, abnormal behaviour in older 
people is less readily tolerated than in their younger counterparts. Older people in
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particular may, through their perceived social uselessness be expected to be even more 
compliant than the younger hospitalised person, thus when they are perceived as 
abnormal it is seen as even more extreme.
It is interesting that the staff groups, in both Glimster General and Chapley Hospitals, 
concur with patients and relatives in their images of mental illness. They are able to 
come up with a list of mental illnesses, that they have learnt along the way, yet, as non­
psychiatric specialists, defer to their lay perceptions in describing how they define mental 
health problems. As has been discussed in Chapter 3, this is evidence of the ongoing 
chasm of the Cartesian division between medicine and psychiatry. Mental illnesses, 
although known through the terms of medical diagnostics, are not categorised in the same 
way by those who work within the field of pure medicine. None of the staff consider 
“dementia” in terms of signs and symptoms, or indicators of a disease state as they would 
a diagnosis of “stroke”, for example. As I move through the thesis I will further consider 
the stigmatized power of the psychiatric label and how this may impact on perception and 
avoidance of involvement.
Also of interest is that the older people at Chapley Hospital, who had all been seen by 
mental health services and had, except for one, diagnosed dementia, did not perceive 
themselves as having mental health problems. They do not feel socially deviant or 
different from their fellow patients yet they can perceive such differences in others who 
are exhibiting unusual or disruptive behaviour. This suggests that mental health 
problems in old age in hospital are constructed only by those outside of the experience. 
However, as I explore in the next chapter, this is not the case in depression.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the differences between Chapley and Glimster Hospitals in 
terms of their power structures and organisational goals, as they influence perceptions of 
mental health problems in old age in each setting. I note that the older people and 
relative clusters did not significantly differ in their perception of the organisation, tending
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towards a perception of traditional medical power. Responses from the staff, however, 
suggest a differing organisational focus with Glimster General more geared towards the 
organisational goal of moving people through the system and Chapley Hospital 
potentially moving towards a greater person centred, consumer focus.
I have demonstrated, through the data, that people with mental health problems in old age 
in the general hospital setting are seen as confused people who are morally different, 
deficient and deviant. When an attributable behaviour is present, any other potential 
cause including the presence of a biological illness, even if considered, seems to become 
secondary to the predominant deviant presentation. I have outlined the various ways in 
which the social deviance is described and suggest that the constraints of the setting, both 
in terms of organisational and bio-medical culture, render levels of tolerance lower.
Given the perception of what constitutes a mental health problem in this setting, that is 
somebody who does not comply with the social norms, it appears that any older person 
who exerts personal power is in danger of being so labelled. Not to conform with service 
expectation is unacceptable.
I suggest that the social construction of mental health problems in old age in the general 
hospital setting is an emphatic exaggeration of the lay perceptions within wider society as 
discussed in Chapter 3 of the literature review supporting this thesis. Despite the medical 
nature of the setting, psychiatric, bio-medical constructions are not used, even by the staff 
members, to describe the phenomenon of mental illness.
I have noted that almost all of the data around mental health problems in old age, as 
constructed here, refers to the potential medical diagnoses of dementia or delirium, to the 
exclusion of depression. In the next chapter we will examine this further as I explore the 
invisibility of mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting.
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Chapter 7
The Invisible
7.1 Introduction
As seen in the previous chapter, the respondents describe mental health problems in terms 
of socially deviant behaviour and focus on older people who are confused. In this chapter 
I explore mental health problems in old age that would, using psychiatric biomedical 
construction, be termed as mental illnesses and yet are not visible as such to the 
participants in this study.
In the exploration of the literature, Chapter 4, the most prevalent mental illnesses of old 
age are bio-medically defined as delirium, depression and dementia (Holmes et al 2002, 
Royal College of Psychiatry 2005). In the previous chapter I noted a lack of distinction 
made here between delirium and dementia. It is also apparent that dementia is only 
visible in the presence of adverse behaviour and confusion, such that it disturbs the 
equilibrium of the controlled setting. Dementia is not defined by diagnostic category and 
characteristics as expected in the psychiatric medical model. Such perception potentially 
leaves other mental health problems in old age invisible, unrecognised and unaddressed.
It is this potential that I explore within this chapter.
Here I examine the data around people with cognitive problems who are not defined as 
mentally ill but ralher by a category of social incompetence that Louisa, an older woman 
in Glimster General, calls “poor things”. The loss of faculties is attributed, by the 
participants, to a natural part of the ageing process, when memory loss is not 
accompanied by any socially disruptive element. As the chapter progresses, I move on 
to look at the apparent effect of stigmatization on perceptions of mental health problems 
in the general hospital setting. It transpires that the presence of ongoing stigma is 
evidenced through the participants’ emphasis on their own exclusion from association 
with the phenomenon.
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Lastly I look at the phenomenon of depression and how it is conceptualised in old age in 
the general hospital setting and compare that with a more general view. I argue that older 
people and their relatives, and indeed many staff members, do not see depression as a 
mental health problem but rather as a normative expectation given old age and the 
circumstance of ill health and hospitalisation. I consider whether this may indeed be so, 
particularly for older people in the fourth age and nearing the end of their life. I also 
explore reasons for the invisibility of depression for this cohort of women, as compared 
with their younger counterparts.
As the chapter progresses it becomes more and more apparent, in concurrence with the 
last chapter, that the nature of the setting and the influences within it are key in the 
perceptions of mental health problems.
In conclusion I bring together the discussions from this and the previous chapter to 
consider that mental health problems are only noted through overt visibility or social 
inadequacy. Depression is invisible as it lacks impact within the social setting. I begin to 
examine the potential impact of these findings on how service is delivered. First I return 
to the category that I call “poor things”.
7.2 Poor Things
Alongside, and contradictory to, the attribution of deviance and badness to older people 
with mental health problems in this setting, there exists a parallel yet distinct assumption 
of social weakness and vulnerability. Those who are not “misbehaving”, but who are 
seen not to belong to the normal social world, are pitied. There is a desire among the 
participants, particularly those from Glimster General, to protect these “poor things” from 
the world, with which it is thought, they cannot cope. This assumption is in line with 
theories on ageism whereby older people are seen to be in need of protection from able 
bodied and able minded, adults.
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Louisa describes a fellow patient as a “poor thing”. She suggests that in having lost her 
memory she has lost her social status and, as a “lost soul” is without a role in society.
She thus defines her as disempowered and socially excluded (Goffman 1961). Mary calls 
this type of person “a different breed”, implying a need for nurture as well as a distinct 
separation from herself. Pat’s contribution is particularly powerful and in line with the 
supposition that people with mental health problems hold no place in society. She 
perceives those who are mentally unwell as dead, although in body they are present.
G. Louisa: Poor thing, I'm terribly sorry for her....I feel sorry for
somebody who’s like that, ...poor tiling, she’s obviously 
lost her memory... It comes back, because she knows her 
daughter, and that sort of thing, but she’s a lost soul.
G. Daughter Pat: Well, poor soul, this man or woman, I don’t know, was
counting up to a hundred and then shouting out, and I just 
felt possibly that was not the place for them....you don’t 
need, I mean these poor souls can’t help it, but you do not 
need to be exposed when you are trying to recover from a 
stroke. I just don’t think you need it, you really don’t. I 
mean, I’m going to use a term now that will probably 
horrify you, but I came home, and I said to my husband 
and my sons that they are either dying, don’t know they’re 
dead or think they are dead, in that ward.
These descriptions can be seen to define the confused older person as being “mentally 
dead”, thus concurring with the bio-medical model of dementia (Adams and Bartlett 2003 
p6). Alongside the behaviour that does not fit in with the organisational rules, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter, this difference may also provide explanation as to why 
older people with mental health problems are so alien in this environment. The business 
of a hospital is to focus on curing the living. If a person is seen as no longer wholly alive, 
s/he ceases to fit into the necessary criteria and thus does not belong. The person with 
dementia, who is socially inept, is thus to be marginalised. S/he has no category within 
the setting.
The social exclusion of people defined to have mental health problems is in line also with 
Sweeting and Gilhoolys’ (1997) examination of the definition of “socially dead”. In their 
study, only the relatives of people with dementia who had a particularly strong and close 
relationship perceived social life in the person with dementia. Those whose relationship
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was not strong perceived social death in the same way as we see here. Social death 
implies dependence and inability to engage at all in the social world. As Pat describes, 
they have lost their place in the world (Gilleard 1992) and need somewhere else to go 
(Spicker 2000) away from those who continue to engage in life. Kitwood (1997) defined 
this way of ignoring the personhood of someone with dementia, excluding them by 
treating them as a diseased object, although what Pat actually describes is a deceased 
object.
Goffman (1964) described discreditable and discrediting stigma whereby ones perceived 
weaknesses may be visible or invisible to the world (see p47). These “poor things”, 
through their perceived inability to engage in society, have a discrediting stigma, and are 
assumed to have no social role, due to their presentation. This compares with those in the 
previous chapter, whose behaviour is overt, who have a visible discreditable stigma. 
Geraldine’s response is very reminiscent of Goffinan (1964). She talks of visible 
vulnerability (discreditable stigma) and invisible vulnerability (discrediting stigma). 
Geraldine suggests that one may appear able, outwardly, when inwardly you are not.
Once the weakness of mental illness is uncovered, in the presence of old age, the 
assumption that one cannot cope is made. Angela, the daughter of a woman in Chapley 
Hospital, concurs, saying that “they are not capable of looking after themselves and that 
obviously is associated with a mental illness.”
C. Daughter Geraldine: I take mental health as being a vulnerability; we are not
easily visible to be vulnerable. Let me start again. I take a 
mental health problem to be where you are vulnerable and 
sometimes not to be visibly vulnerable.... It hasn’t been 
detected your level of vulnerability and inability, right. And 
so therefore you are a bit prey to being in a world ...for any 
number of reasons. ... Well, I suppose that the end result 
is that they all have to be moved out into homes.
In her work examining how nurses in a general hospital view people with dementia 
Rachel Norman (2003) found that people with dementia were constrained because they 
were seen to be dependent. All but one of the staff at Glimster General agree that older 
people with mental health problems cannot cope with the world and that their main staff 
role, as I explore fiirther in Chapter 8, is in finding them an appropriate place to be cared
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for. As with the disruptive behaviour, discussed in Chapter 6, this inability to fit in with 
normal hospital business, defines the “poor things” as mentally unwell. They do not fulfil 
the required expectation of a patient within the organisational and medical purpose of the 
setting, particularly in the more ordered setting of Glimster General. The “poor things” 
are noticed in Glimster General only when they challenge the system by not getting better 
and going home.
G. Physio Maggie: [people with mental health problems have] difficulty with
coping with life generally. People not being able to live on 
their own through it.
G. Consultant Peter: cognitive impairment to the extent that they can’t look after
themselves.... [it] is such a problem that they are likely to 
require a higher level of service.
This “poor thing” category is common to both relative clusters and to the older people 
and staff in Glimster General. The older people at Chapley hospital, diagnosed with 
mental health problems, did not indicate inability to cope with the world as suggestive of 
mental health problems.
The other cluster group that use the “poor thing” category less readily are the staff from 
Chapley General. All but one of the Glimster staff, and less than half of those at 
Chapley, describe this perceived social incompetence as an indicator of mental illness in 
old age. As I go on to explore further in Chapter 8, Chapley Hospital staff appear less 
readily to perceive people with dementia, whether this is characterised through their overt 
behaviour or through passivity and social withdrawal, as wholly incapable. This is 
notable particularly in their consideration of whether or not a person with dementia can 
go home.
In this section I have highlighted a difference in perception between confusion that 
causes people to become disruptive within the setting and confusion that is seen to render 
an older person as a sad and worthless waste product of society and socially dead. Such 
definition can readily be seen alongside the discussion on ageing in Chapter 1, whereby 
the old are discarded and seen as of little use to society. Foucault (1967) described
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mental illness in terms of unreason and irrationality, here it appears, only the latter is 
applicable in that irrational behaviour is the definition used. If one is solely without 
reason in old age, society accepts this as normal.
It is interesting to consider how the category of “poor things” could correlate with a 
disability model of dementia as advocated by Jane Gilliard (2002, see p57). I suggest 
that older people with dementia in general hospitals, especially in highly regulated 
organisations such as Glimster General, are not seen as disabled, rather they are seen as 
nnable.
My exploration so far suggests that people who have cognitive impairment in old age in 
the general hospital setting are defined as having a mental health problem either due to 
their overtly visible behaviour or because they are poor things and socially inept. This 
latter group are, in general terms, viewed as old rather than mentally ill. However, if they 
challenge the system, particularly the more rigid system, age related problems become 
mental health problems. Such dual definition potentially leaves a third group, those who 
have memory loss but do not challenge the setting, invisible and disregarded.
Whatever the definition of a mental health problem in old age any perceived attributes are 
not readily attached to oneself or to one’s nearest and dearest, as I now explore under the 
heading of “stigma”. All of the participants seek to distance themselves from the 
phenomena of mental illness and old age by various means.
7.3 Stigma
Examination of the data to this point has already demonstrated the presence of stigma. In 
this section I explore, more specifically, the data and how it underlines the power of 
ongoing stigma towards issues of mental ill health. Within all the cluster groups there is 
evidence of intent to distance oneself from the potential of being tarnished by that stigma. 
I have already demonstrated the power of stigma in exaggerating the presence of mental 
health problems in that, in the presence of any deviation from normal behaviour or any
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perceived loss of social competence, total mental incapability is assumed. There does not 
seem to be a perception of a bit of a mental health problem, the perceived sufferer is 
either wholly deviant and bad, or wholly inadequate and socially inept.
Mental illness has long been stigmatized and, given the long history of social exclusion 
and fear, as explored in Chapters 1 and 3, its effect on perceptions of mental health and 
illness cannot be under estimated. Lindsay Prior, in his study within a psychiatric 
hospital suggests that:
“Perhaps it is a result of the stigma associated with mental illness, that psychiatric 
patients rarely describe themselves as being mentally ill (even though they recognise 
other patients as being so). So patients will readily say, for example, that they suffer 
with their nerves, that they come from a nervous family, that they are constantly 
bothered with their nerves, that they feel unwell or just not themselves or more likely 
refer to some general notion of dis-ease.”
Priori 983 p161
Alongside the stigma associated with mental illness, for older people there is also stigma 
associated with ageing (Bytheway 1995) and dependency. Therefore, in line with 
Golander and Raz (1996), older people and their families disassociate from any condition 
that may define them as either mentally ill or as old and burdensome. Such distancing 
seems also be linked to the desire to not be negatively judged as either bad or 
incompetent, in line with the attributes of mental health problems, of bad behaviour or 
social inadequacy, already discussed. Pru, a patient at Glimster General, powerfully 
suggests that the possibility of having a mental illness is terrifying.
I’ve only been depressed on and off, lightly like nothing 
sort of bad but...
So, if you did have to see somebody and it was thought 
that you might have depression, how would you feel about 
being told that you might have a mental illness?
That would hurt wouldn’t it?
Why would that be?
You wouldn’t expect it. The terror of it.
Some older people describe never having noticed any person with a mental health 
problem, either in hospital or elsewhere, Both Olive and Daphne noting that they have
G. Pru: 
Int:
G. Pru: 
Int:
G. Pru:
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been very “fortunate” not to do so, suggesting that it is unlucky even to meet someone 
with mental health problems. As Selina suggested above (pi 67) it is as if ones persona 
can be stained through being in the presence of such people.
Cathy sees herself as a normal person going into hospital for normal things; she 
acknowledges that there may have been people around her with mental health problems 
but that she chooses to blot them out of the sphere of recall. She, like many others, 
particularly in Chapley Hospital, has memory problems but attributes her own 
idiosyncrasies to the normalities of old age and/or a physical illness rather than to a 
mental health problem. She explains her memory problems as having been caused by a 
fall, painting an elaborate picture in an attempt to ensure that she is not seen as being out 
of the ordinary permanently. In his work on stigma, Goffman (1964) describes this 
behaviour as “impression management”. Such avoidance of the stigmatized condition 
renders one as commendable, and not stigmatized, to oneself and others. Thus 
something, Cathy says, has been temporarily moved out of place. She is sure that things 
will return to normal, given time, when she is stronger.
I don’t really know, because I have never come up against 
it. I have gone into hospital on various occasions but it 
has been for quite normal things you know what I mean. 
And have you ever noticed any other patients around you 
who may have mental health problems?
I expect they were there but you see at this time that is all 
blotted out. It never happened
Oh I do try to remember but I am sure I will as I get 
stronger...Yes, well I am not in that state by any manner 
of means and I won’t be as I get stronger in myself. I don’t 
know why I had a fa ll...
And your memory was OK before that was it?
Oh well yes I had a very good memory, so I, you know, I 
really wondered if it was something I jolted out of place 
when I had the fall, because I did go quite heavy and can 
remember again catching hold of the rhododendron tree to 
pull myself up and you will think this is funny, but by the 
side of it there was a shrub with a small sort of stem a sort 
of a forsythia thing and I could remember thinking, no you 
mustn’t pull yourself up with that because it is not strong 
enough to take your weight but I mean I had quite..I was 
sort of sensible if you know what I mean. So I got on my 
hands and knees and crawled across the lawn until I came
C. Cathy: 
Int:
C. Cathy:
C. Cathy: 
Int:
C. Cathy:
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to a clothes post and pulled myself up you see. Whether 
that was anything to do with starting this I don’t know.
Some of the older people at Glimster hospital are adamant in their self exclusion from 
mental health problems. Louisa believes it impossible that such problems could affect 
her although she has suggested that mental health problems, in hospital, are driven by 
pain and poor health. She sees herself as removed from these risks despite her severe 
arthritis.
So you think that their mental health problem, if you like, 
has been brought on by their illness?
I think so
So in that case do you see yourself as at risk of falling into 
that hole?
Oh no, I definitely won’t!
In examining the responses from relatives, those people whose relatives have a 
recognised mental health problem tend to powerfully disassociate their relative because 
they are somehow not as bad as others. This may help them to preserve their impression 
of their relative as a person and as their loved one rather than as an ill, or indeed bad, 
person. The attribution of a stigma renders one as something less than human (Goffman 
1964), it is thus understandable not to perceive a relative as such. Alternatively such 
disassociation may be demonstration that the media image of mental illness outweighs 
and is more powerful than any personal experience (Philo 1999). Both Angela and 
Lesley’s mothers have diagnosed dementia yet they cite others who they can see as 
worse. Angela suggests that her mother does not have real confusion, and Lesley feels 
that her mother is well behaved and therefore less mentally ill than someone who shouts 
and swears at nurses. This again, as is the case for the Chapley older people cluster 
(pi 80), suggests that it may not be possible for people to correlate what mental health 
problems are through their personal experience. Perceptions of mental health problems 
remains removed from personal experience.
C. Daughter Angela: She got confused but it was logical confusion, if I can kind
of categorise it in that way
Int:
G. Louisa: 
Int:
G. Louisa:
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G. Daughter Lesley: I mean, I suppose I thought she might be going that way,
you think those things won’t happen to you....She likes the 
nurses. When I was here, that day, she was saying how 
clever they are and how accomplished they are, whereas 
the lady in the end bed was shouting and swearing at them 
saying that they were hurting her.
Relatives who have had no personal contact with mental health problems, in contrast, are 
more likely to not want to consider the subject at all. Steven provided an extreme 
construction finding it very difficult to bring himself to consider such issues at all, finally 
settling for the media image of violence and social deviance (Philo 2001).
Well, I’m not sure what you mean really,
Have you noted anyone with mental health problems in the 
hospital?
No, no I haven’t...
You have no idea what mental health problems some older 
people here may have?
No, I’m sorry, but no 
What about not in hospital
Urn, well, urn...there are people who molest children and 
kill them, alcoholics, that sort of thing.
I asked the staff members how, or whether, they would inform an older person that 
someone from mental health services had been asked to come and see them. Most of the 
professionals acknowledge that, if they do talk with the older person about mental health 
issues, they do not use the terminology of psychiatry because of the negative 
connotations that they perceive it will evoke. Linda suggests that staff seek to distance 
themselves from mental health problems by avoiding reference to them and thus 
minimise their own discomfort. This underlines that the stigma of mental illness is felt 
by staff as well as by those they care for.
C. Discharge Nurse Kate: I think there is quite a stigma attached to it. I think if I was
an elderly person and someone came up to me and said, 
we’re going to refer you to the mental health services, I’d 
probably freak out. You’d be thinking “Oh, am I going 
mad, what have I been doing, what have I been saying” 
you know. “What will everyone think of (ne?” All that...
G. Son Steven: 
Int:
G. Son Steven: 
Int:
G. Son Steven: 
Int:
G. Son Steven:
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G. Nurse Linda: I think there’s a lot of stigma, in terms of talking to a
psychiatrist, particularly with older people. Urn, maybe 
culturally it’s been seen as a sign of weakness... I 
suppose, in a way it’s [not telling] a means of causing 
minimum distress to them, but maybe it’s easier for the 
staff not to have to deal with somebody that’s facing 
something that they’re not happy to face.
As well as disassociation by avoiding talking of mental health issues in conversation with 
patients and relatives, some of the staff members distance themselves from mental health 
problems by claiming that to be involved is beyond the remit of their job.
G. Discharge Nurse Ruth: Well, thafs general, because I’m not dealing with mental
health, we’d see that there could possibly be a mental 
health problems, I’m no expert.
Several of the staff from Glimster General, as mentioned in Chapter 6 (pi 45), suggest 
that inappropriate admissions to hospital occur for people with mental health problems 
and no, or what are seen as negligible, medical problems. Naomi suggests that mental 
health problems are not her job. She, like Nurse Trish (pl45) does not see it as the 
business of the general hospital to provide care and treatment for people who are not 
looking after themselves, that is Ihe “poor things” discussed above (pl74).
G. Dr Naomi: I don’t think I’ve seen anybody who’s not had medical
needs as well as only mental needs. Urr no, that’s not 
true. There is somebody on the ward at the moment 
whose needs are not being met here.
Possibly what is most noticeable about this section of the chapter, examining how stigma 
is apparent within the data, is that all of the research subjects demonstrated its presence, 
in one way or another. Older people and relatives all distanced themselves from mental 
health problems by denying any connection with die virtual social identity of a person 
with mental health problems. Even the relatives from Chapley, who know that their 
relative had a defined mental illness, seek to minimise it by describing their loved one as 
not as bad as others. Staff, in both sites, tend to demonstrate their disassociation either, 
predominantly in Chapley, by claiming that this type of thing is not their job, or, in 
Glimster, by emphasising that it is inappropriate for such people to be in this setting in
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the first place. There is a tendency, particularly among the Glimster relatives, to avoid 
even entering into conversation about mental health issues.
Crawford and Brown (2002) suggest that the stigma of mental illness is perpetuated by 
the continued divisions in health service between general medicine and psychiatry. I 
continue to explore this theme as the thesis progresses.
In this chapter so far I examined how mental health problems in old age may be rendered 
invisible in the general hospital setting either because they are termed as the normal 
debility of failing mental ability in line with old age, or because reference to them is 
avoided because of stigma. I now move on to explore the phenomenon of depression 
which rarely features in the data as a term of description for a mental health problem in 
old age.
7.4 Depression
There is both professional and political acknowledgement that depression in old age is 
under-recognised and under-treated (DoH 2001, Holmes et al 2002, NICE 2004, Godfrey 
and Denby 2004, CSIP 2005). Manthorpe and Iliffe (2005) suggest that the complexity of 
presentation make under-diagnosis inevitable. It is said that 25% of older people in 
general hospitals are depressed (Anderson 2001, RCP 2005).
Depression is considered as a common condition within the life course with 20% of the 
population experiencing it at some point (Depression Learning Path 2006). Indeed the 
word “depression” has moved within language use. One can no longer use this word to 
describe feelings of misery and sadness; rather it has become a medical diagnosis and the 
property of medical psychiatry. In general language phrases such as “I was depressed” 
now readily conjure up an image of a problem for which one has received professional 
intervention.
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The figures for incidence of depression and the acceptance of it as a treatable 
phenomenon may lead to a supposition that it would readily be recognised as a mental 
health condition in old age. There has also been a marked increase in lay literature (e.g. 
Cembrowicz and Kingham 2002, Massey 2004) and media coverage (e.g. BBC 2005). 
However, an anticipation that depression would immediately spring to mind for anyone 
asked to consider mental health problems in old age was unfounded. Depression in old 
age, it emerges, is not defined as a mental health problem; rather it is seen as normal and 
inevitable for older people in the general hospital setting. This raises questions about 
how, and whether, depression in old age, in this population, exists at all or whether it is 
part of a general categorised societal assumption attributed to older people in hospital. I 
argue that the psychiatric definition of depression, now readily accepted as the acceptable 
face of mental illness for younger people, has not been applied for older adults in 
hospital.
As in the previous chapter I first examine responses around the medical diagnosis of 
depression noting that, like dementia, such attribution almost only occurs among staff 
members. I go on to again consider the staff ambivalence before looking at how 
depression is characterised by the older people and relative cluster groups. In conclusion I 
suggest that depression is seen as a bi-product of ageing rather than as a mental illness 
and as such it is invisible. Such invisibility may be even more evident in this setting 
where mental ill health is defined through negative impact on the smooth running of the 
hospital system as already discussed. The presence of depression does not negatively 
affect the power structures that govern the setting and as such is not seen. This 
invisibility poses major challenges in considering howto address the issues.
During early interviews it became apparent that people did not always specifically 
mention depression unless encouraged. Therefore if subjects did not make reference to 
depression they were prompted to the effect of:
Int: Is there any other mental health problem, in this setting,
that you can think of?
Going further as necessary to ask: -
184
Int: What about depression, have you heard of depression?
In analysing and discussing data elicited after such an intervention on my part, I am 
mindful that through my emphasis I highlighted my position in expecting depression to 
feature as a mental health problem in old age. This will have inevitably influenced how 
the research participants responded thereafter. The content and comparability of the data 
is also influenced by differences within the cluster groups, particularly the older peoples’ 
clusters. As discussed and explored in Chapter 6 1 had difficulty recruiting people 
diagnosed with depression to participate in Chapley hospital and interviewed only one 
such older person. In Glimster Hospital I considered that six of the older people I 
interviewed were depressed or potentially depressed, although none of them had, as far as 
I was aware, been diagnosed or received targeted care or treatment. This difference is 
reflected in the data, notably in that the older people from Chapley Hospital, and the 
relatives, rarely dwell on issues around depression whereas their counterparts in Glimster 
were more likely to.
7.4.1 Staff Perceptions
Paradoxically, given the apparent lack of recognition of depression in those older people I 
interviewed, the staff at Glimster General identified depression as a mental health 
problem in old age more readily, and with less encouragement, than their colleagues at 
Chapley Hospital. It was mentioned by the medical practitioners in both sites. However, 
as with dementia, the majority cite it briefly as a diagnostic label within a list, before 
returning to their more predominant concerns about those who do not fit in, as discussed 
in the previous chapter and within the “poor thing” category above.
Of those staff who did not readily come up with depression, some were clearly 
embarrassed at their perceived omission. This feeling may be associated with knowledge 
of the recent focus and attention on depression in professional journals (e.g. Peveler et al 
2002, Minardi and Hayes 2003, Schofield 2004) and in the National Service Framework
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for Older People (DoH 2001) which was much heralded at around the time of the 
interviews. Sue was clearly taken back at her failure to note depression as a mental 
illness. Her embarrassment can be explored in terms of “membership categorization” 
(Baker 1997). In not readily coming up with the term, she sees herself as not fulfilling 
the expectation of her role as a health care professional who should readily identify 
diagnostic labels. Her discomfort is potentially fuelled by her categorization of me as a 
mental health nurse, rather than a research interviewer, who she places within the bio­
medical model of psychiatry. She therefore feels that she has given an incorrect 
response. The embarrassment may also be seen in relation to the organisation structure 
within Glimster, as I explored in Chapter 6, which encourages systematic categorization, 
in which she has just failed by missing out depression.
Int: So you haven’t mentioned depression
G. Manager Sue: Oh yes, depression, yes depression, I mustn’t forget
depression.
In contrast to the listing of depression in old age, albeit transiently, in Glimster, the staff 
in Chapley Hospital arrived at depression more often as an afterthought to dementia and 
confusion, defining it in terms that suggest that it is less important than other diagnoses. 
For Fiona, although she tries to cover what she perceives to be a mistake, it is just 
depression. Ann sees depression as being much less serious than other mental health 
problems correlating with the definitions of severe mental illnesses according to the 
National Service Framework for Mental Health (DoH 1999, see pl2).
and just [my emphasis] - 1 don't say just - depression in 
varying degrees of depression.
Well, I think there are many degrees of different mental 
problems that can go to, I don’t know, a depression, to 
something bigger [my emphasisj like schizophrenia or 
you know, something like this....Serious, really serious, 
more than a depression.
The data, examined so far, suggests that depression in old age is seen as an ontological 
bio-medical reality for medical practitioners and some other staff. However many staff, 
from both sites are ambivalent, which suggests a lack of clarity in their concept of
C Nurse Fiona: 
C Physio Ann:
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depression in this setting. There is an apparent contradiction between how staff are 
expected to define depression as health care professionals and how they may see it as 
members of society, as a normal reaction of sadness to circumstance.
There is a suggestion that those who dwell on depression as a diagnosis are those with 
personal experience of the phenomenon. Nurse Ruth described the social isolation of her 
own mother and Nurse Trish spoke about a friend’s depression. Geraldine was the only 
relative to immediately mention depression later disclosing that she has herself been 
depressed in the past. Selina, who has a history of depression, is the only older person to 
make unsolicited mention of depression.
Highlighting the problems experienced by staff members, Trish is uncomfortable about 
what she sees as the inadequacy of the treatment given to people with depression. The 
case that she describes here highlights the apparent lack of clarity both she and her 
colleagues have about howto see the phenomenon. She feels helpless in her inability to 
adequately care for a woman whose wish to die is assumed by others to be a rational 
choice. Yet, earlier in the interview, she doubts the efficacy of the treatment when it is 
offered. We see the dilemma experienced by those who work with older people, who try 
to balance the opposing perceptions of depression as a diagnosis or as an inevitability of 
old age. Trish seems to feel helplessly confused by the opposing possibilities.
G Nurse Trish: And I feel that depression in the elderly isn't addressed
properly here. They’re just slapped on [an anti­
depressant] or something like that whereas somebody
who is inside themselves isn’t seen. The person who sits 
quietly and doesn’t speak, with their head in their hands, 
often isn’t treated.
Int: So what happens to them?
G Nurse Trish: They may get put on anti-depressants
Int: And do they get better?
G Nurse Trish: Not really, no. And you know that when they go home
they’re probably not going to take the tablets anyway...
G. Nurse Trish: [later] There is one lady in there now, I feel helpless. I
can’t help her. Except try and get her to eat. I say, no you 
can’t go to bed until you’ve had a drink but that’s terrible, I
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mean for me to say that to her, dreadful. Butwhenshe 
goes to bed she goes in under the cover and she’d die...
And then people say, “Well that’s her righf. But I feel that 
it is not her right, that’s her illness... she’s ill, and that’s 
what we’ve said all along, if somebody wants to do that, 
that’s up tp them and I’ve said, but they might not really 
want to do that. I feel helpless.
Val, who listed depression as a mental health problem, also demonstrates ambivalence in 
being unsure as to whether depression is appropriately addressed with the use of anti­
depressants. In recognizing that depression is “picked up” she identifies depression as a 
medical phenomenum but then suggests that medical intervention may not be appropriate 
as low mood is inevitable for someone in hospital.
G. OT Val: It depends on the consultants. One of them is quite good
at picking up depression and one of them isn’t. But then 
on e of them is almost too quick to put them on an anti­
depressant when he hasn’t really given them a chance... [It 
may be] just because they are fed up with being in 
hospital.
In terms of hospitalisation the literature suggests that depression can be seen as either 
causative in or resulting from, physical health deterioration (Katz 1996, Kennedy 2000, 
Godfrey and Demby 2004). Peter suggests that without the depression there would be no 
physical health problem. Gayle also defines depression with the pessimism of 
permanence.
G Consultant Peter: Problem wise, I’d say two main things, volume wise, I’d
say the main conditions I see are dementia and 
depression...The vast majority are physically unwell 
because they are [sic] depression, or its part of their 
depression, its the way their depression runs.
C OT Gayle: Urn, could seeing things like the permanent problems not
just say acute confusion, I think? Maybe things like 
dementia, depression.
Both these responses suggest that diagnosed mental health problems, in old age, are seen 
as an insurmountable barrier in the acute general hospital setting, whether the problem is 
related to mood or cognition. The older person becomes the diagnosis, suggesting that 
problematic needs in old age in hospital can be seen as equivalent to mental ill health.
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Such pessimism is thought to contribute to therapeutic nihilism, lack of treatment due to 
perceived lack of hope (Godfrey and Demby 2004 p20).
Some Glimster staff members, in line with the organisational focus on throughput, 
mention depression in pessimism, in terms of its influence on potential to return home. 
Maggie, a physiotherapist, correlates depression with an inability to concentrate on, and 
therefore benefit from, her instructions aimed at improving mobility. Dr Naomi focuses 
on the lack of drive with the same probable outcome, not getting home. Herrman et al 
(1998) suggest that people with depression are not afforded rehabilitation opportunities; 
there is suggestion here that this is subtly linked to lack of hope and the social inadequacy 
attributed to those with mental health problems.
G Dr Naomi: Certainly things like depression. People won’t be
motivated to go home. It’s all right us saying get up and 
walk, but if you don’t feel that actually it’s worth getting up 
and walking it’s not going to be any benefit to do that then 
why bother trying?
Between the two sites there is some apparent difference in the staff actions taken when 
people are thought to be depressed and what happens when they do not recover. In 
Chapley Hospital all the staff respondents described referring for a specialist opinion for 
people with suspected depression, in Glimster General such an action was felt to be rare, 
as Sue confirms.
Int: At what point would you consider calling somebody in,
for somebody who is depressed, or does that not 
happen?
G. Manager Sue: I don’t think that happens. No, I don’t think it does. I
think that provided that there are signs that, say in a 
fortnight after they’ve started the treatment, that things 
have improved...
Int: And has it?
G. Manager Sue: Not always. I don’t think enough is done.
In line with the literature (Rapp et al 1988, Grout 1997, Rothera et al 2002), staff in both 
sites belieVe that they readily identify depression in absence of evidence that they do. In 
Chapley Hospital the lack of older people diagnosed with depression was evident during
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the sampling process and the data confirms that staff rarely readily identify depression, in 
considering mental health problems in old age in their workplace. At Glimster General, 
although depression was readily mentioned, the older people sample, the majority of 
whom may have been depressed, suggests lack of recognition and treatment. This seems 
to demonstrate that the differing models of mental health service in these sites, were not 
impacting on issues around identifying and addressing depression.
In this section I have examined how staff members conceptualise depression. While 
many staff members, in both sites and more confidently in Glimster, identify depression 
diagnostically, there is evidence of ambivalence in all but the medical staff. Contrary to 
the assertion from Manthorpe and Hiffe (2005 p9) who suggest that describing depression 
as a psychiatric phenomenon helps differentiate it from sadness, staff appear confused 
about howto identify it with many describing it as expected misery, understandable in ill 
health in old age. In mental health circles there is a recipe for depression (Box 3.1) that 
others do not share. The staff respondents believe that depression exists as a medical 
condition but they cannot define it in terms of the diagnostic ingredients.
I now go on to explore depression as sadness by examining the data from the older people 
and relative clusters.
7.4.2 The Views of Older People and Relatives
Among the older people and the relatives, depression in old age in the general hospital 
setting is generally not seen as an illness. Being unhappy and fed up are seen as normal, 
within the context of being old and being in hospital, and indeed expected.
G. Son Steven: Depression is normal in old age isn’t it?
Several respondents use colloquial articulations of depression, demonstrating its 
perceived normality in these circumstances. This view concurs with the work of Brown 
(1996) who describes depression as occurring in response to attacks on ones self esteem
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whereby one is in a subordinate position, with loss of control, events that undermine the 
person’s value and a perception that escape from the current situation is blocked. All of 
these can be true for the hospitalised older person, as can the loss of autonomy that 
Geraldine Boyle (2005), in her study of older people receiving care at home and in 
residential settings, found to be a key risk factor in the development of depression.
Selina described her fear of loss of control (pl67) and goes on to describe her fight 
against the tide of potential depression brought on by the circumstance of hospitalisation 
and ill health. She is a relatively young woman, at 67, and unhappy at being in a ward 
with older people. She demonstrates fluctuating resilience. The depression she 
expresses, may win over within this environment that encourages dependence and 
compliance. She wants to behave in the “old” way, to strive to get better, but feels 
dragged towards the “new75 way, the way of the ward, of allowing things to be done for 
her. The way that Selina talks about her two potential selves, the old me and the new me, 
epitomizes the potential membership categories (Baker 1997) that she can fulfill. The old 
her, the Selina that she wishes to hold onto, the one who would go into hospital as a 
patient who has fractured their hip would strive to get better and get out. However, 
Selina’s old self is in danger of being overshadowed by the expectation from the social 
structure in this older peoples’ ward, as defined by the organisational structure discussed 
in Chapter 6. Here she becomes the “new” me and is drawn into the category of old and 
ill which she does not want to identify with, but feels forced into. She suggests that it is 
this overpowering pressure to conform to the category expected of her, which drives her 
towards depression. She fears but does not want to be bracketed with those whom she 
sees as distressing and having mental health problems.
Int: Have you had depression yourself?
G. Selina: Yes. It can be nasty... It slows things up, it does. Because
you are dealing with the old and the new. You get the old 
feeling and you get the new feeling about getting better.
Let me put it this way, the old feeling was go into hospital, 
lay in the bed, smile at the world, smile at people, try and 
get better, but it [mental illness] mustn’t touch you. Then 
you get the new people, they go into their own world and 
they want people to come and touch them, get them out, 
get them doing things, they want them to do it.
Int: And sometimes you feel like one of those and sometimes
you feel like the other. Is that what you are saying?
191
G. Selina: Sometimes you want to lie back and..but at other times
you want to get on and get out of here. And it’s been more 
like that this time, I’m getting more like them. [Those she 
calls mentally ill]
Int: So is there a danger, and you have been depressed
before, so I think I can ask you this, is there a danger of 
you getting depressed because of this?
G. Selina: Yes
Tom too appears to be depressed, following his bereavement, but approaches his feelings 
in a particular way. Like Selina, he sees depression as something that he must not 
succumb to. He must buckle up and get on with it rather than consider the weakness he 
associates with being depressed.
So, what about depression. Have you heard anything 
about depression, do you know anything about that?
Well, not a lot ...and I still don’t understand what it means 
really...Why they don’t sort of buckle up and say “come on 
lad, we’ve got get cracking, we’ve got to. ...Because 
somebody told me I was a bit depressed a while ago after 
my wife died, but I’m certain I wasn’t... It is difficult when, 
especially when you love someone you think how the heck 
am I going to get over this. In fact now I’m going back to 
my cottage, I leave it as long as I can at the end of the 
day...Too many memories
All the participants, who I considered to be potentially depressed, describe their feelings 
of unhappiness as environmentally and circumstantially inevitable yet not attributable as 
a mental health problem.
Pru emphasises that her feelings of being fed up are different than having a mental health 
problem, because a mental illness would be demonstrated through not “thinking right”. 
Here she emphasises the attributes of mental health problems as discussed in Chapter 6 
whereby one would have to be physically displaying something abnormal to be classified 
thus.
Int: What about depression, have you ever met anyone who’s
had depression?
G. Pru: I have yeah. I can get depressed a bit sometimes...But, I
mean, day after day, as I just said to my husband, I just sit 
here and howl my head off...Especially with the family 
being away, you know, you think of them then...and it 
makes you feel worse.
Int:
G. Tom:
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Int: So is there a difference between being depressed like that
and being depressed in a mental way, do you think?
G. Pru: Oh, I should think so...That’s worse isn’t it?
Int: How would that be worse then?
G. Pru: When you really would be awful I think...not quite thinking
right or anything like that I think so. Think I’ve only been
depressed on and off, lightly like nothing sort of bad.
Oliver’s wife had been diagnosed with depression following her admission to hospital 
due to a stroke that had rendered her unable to speak. He sees her feelings of frustration 
and sadness as inevitable in the circumstances and does not feel that the pills, anti­
depressants, will serve to help in any way. Like Pru, he differentiates depression from 
“real” mental illness through the attribution of negative behaviour.
[my wife] is fed up (my emphasis)because she is not 
herself. Who wouldn’t be? ... I don’t know if she is really 
depressed, you know, ill depressed (mv emphasis) if you 
know what I mean. I don’t think so. I don’t expect that 
these pills will change how she feels about what has 
happened to her [health].
What do you mean? Ill depressed?
Well, I suppose not being able to stay still, urn, wanting 
attention all the time.
Although die participants expect depression to be present in old age in hospital, as a 
feature of ageing and ill health rather than as a mental health problem, they generally 
anticipate no action upon it, perceiving it as futile. Nora demonstrates a belief that 
nothing can be done, suggesting therefore, that overlooking depression is to be expected 
as there would be little point in doing anything else.
Int: What do you think happens to them? What do you think 
the hospital staff do about that [depression]?
G. Nora: Don’t know quite. 1 think they quite happily overlook it.
Int: you think they overlook it, why would that be?
G. Nora: They can’t do anything about.
Int: Can nobody do anything about it?
G. Nora: Shouldn’t have thought so, perhaps, 1 don’t know.
This data begins to suggest a differentiation from the popularist, publicised phenomenon 
of depression in younger people, people with social capital, against a perceived absence 
of treatable depression in older people who have “disengaged” (Cumming and Henry
G. Husband Oliver:
Int:
G. Husband Oliver:
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1961, Wain wight 2004) and are losing their usefulness to society. Both Oliver and Pru, 
above, seem to be trying to differentiate between the lay and the medical use of the word 
depression as it is differentiated from feeling glum, fed up or sad. Clinical depression, 
they seem to realise requires some sort of treatment before it can be cured. I go on to 
discuss this possible difference between sadness in extreme old age, and clinical 
depression in section 1 A.1.2 below.
7.4.3 Discussion on Depression
I have explored the participants’ views about depression in old age in the general hospital 
setting to discover that it is not generally viewed as a mental health problem. Even 
among staff, who are aware of depression as a medical phenomenon, an expectation of 
being inevitably fed up, due to age and circumstance, emerges. Such a view has 
implications for recognition and service response which I will explore further in the final 
chapters. Of course it also suggests that, in line with the literature, older people in 
hospital are invisibly suffering a remediable mental health problem to the detriment of 
their quality of life and their general health potential.
However, I suggest that lack of recognition is not merely due to an inability on the part of 
clinicians to put the symptoms together to formulate a diagnosis, as has been suggested in 
the literature (DoH 2001, Godfrey and Denby 2004, Manlhorpe and Hiffe 2005, RCP 
2005, CSIP 2005). The inability to see depression is due to its lack of existence as a 
phenomenon for this population group in this setting. If depression in old age in hospital 
is socially accepted as normal a clinician will not look for an illness. Ironically if the 
problem was accepted, identified and addressed it would facilitate faster throughput 
within the organisational system that, when it is not noticed, it challenges.
The under-recognition and acceptance of depression as normal in these circumstances, is 
out of kilter with a proliferation of lay interest and acceptance of depression as mental 
health problem for younger people. Recent examination of the effect of media coverage 
on society’s view of mental illness and distress, explored by Clarke (2004) suggests a
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raising the profile of experiences such as depression. Some high profile sufferers, with 
whom the press sympathised, notably Princess Diana, may, she suggests, have effected a 
clear delineation between acceptable mental illness and bad mental illness. The use of 
anti-depressants, such as Prozac, is now acceptable and, as Lindsay Prior (1993) noted in 
his study of younger people in a mental hospital, depression was the one mental illness 
that people were willing to acknowledge that they had.
This apparent acceptability is not apparent for older people in hospital, either in 
themselves or by others. Low mood is seen as circumstantially normal once one has 
reached that stage in life, and it appears to be believed that any intervention would be 
fruitless. Such definition is more in line with the condition formally known as 
“melancholia”, described by Joan Busfield (1996) as the predecessor of the 
medicalisation of depression. Arguably depression in old age in the general hospital 
setting has not achieved the same degree of medicalisation as that for other societal 
groups and remains as expected and inevitable sadness. Although psychiatry has claimed 
the word depression, and its diagnostic use is widespread among younger adults, it only 
has focus in the general hospital setting from mental health professionals.
This apparent different perception of depression in old age in the general hospital setting 
leads me to explore further in two differing directions. Firstly I consider depression in 
old age against the feminist literature already discussed in Chapter 4. I consider why 
depression may be different for this group of older people, notably women, who are 
actually of the same generational cohort as those originally studied in the mid-twentieth 
century. Secondly I speculate about whether there may be a differential between 
medically defined depression in the fourth age, in those who are nearing the end of their 
life, and depression in younger people.
9.4.3.1 Structured Depression
Firstly then I draw comparison particularly with some feminist writers of the mid­
twentieth century. Friedan (1963), Gavron (1966) and Oakley (1981) all wrote about the
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perceived over diagnosis of depression in women the 1960s and 1970s. They suggest 
that diagnosis and treatment formed a means of social control that enabled disillusioned 
housewives to be tranquilised into their undesirable social roles. Ironically the cohort 
that I now study, the majority of who are women, would have potentially been among 
that group of oppressed women in their younger years. At that time their misery was 
over-recognised and blunted in order that they could be useful to society as housewives, 
hostesses and mothers; now it is ignored.
The links that Oakley (1981) made to depression and oppression are applicable in old age 
but differently. The “fed up” woman who aspired to be the perfect mother (Friedan 
1963) were oppressed through the use of “mother’s little helpers” tranquilisers (Rolling 
Stones 1963); the current older generation who are fed up in their situation are oppressed 
by their invisibility. The assumption of the normality of their misery precludes action, 
medical or otherwise. Such exclusion enables society to put them away and allows them 
to fade away. The general hospital setting perpetuates, through its social forces, the 
dependency and loss of autonomy (Boyle 2005) of older people and therefore serves to 
create the depression it does not recognise, as Selina (p i93) fears.
Townsend (1981) described the concept of “structured dependency” whereby older 
people are socially moulded, by state social systems, into dependent beings. The 
definition of depression as an inevitable consequence of ageing, particularly when in the 
general hospital setting, can either be seen as either a bi-product of that structured 
dependency or as a factor that contributes towards it. Older people either become 
depressed because structured dependency has defined them as of no social use, or they 
are seen as of no social use because they are perceived to be inevitably depressed. This is 
in parallel to the bio-medical literature that defines depression as caused by, or causative 
of, physical health problems (Godfrey and Demby 2004). To extend on Townsend’s 
theory I suggest that depression in old age in this setting is an artifact of “structured 
dependency” as structured depression is invisible as it is perceived as the norm.
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7 .4 .3 .2 Acceptable Sadness
I now consider that there may exist clear differences between the definitions of both 
cognitive impairment and depression in the third as opposed to the fourth age. Although 
it has not been within the remit of this research to consider age cohort related differences 
in depression, the data have led me to consider such a possibility.
The construction of mental health problems, in this setting, is one of invisibility when it 
is attributable to normal ageing and circumstance, unless overt adverse behaviour is 
observed. In the case of dementia this is characterised by behaviour that challenges the 
staff and others, and the rigid day-to-day organisational requirements of the setting. For 
depression, and indeed for the “poor things”, particularly in GHimster General, it is noted 
only when the organisational goal of moving through the system towards discharge is not 
being met (see Chapter 8). Within the data there is some indication that the younger 
participants, from the older people’s clusters, Mary and Selina, view depression 
particularly differently for themselves, without the acceptance and perceived inevitability 
voiced by others.
More research is necessary in order to consider whether the older old accept depression 
as an end of life reality when they are getting ready to die. Do older people in ill health 
philosophically look forward to death, not in a negative way, accepting that it is their 
time to die? Such a supposition is supported by the stage theory of life described by Joan 
Erikson as “gerotranscendence” and the “assimilation and accommodation” model of 
ageing (Coleman and O’Hanlon 2004, see p20). A view that acceptable sadness may be 
part of the natural journey towards life’s end, is also complementary with the research 
carried out by Geraldine Boyle (2005) which demonstrated that depression was more 
common in older people living at home, who felt that their autonomy was being 
threatened, than for those in institutional care who knew, and possibly accepted, that their 
autonomy was lost. Both Pru and Oliver (pl94) in older old age, describe depression in 
terms of inevitable acceptance.
197
Theoretically it is possible that depression and the experience of depression is different 
once one has reached those last years of life in which one experiences the “compression 
of morbidity” (Fries 1991, see pi 8), that is the last eighteen months of life within which 
one experiences a period of sustained health problems prior to death. Of course it is 
essential to then ask whether this acceptance of inevitable decline towards death is part of 
the life course or is a result of the strong influence of societal ageism. The stigma of old 
age renders those who perceive themselves to be old, and it is only when one is ill that 
one does so, as useless and dispensable. If depression in the fourth age, in ill health, is 
found to be a different phenomenon, the arguments that researchers in the field of 
dementia use for placing dementia within the disability agenda (e.g. Gilliard 2002) rather 
than health, could be ascribed to depression as a chronic disability.
One could argue that the recent focus on social inclusion for older people (Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister 2005) as discussed in Chapter 1, serves to further exclude the old 
ill and thus render them structured into depression. As Tester et al (2004) noted, the older 
old are more and more excluded, perpetuating the development of “poor things” arguably 
in the eyes of the older people themselves as well as wider society. This work is serving 
to emphasise the enormous extent of the gaps in research on depression in old age 
(Godfrey and Denby 2004, Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005) creating more further questions 
than answers on the subject.
The invisibility of depression in this setting displays a major paradigm difference 
between psychiatry and lay view. I suggest that recent emphases on enabling non­
specialists to better recognise, and therefore address the problems of depression in old 
age (DoH 2001, Godfrey and Denby 2004, Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005, RCP 2005, CSIP 
2005) cannot be met. Non-specialists cannot recognise the indicators of a condition that 
they do not perceive to exist. In the next chapters I go on to explore the apparent lack of 
impact on perceptions of depression through the presence of either model of mental 
health service provision. I explore how the needs of older people with depression, in this 
setting, may better be considered in the future.
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7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have continued to explore how the research participants perceive mental 
health problems in old age. With regard to cognitive and memory changes, it appears 
that there are two types of dementia, the age related, unproblematic “poor things”, 
described in this chapter, and the people whose behaviour is unacceptable in the general 
hospital setting, as discussed in the previous chapter. Each group brings challenges to the 
organisational management as I explore further in Chapter 8 and neither is seen being the 
proper business of the general hospital. There also may exist a third group who are 
invisible as they are not challenging to the system in any way.
It is clear that perceptions are markedly different from those within the field of psychiatry 
with a general conclusion that mental ill health is defined through behaviour, or absence 
of behaviour, rather than any other diagnostic symptomology. There exists a dilemma 
between the constituents of mental health problems as opposed to the expectation of old 
age. I have demonstrated that the stigmatised position of both mental illness and old age 
complicates perceptions. The individuals may be seen as bad, yet the group, the older 
people, are socially inadequate. This dichotomy of definition between bad and in need 
locking away, and pitied and in need of nurture leads to conflict, particularly in 
considering how needs can be met as I go on to explore further in Chapter 8.
In considering the construction of depression, exploration of the data leads to the 
conclusion that depression is not generally seen as a mental health problem in this setting. 
Rather it is seen as bom out of the inevitable social processes of ageing and ill health that 
people believe they can do nothing about. To the outsider the presence of depression is 
seen as an intrinsic part of membership categorisation (Baker 1997) for older people in 
general hospitals and, as such, it is not defined as a mental illness. Sadness, in such 
circumstance, is seen as inevitable. Such a perception arguably renders depression 
accepted, intrinsic and invisible. I argue that structured depression exists in this setting.
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Further investigation is necessary in order to consider the apparent age related differences 
in the recognition of depression, a phenomenon which has become the acceptable face of 
mental illness for younger adults. Also in need of further exploration are possible 
differences in perceptions of mental health problems in the young old as opposed to the 
older old, with a potential difference in how the older old express how they feel. As with 
dementia (Gilliard 2002), there may be a case for defining depression in ill old, old age as 
a disability rather than an illness. Depression may be different for the, otherwise 
physically healthy, seventy year old.
Viewed together the exploration and examination of the data in Chapters 6 and 7 suggest 
that mental health problems in old age in this setting are only perceived when they are a 
challenge to the organisational structure and obstruct the smooth running of the powerful 
system. This may be either due to overt and visible behaviour or to an inability to fulfill 
the normal patient role, in moving through the system, due to passivity or depression.
This leaves some mental health problems, as defined by psychiatry, as unseen and 
unattended. In the culture of a general hospital these mental health problems do not exist.
Whether an older person has a visible and perceived mental health problem and is thus 
defined as bad, or an invisible memory or mood disturbance, and perceived as inept, they 
are not afforded a valid voice. They are largely without power in a setting that thrives on 
the presence of power.
In the next chapter I move on to consider the nature of mental health service provision 
and the desires of the participants for future service. In doing so I am mindful of the 
findings detailed within this and die previous chapter; that is that perceptions of mental 
health problems in old age in the general hospital setting are both influenced and 
sustained by broad lay perceptions, organisational power and the ongoing stigmas about 
old age and mental illness. I also seek to answer the second part of my research question, 
in considering whether the differing nature of service provision, in Chapley Hospital and 
Gimster General, has any effect on the ways in which mental health problems in old age 
are perceived.
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Chapter 8
Delivering a service
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter I explore responses in relation to the second part of my research question: 
Does the nature of mental health services provision affect and/or influence the social 
constructions of mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting?
In order to explore whether the nature of service provision affects how mental health 
problems in old age in the general hospital setting are conceptualised, in this chapter I 
explore firstly the views of the participants about how service is, and should be, provided. 
I conclude an ongoing will for the exclusion of people with mental health problems, 
either through physical removal or by providing others to take on the burden of care, with 
potentially greater such desire in the consultation liaison site of Chapley Hospital. I go 
on to consider the site differences with regard to knowledge skills and perceptions about 
mental health issues and note some influence of the mental health consultation/liaison 
model of service through, what I call, Osmotic Learning. Finally I return to consider the 
wider implications of the analysis both in terms of the research question and in starting to 
consider the implications for the future in preparation for Chapter 9.
In Chapter 6 1 discussed apparent organisational differences suggesting a possible greater 
consumer focus in Chapley General with the more traditional model in Glimster General. 
This latter, as explored in Chapter 7, renders older people with mental health problems 
less visible unless they do not fulfil their anticipated role as defined by the demands of 
the organisation. Given these differences it is not possible to exclusively untangle any 
relationship to construction of mental health problems in old age that may be attributed 
solely to the model of mental health service in operation.
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I conclude that perceptions of mental health problems in the general hospital setting are 
influenced by the nature of provision but also, and probably more powerfully, by the 
culture of the setting under examination. While there is some evidence that the presence 
of a mental health consultation liaison service influences the knowledge and skills of 
those general practitioners in regular contact with such services, I suggest that the 
continued provision of an external specialist service perpetuates the traditional Cartesian 
division and ongoing stigma. Such division enables those in the general hospital setting 
to be rescued from having to contemplate how to absorb and meet the needs of people 
with mental health problems in their setting. The division also ensures that die invisible 
mental health problems of old age, discussed in Chapter 7, remain unseen.
In order to illustrate how l reach such a conclusion, I start by considering what 
participants expressed as necessary in terms of service provision for older people with 
mental health problems in the general hospital setting.
8.2 What is Needed?
Having discussed with each participant what they see as mental health problems in old 
age in this setting, I went on to ask them to talk about service response to such problems. 
Typically I asked something like “what happens to an older person who is mentally 
unwell on this ward?” I then asked the respondent how they thought mental health issues 
could ideally be addressed for those in need.
I have already examined how people predominantly construct mental health problems by 
identifying those who do not fit in. It is therefore unsurprising that, in looking at care and 
solutions, respondents tend to focus on older people who they find challenging, in the 
absence of those who may be depressed or those “poor things” who have memory loss 
but are passive. Responses can generally be divided between a desire for more mental 
health external expertise to be brought in to help in 1he current setting or, alternatively 
and more emphatically, the removal of older people with mental health problems. I 
address the latter first.
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8.2.1 Take Them Away
The majority of respondents, other than the older people in Chapley Hospital and the staff 
at Glimster General, suggest that there should be a special place to which older people 
with mental health problems can be moved to receive their care away from others. Most 
would prefer a special ward within the general hospital as the people concerned are often 
not perceived as “bad enough” to require mental hospital care. Although a desire for a 
specialist ward within the general hospital concurs with limited literature in the United 
States (Bartels 2003) that suggests the desirability of integrated mental and physical 
health care for older people, responses emphasise a desire for segregation rather than 
desire for improved therapeutic value.
This appears to again emphasise a degree of pity about being old, which places one in a 
different category from the, even more bad, younger people with mental health problems 
who are perceived to need to inhabit psychiatric in-patient facilities. The difference in 
definition can also be seen to support the current political position that defines mental 
health services as necessary only to respond to those with severe mental illness (DoH 
1999). People with depression/delirium and dementia do not fall into this category, as 
explored in Chapter 4.
Of the Chapley older people with memory problems, only Hilda concurs with her 
counterparts at Glimster in believing that such people should not be in the same place as 
her.
C. Hilda: I don’t think she should be really, I think she should be in a
further advanced ward. Somewhere where she can talk to 
people and find out about things.
Int: Do you mean in a mental institution, or do you mean
something else other than that?
C. Hilda: Oh something else other than that...not bad...no, no, not
that bad.
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Selina alludes to the qualities of a person that render them unsuitable to be among others 
who may be adversely affected by their presence. This view is clearly linked with the 
descriptions of mental health problems as discussed in Chapter 6.
Int:
G. Selina: 
Int:
G. Selina:
So if there is a patient here who has got particular 
problems, is particularly depressed or is particularly 
disturbed, do you think they need to call a specialist in?
I think they should go to a different place.
You think they should go to a different place. What sort of 
place would that be?
A place that deals with that quality of person.um..get them 
all in together... Obviously hospitals have got so much on 
their plates at the time that they don’t want the added 
burden of mental patients as well. ... it’s difficult. They’ve 
got to be here obviously, but I still say all the time that I’ve 
been in, that they should be in separate wards.
Views expressing die desirability of removal are most frequently expressed by relatives, 
whether or not their nearest and dearest has a mental health problem. The rationale is 
most often to remove the problem from the presence of their relative, with apparent lack 
of acceptance that one’s own relative may be perceived as a problem by others. This 
correlates with the utterances suggesting the stigma of mental illness discussed in the 
previous chapter. Rachel expresses the views of many in wanting those, who Natalie 
describes as “the most disruptive ones”, to receive their care elsewhere.
G. Daughter Rachel: She shouldn’t have been in the same room as my Mum.
She was really scared that she would steal something from 
her and I’m sure it didn’t help her to get better, did it? ...I 
think that all these people, these difficult people, should be 
on one ward here. There must be enough of them. I’ve 
heard quite a few. Then they would be with nurses who 
know what to do with them and they would not worry my 
Mum.
The majority of staff in Chapley Hospital, would rather there was somewhere else for 
these people to go. Physio Maggie suggests that this is an “obvious” feeling when 
considering people with dementia who, it seems she feels do not meet the criteria for 
being in the ward.
G.Physio Maggie: Well, I see people on this ward that have dementia. Urn,
which obviously people are not happy with.
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Int: Well, where should they go then, in an ideal world what
would be... how would you envisage service being 
provided?
G.Physio Maggie: Well maybe they would get admitted to somewhere that
will look after their needs but I don’t think it should 
necessarily be called a mental health unit.
However, Maggie is one of only three staff from Glimster General expressed a will for 
older people with mental health problems to be removed from their ward, unlike the 
majority of their counterparts at Chapley Hospital. I will explore this difference further 
as this chapter develops by considering that the presence of mental health 
consultation/liaison not only highlights to staff that they need more knowledge and skill 
but also that it may make mental health problems more overt and therefore less desirable 
in the setting. Although Gayle is eloquent in her rationale, there is, like the desire for 
more mental health input (p207) the flavour of a desire to be rescued from dealing with 
the undesirable. Such discomfort is possibly not felt by those staff at Glimster, who do 
not so readily perceive that mental health issues are present for their patients. In absence 
of specialists to highlight need they believe that they are providing an appropriate service 
and therefore do not perceive any need to change.
C. OT Gayle: It would probably be better for the patient actually if they
were having mental health problems and physical 
problems if they could be seen in a mental health 
environment where it is more geared towards there 
problems and solve the physical problems at the same 
time. Because here we are very much geared towards 
physical problems but not handling a mental health 
problem properly could have.massive effects. With a 
physical problem it tends to be very prescipt've, you’ve got 
a broken leg you fix it, um, if you’ve got depression you’ve 
got, you know, quite a specific thing. Yeah, but I don’t 
know how that would work practically.
I have already suggested that mental health problems are only readily noted, in these 
settings, when they are overtly visible. Such visible socially unacceptable behaviour does 
not fit in to the general hospital setting and nor is it seen as the role of general hospital 
staff. What is desired therefore is a service that rescues staff from the challenges of 
caring for those with mental health problems in old age, as perceived by the social actors
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within the general hospital setting. Such a rescue service would take them out of the 
front line of service delivery and problem solving.
Interestingly none of the research participants spoke directly of the rights of older people 
with mental health problems to be socially included and afforded the same service as 
other general hospital patients. None of those who suggested a separate ward considered 
that this may perpetuate stigma though many, like Gayle, alluded to the potential greater 
expertise. Only Gayle considered the physical health needs that require attention, as they 
had brought the person into hospital in the first instance. This suggests that the presence 
of an overt mental health problem, in this setting, leads to the risk of blindness to other 
health issues, as evidenced elsewhere.
I now examine the responses that suggest a need for an increase in mental health service 
in-reach to the setting.
8.2.2 Help Us More
In considering the current service provided, it was not possible to elicit detail from the 
older people and relative cluster group members at Glimster General as they had no such 
experience. Similarly eliciting detail from the older people at Chapley was a challenge as 
all but one of them had no recall of the experience, as Cathy demonstrates.
Int: So when you saw a mental health professional here, a specialist,
had your doctor told you that you were going to see somebody?
C. Cathy: When did I see anybody here?
Int: Last week.
C. Cathy Did I? - You see I don’t remember.
The Chapley relatives were positive about their experience of the mental health 
consultation/liaison model with Charlie describing his belief that such service was an 
integral part of normal practice.
C. Husband Charlie: I don’t know why [the mental health nurse] were a$ked to
see [my wife] in the first place, I suppose I thought that it 
just always happened. Anyway I’m glad...because she
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can talk about how she feels and so can I. It has helped 
me understand a bit of it all.
Flora reflects the responses of other relatives in Chapley Hospital, describing how she felt 
supported following the process of mental health consultation/liaison. She went on to 
describe, like Angela above (pi55) how it helped her plan her mothers future care.
Oliver, whose wife had had a stroke rendering herunable to speak, wished that he had 
been able to see someone at Glimster General.
Int And when she had an assessment, what do you
think was the potential value for you and for her, 
or was there any?
C. Daughter Flora: I think one of [the] roles, one of the things was to 
act as an advocate for my mother and for me, or 
a mediator I suppose as well and I think that has 
been a very powerful thing...
G Husband Oliver: What, a specialist? Yes I’d quite like [my wife] to 
see someone to clear up this depression 
business and to see if anything can be done to 
help her frustration.
The Glimster staff express frustration at the current mental health service, which they see 
as over-stretched and distant from general hospital staff members. Sue expresses a desire 
for a more integrated approach whereby staff are more involved in giving and receiving 
information about the older person who has been referred. She describes the exclusivity 
of the traditional approach in mental health service provision.
Int:
G Manager Sue:
Int:
G Manager Sue:
When the psychogeriatrician comes to see your patients, 
what is the experience like?
Isolated really. Very much they go and speak to the 
patient and write a report. There’s no active involvement 
from the nurses’ point at all...Often the diagnosis has been 
put down and recommendations for treatment.
And what sort of things would be the recommendation? 
Medications mainly, medications...She doesn’t actually do 
any treatment on the patient. She doesn’t do any sort of 
treatment plan or give any advice to nurses. It’s just one- 
off assessments.
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All the respondents were asked for their opinion on the preferred profession of the mental 
health practitioner responding to referrals from the general hospital staff. The older 
people at Chapley and both groups of relatives gave divided opinions with most feeling 
that expertise rather than profession was the issue of importance. In line with the 
organisational differences discussed in Chapter 6, Rachel’s intuitive response is to expect 
the mental health professional to be a doctor. However, with exploration she realises that 
this may not be essential, although she feels that her mother would expect a doctor. Her 
supposition is supported in the older peoples’ Glimster cluster who do indeed anticipate 
that a doctor would carry out such intervention.
G. Daughter Rachel: I would always think that it would be a doctor, you know, a
psychiatrist, but I suppose a nurse may be alright if she 
knew what she needed to know. These days it doesn’t 
seem to matter so much about it being a doctor though I 
think maybe my mum would prefer it to be a doctor 
because of her age you know. But actually I think that 
nurses may be a bit better because they can look at the 
bigger picture.
Within the staff groups the majority at both hospitals would prefer the availability of a 
mental health nurse, with the remainder saying that the profession was not relevant, 
rather the knowledge and expertise. The reasons for the nurse preference all reflect the 
traditional hierarchical power of medical staff discussed above (p32). Doctors are seen as 
above others and therefore less accessible. Psychiatrists are, according to Nurse Fiona, 
“one league out of my understanding”. Hannah, a doctor herself, underlines how she sees 
the restriction of the social division. Christine, in line with Roberts (1997), feels that a 
nurse is more accessible and visible and Elizabeth declares that a nurse is thought to have 
a more holistic view on the older person’s situation and thus provide more practical, 
down to earth, advice.
C. Consultant Hannah: I know that I would have to work for much, much longer
and harder, even with my own nursing staff, to achieve the 
level of acceptance and understanding that [a nurse has] 
from day one. And so a psychiatrist coming here, a 
medical psychiatrist, will be treated, in public, with a kind of 
respect and deference, things like that, but the nursing 
staff will not listen, or will qualify what they hear, especially 
if we were talking about very.nursing things. I cannot tell a 
nurse what to do, as a doctor. A nurse will not listen to me
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teaching them about nursing practice and a lot of care of 
the confused patient is about nursing.
The normal scenario that you get a doctor in response to 
your referral, whereas here you get a nurse. What do you 
see as the pro’s and con’s of that one? If there are any?
... There probably is a different focus because nurses tend 
to be more practical and realistic about what people can 
do and not do whereas doctors are a little bit “head in the 
clouds”. Some more than others and wouldn’t perhaps 
see the realities of day-to-day issues and how a patient 
might manage.
The majority of staff in both sites want more input from mental health specialists. 
However, there are site differences. In Glimster this is expressed as a general desire for 
advice and someone to talk things over with, as Zoe suggests. However, there is little 
detail about the potential impact of such service because of lack of experience and 
possibly because the extent of the potential need is not identified. Interestingly Zoe 
alludes to a feeling that speaking to someone in mental health is not a direct link, 
emphasising the extent of the Cartesian division. A telephone contact does not serve to 
breach the gap, whereas person to person may do so.
G. OT Zoe: I think it would be useful to have a named person who
could be contacted for advice and, in the same sort of way 
that we have people who liaise with district nursing 
services, you have a named person who you can talk to, 
we obviously do have colleagues who we can speak to in 
mental health, but there doesn’t seem to be that direct link 
with the hospital.
In Chapley Hospital, while the above quotes about nursing intervention appear to suggest 
satisfaction, there is a clear will for mental health liaison services to increase in order to 
rescue staff further from that which they do not perceive as part of their role. This occurs 
in Chapley despite an apparent acquisition of skill in caring for older people with mental 
health problems as I explore below. There is then a suggestion that skill development 
does not remove the desire not to care for this group of people. Indeed it may increase 
dissatisfaction.
Int:
C. OT Elizabeth:
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This exploration of the data emphasises, among staff in both sites, the ongoing perception 
of the mind/body split characterised by historical models of service provision. Although 
use of the consultation/liaison model, and the presence of nurses, is welcomed, it appears 
that 1he motive for presence may be founded in historical avoidance rather than with the 
view of service integration and improvement in care and outcome for the older people.
On reflecting on the nature of this data, I note that I did not ask any of the research 
participants who the mental health professional should be employed by, or indeed which 
organisation would run the special ward that people with mental health problems should 
go to. I return to this consideration in discussion about potential future services in due 
course.
8.2.3 Other Possible Service Needs
Lastly, in considering how people responded about 1he potential perfect service, I 
consider other voiced ideas. The majority of the staff at Chapley had ideas about 
alternative approaches to care and had given this consideration, as Christine demonstrated 
in suggesting the use of a tagging system to minimise the risk involved in wandering.
Only two staff members at Glimster had alternative considerations. This appears to 
emphasise further the invisibility of mental health problems to staff in the Glimster site 
unless they are of major challenge. Ann is one of several staff members who want more 
emphasis placed on talking approaches to addressing mental health problems in old age.
C. Physio Ann: Counselling, counselling, counselling.... Because I think
that, you know, it’s just like for anybody else. Like if I have 
a problem, you know, and I can’t talk to anybody about my 
problem then I start building up something that it doesn’t 
really necessarily. I mean it’s not really the reality, but 
that’s the reality I’m leading so, you know, if I don’t have 
somebody that help me to go through, and that's what 
happens with many of our patients, I think.
Among each of the cluster groups some respondents suggest that service could be 
improved if there were more staff, especially nurses, to spend time with older people with
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mental health problems. Interestingly none of the nurses expressed this view, suggesting 
that they do not want to fulfil such a role.
In this section I have examined ideas on mental health service provision for older people 
with mental health problems in the general hospital setting. There is a general consensus 
that the current situation requires improvement either by providing more mental health 
specialists or by removing those with mental health problems from the setting. It is worth 
remembering again that these desires centre on the construction of mental health 
problems in old age in this setting as characterised by visible disruptive behaviour.
It appears that the views are most adamantly held by those who perceive themselves as 
particularly adversely affected by the presence of people with mental health problems; 
that is all cluster groups, other than the older people with recognised mental health 
problems and the Glimster General staff who do not see the problems so readily. The 
Glimster older people, the relatives and the Chapley staff feel in need of information and 
support, they feel disrupted, or that their relative is disrupted, or that they are being asked 
to do a job that they do not readily embrace.
Increased diagnosis of mental illness as a result of increasing knowledge generates more 
people who are deemed to be mentally ill, and a need for knowledge and acceptance from 
within medical and other services. I suggest that this proliferation of perceived illness 
may also encourage a dependence of non-experts on experts in the general hospital 
setting, enabling staff to move responsibility to psychiatry either by seeking separation or 
by bringing in external expertise.
However, conversely psychiatry may seek to resist, perceiving, as encouraged by the 
direction of current policy guidelines, the degree of the mental health problem as minor 
and manageable by lesser experts (Kessell 1996) unless it is a “severe and enduring” 
mental illness such as psychoses (DoH 1999). Such divisions potentially leave issues of 
mental health problems in old age out in the cold and addressed by nobody, as I have 
noted with regard to depression (Chapter 7). The lack of clarity about where mental
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health problems in old age belong, organisationally and politically, facilitates the lack of 
recognition that is so apparent.
I now move on to consider any educational impact of mental health service provision 
before considering 1he implications of this research in future service provision.
8.3 Education / Knowledge
In this section I consider die data around the staffs skill and knowledge in providing care 
and treatment to older people with mental health problems. Participants were asked their 
views on the knowledge and skills of staff and also to consider possible influences on that 
knowledge and skill.
In analysing the data a potential link emerges between the educative influence for staff 
who experience the mental health consultation/liaison model and how they view mental 
health problems, specifically dementia. I look initially at the responses from older people 
and relatives.
8.3.1 Trained to Cope
Among the older people, particularly at Chapley Hospital, there is an assumption that the 
staff have the necessary knpwledge and ability to fulfil their roles. This is particularly so 
because they have the innate personal qualities which, as Arthur puts it, “equip them for 
the job”. Mary emphasises her belief that these qualities are more necessary than any 
formal education and in doing so underlines the traditional approaches to care 
characteristic of Glimster’s culture. In line with Alistair Hewison’s (1995) study, 
examining power within the nurse patient relationship on an elderly care ward, nurses 
legitimately use persuasion in order to achieve compliance in those who initially are not 
happy to compiy.
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G. Mary I mean the nurses have been brilliant. I mean I, sort of, lay
and listen, you know... Do you laugh at them, do you 
ridicule them, no, I mean. Nurses seem to be so good at 
cajoling them into doing what they want... They do the 
best with the experiences they’ve got of love and life... I 
mean sometimes them bite are more important than any 
degrees or anything.
In considering knowledge and skills, several of the older people at Glimster while 
initially expressing belief that this was sufficient, became more ambivalent on 
exploration. Selina talks of nurses being “trained to cope” in performing tasks associated 
with incontinence and so on, but that they need to have and to be more understanding. 
Olive places distance between herself and those seen to have mental health problems 
placing the “they”, people with mental health problems, as different. It is only when she 
is encouraged to give attention to what she has said that she can personalise the nursing 
response and consider how she may react were she to be nursed in this way. Indeed she 
became angry at the idea that anyone would consider calling her a “good girl”.
Do you think that the nurses know howto handle that sort 
of thing here?
Well, generally. I don’t know how they do and I think 
they’re wonderful. Mind you, I’ve come to the conclusion 
that you treat people, the ones you’re talking about, as if 
they are children. You know, “come on darling” and all 
this, what I call rubbish. Urn and I don’t know how they do 
it. I really don’t...They say “there’s a good girl” and things 
like that.
How would you feel if somebody said “There’s a good girl” 
to you?
Shut your face!...Urn, well. They seem to know who to say 
it to, I think. I hope.
Do yoU think they get any training?
I can’t say. I’ve no idea. No idea at all. They seem to 
keep an eye on them but, I don’t know if that’s just inside 
them that they do it, that sort of thing.
The relatives, in both hospitals, show less confidence than the older people, concurring 
that there is knowledge and skill shortage. In Glimster a greater emphasis on the need to 
expand knowledge is linked with the call for a specialist environment, away from their 
loved ones, as mentioned above. Those participants whose relative has been identified as 
having a mental health problem are more focussed towards education in the current
Int:
G. Olive:
Int:
G. Olive: 
Int:
G. Olive:
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setting. They particularly look at practical issues such as recognising the need for pain 
relief and providing diet. In expressing such concerns Flora, concurring with Dormer 
(2004), is mindful that die presence of people with dementia in general hospital wards is 
inevitable and that therefore such skills must become part of the staffs repertoire. She 
feels that the presence of a mental health professional aids such learning, in this case 
about giving analgesia.
C. Daughter Flora: I certainly do think there are education issues because
people with dementia are going to continue to be cared for 
in acute settings.
Someone like my mother she is vulnerable because she 
cannot explain what is wrong... At the beginning of her 
admission following the operation she refused analgesic...I 
think I certainly felt it left my mother quite helpless really 
because they didn’t see it...I wasn’t convinced about it I 
felt it was very early on and that she could well have 
needed something...
[Now] certain nurses in particular who have really taken 
the trouble to get to know my mum and who have really 
got a lot of understanding about what she does need, and 
that has been very positive to me that is this way of 
working together at its best.
8.3.2 Osmotic Learning
It is the staff groups that differ most in their responses when contemplating their 
knowledge and skills and whether they have a need for more. Here the potential 
influence of a consultation/mental health liaison service model is evident, through what I 
call Osmotic Learning. As has been suggested in the literature (Scott 1988, Roberts 
1997, Harrison 2006b) the Chapley hospital staff appear to have absorbed knowledge 
through their regular contact with the consultation/liaison service. Such a finding 
concurs with the literature that describes one of the key differences between the 
traditional and the consultation/liaison models of mental health service provision as being 
the focus upon education as part of the role (Dormer 2004, Draper 2001, Baheeratha and 
Shah 1999). Caplan (1970) felt that the most influential aspect of the mental health 
consultation liaison role is that of collaboration. It is through such collaborative working,
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with someone perceived to be in a position equal to oneself and approachable (Sensky et 
al 1985, Roberts 1997) that osmotic learning has occurred.
There is a suggestion within the data that those who have been exposed to more mental 
health expertise are more accepting of older people with mental health problems and 
recognise more readily their need to know even more. I first consider the responses from 
Glimster staff before making comparison with their colleagues at Chapley Hospital.
There seems to be a complex picture around knowledge and skill at Glimster General. 
This is emphasised by the organisational priority to move people through the system, 
together with the perception of hopelessness about older people with mental health 
problems, as discussed elsewhere. Like Val, the majority of the staff feel that they 
provide appropriate care for people with “general dementia”, that is those described in 
Chapter 7 as “poor filings”, who are perceived as helpless and dependant on staff for their 
every need. Their desire for education tends to centre on, as Trish puts it, the 
organisational goal of “knowjjng] where to send them to”.
G.OTVal: Yes, memory loss is fine, we’re more than happy to treat
these people. We’re quite good I think, the nurses try to 
establish routine. They’re very good if people need 
feeding, encouraging them, that type of thing. It’s very 
accepted that people, you cannot expect people to 
remember what they are doing, to be able to get dressed.
They expect to giving all care, basically. I think that we 
could do, definitely, with more training as a whole staff, 
nurses, OTs, everybody in mental health in the elderly. I 
don’t think we’re too bad with general dementia, people 
know signs and ways of talking to people and that.
Among the respondents at Glimster General there were two staff members who had 
expanded their knowledge in dementia care through attendance at external courses. Their 
enthusiasm and skill is evident in some responses within which they describe person 
centred dementia care strategies as championed by Tom Kitwood (1997) and subsequent 
others. However, Sue is unsure that the rhetoric is applied in practice, ah assertion and 
supported by the lack of similar responses from other Glimster staff participants. This
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potential difference between taught knowledge and skill acquired through osmosis, due to 
mental health service presence, is a potential difference between the service models.
G. Service Manager Sue: Well, it’s talking to them, it’s talking to the relative. I 
mean there are little instances; I mean, there was one 
lady that used to, she was always wandering around and 
fiddling with things, and we just gave her little jobs to do 
and she was quite happy. We helped her take all the linen 
off the trolley, she refolded it up and put it all back again.
And she was quite content with that. ..And you may be 
able to find, the reason that somebody folds things up 
really neatly, that’s maybe that they have always done 
that, they’ve done something in their previous life, their 
work, they’ve done that sort of thing, you know not folding 
linen but that sort of thing...they’re just re enacting 
something.
Int: Did you find that? How did you know that?
G. Service Manager Sue: Talking to them, their friends, their relatives. I wouldn’t 
say it routinely happens, but it has happened.
In Chapter 7 1 noted that the staff in Glimster General more readily see older people with 
mental health problems as “poor things” than their counterparts at Chapley Hospital.
This is reflected also in a greater expectation in Glimster, for older people to move from 
hospital into institutional care. Naomi appears to support the supposition that memory 
impairment precludes a return home from this organisation even when external expert 
advice from a mental health specialist suggests otherwise.
G. Dr Naomi: Because she’s got a purely psychiatric condition and is
awaiting a nursing home bed.
Int: A dementia like condition?
G. Dr Naomi: Err, yeah along those lines. Slightly just a personality
disorder with it as well. I don’t know exactly, I can’t 
remember all the bits and pieces but [the psycho geriatrician] 
has seen and, you know, is happy that she can go home 
with that condition but she’s not going home, she’s waiting 
for a nursing home bed so she’s delayed here and it’s 
probably inappropriate. And it’s probably inappropriate for 
the rest of the people in that bay as well to have her there.
This disregard of advice may suggest that the sporadic and distant nature of the 
traditional model of mental health input has no influence on how those with mental health 
problems in old age are perceived. Naomi’s belief that this woman is incapable of 
managing at home is not swayed by the expert’s perception. There is evidence to suggest
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that the consultation/liaison model enables the expert to be heard and that the Chapley 
Hospital staff are more ready to contemplate the older person going home, despite 
potential risks.
An emerging philosophical difference in focus towards older people with mental health 
problems is characterised by Linda and Kate, from dim ster General and Chapley 
Hospital respectively. Linda, like some of her other colleagues and the older people at 
dimster, talks about the positive innate quality necessary to care appropriately for older 
people who may be confused. She describes how the staff are naturally sensitive, 
empathic and patient in “dealing with” care and doing things for older people. Kate 
practices a more person centred approach, and suggests that the assumed caring attributes 
may be “too much”, and may not be beneficial to the patient. She and others of her 
colleagues, talks of her developing skill in considering the rights and risks involved in 
meeting the care needs of people with dementia. She cares about rather than cares for the 
older people in the hospital.
C. Discharge Nurse Kate: Butthe factthat we have a resource...we have have
quite a large amount of education in that respect in a drip, 
drip fashion... For instance this case conference that we 
are setting up for next week, Without [mental health] input 
we may not have gone down that route [enabling the 
person to go home]...Particularly the risk element., and I 
think that’s probably where we, as a hospital, perhaps fall 
down. I think as nurses and as doctors we can try and 
care too much....We can’t cope with letting go because we 
are carers. And that is where the mental health expertise 
is a good influence on us.
Other Chapley staff members also focus on the influential role of a mental health 
practitioner suggesting that they have increased awareness and ability to recognise, 
explore and work through situations. Their knowledge and skills have developed through 
their regular contact with mental health expertise, rather than through formal education as 
experienced by some of their colleagues at Glimster General. Both Christine and Dianne 
demonstrate development in their knowledge and skills not evident in the other site.
C Dr Dianne I try and find out why - if it is confusion I would find out
whether they had had it for a long time, try and talk to their
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family, try and talk to people that know them, if they are 
coming in straight away to hospital to find out whether that 
is new for them and just get an idea of what it is all about. 
... I mean I have leamt more in this job than I have done 
before with that..i and then obviously because [the mental 
health nurse is] there.
C. Nurse Christine I think personally we are a bit more aware and we might 
pick up on issues earlier because we have been in touch 
with [a mental health nurse who has] explained what 
things you look out for and people are more aware of 
picking up on maybe strange things people have said and 
their behaviour... and sometimes a bit of it stays in there 
for a bit and someone will behave in a certain way and you 
think ”Oh I remember that, I can relate that back to 
something”.
The staff at Chapley hospital, where they have more exposure to mental health expertise, 
are more aware of their perceived shortcomings are more keen to learn more. However, 
this awareness of need is contradicted by their desire for problems to be taken away or 
dealt with by more mental health specialists in their midst, as explored earlier in this 
chapter. It is noteworthy that there is also a site difference in the demand for education in 
that the Gimster staff sought generic knowledge of both depression and confusion, 
drawing on the bio-medical model of clear classification characteristic of their more rigid 
organisational model. The Chapley staff, in line with Rachel Norman’s (2003) finding 
that staff wish to understand the people and their behaviours in order to enhance their 
care, focused on confusion, but they ignore depression.
C. Nurse Fiona: I've been to a few specific courses on management of or
recognising problems and they have been a great help and 
now I need something more.
Having examined how the participants view the service and the knowledge and skills 
requirements, both in the present and in the ideal, I will now discuss the findings about 
the current situation and give consideration to the implications for future practice which I 
explore further in Chapter 9.
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8.4 Discussion
The distinct difference in the organisational cultures of Chapley Hospital and Glimster 
General, with the latter being more governed by organisational and professional 
structures, is evident throughout the content of this chapter. Although Chapley Hospital 
is driven by the same political agendas there is evidence of some greater consumer, 
person centred, awareness. Given the site differences, it is not possible to make clear 
comparison between the two sites and conclude that this is an effect of the model of 
mental health service provided. However, there do emerge some interesting differences 
that suggest some influences attributable to the differing approaches, particularly among 
staff responses.
The data that I have presented here suggests that the presence of a mental health 
consultation/liaison model of service facilitates osmotic learning which enables staff to 
approach their patients in a more person centred way. However, in this discussion 
section of the chapter, I consider the lack of influence on the recognition of the presence 
of depression. I also look at the ongoing will, across cluster groups, to avoid issues that 
pertain to mental health problems by whatever means are seen as potentially available. 
Such will to avoid, even in the presence of developing skill, suggests that people within 
the general hospital setting are not ready to embrace mental health problems in old age as 
“Everybody’s Business” (CSIP 2005). Lastly in this section I return to the social 
constructions that influence perceptions of mental health problems in these settings and 
suggest that they also service to sustain the view that mental health problems in old age 
are external to general hospital business.
I noted in Chapter 7 that in both hospitals depression in old age is not readily noticed or 
addressed. This research displays no evidence to suggest that depression, in this 
population group, is recognised better in the presence of either traditional or 
consultation/liaison methods of mental health service provision. This lack of recognition 
is reflected when talking with participants about the service and the skill of the staff
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members. Focus is upon those categories of mental health problems discussed in Chapter 
6; that is those that are overtly visible due to unacceptable behaviour.
The issue of recognition and attention to depression in this population group is not simply 
a matter of inputting expertise and education to the general hospital. As I have suggested 
in Chapter 7 (p200), one cannot see what one does not believe in. The invisibility and 
structured nature of depression within old age suggest that issues of non recognition need 
to be addressed within the wider focus of social inclusion of older people as well as by 
advancing research into the conditions, and how it may vary with the life course, and 
experiences. Such research can serve to improve visibility and attention, as evidenced in 
the field of dementia.
In considering their level of skill in caring for people with mental health problems, the 
staff in Chapley Hospital demonstrate satisfaction with the current service. They feel that 
they have developed knowledge and skill in caring for those older people who are 
confused. They are more able than their counterparts at Glimster General to address and 
explore challenge and to enable older people to go home, in consideration of their desires 
and the risks involved. However, they are uncomfortable performing a role that they do 
not perceive as their own. It is the power of the historical stigma of mental health 
problems that prevents Chapley Hospital staff from embracing their skill. Such lack of 
ownership is further perpetuated by the ongoing political, organisational and educational 
divisions between service providers.
For the staff at Glimster Hospital, where the presence of older people with mental health 
problems on the wards is apparently less recognised and addressed, there is 
dissatisfaction but less discomfort with the current situation. The less visible face of 
mental health problems in their midst means that they have not had to confront the 
potential major diversion into an uncertain role, away from their core, general hospital 
business. In line with the organisational model, they seek taught factual knowledge. The 
wards in both sites, though possibly more so in Glimster, have been socially reproduced 
for older people with physical health problems (Fennel et al 1988) where patients are
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lumped together under that category and become invisible within the setting (Goffinan 
1953). The staff seek to replicate the conformity of invisibility in order that they can do, 
what they perceive to be, their real jobs.
My suggestion that when mental health service is traditional, as in Glimster, problems are 
absorbed, possibly under-addressed and under-treated corresponds with Lindsay Prior’s 
(1993 pi) assertion that “The ways in which we organise care and treatment for 
psychiatric disorders serves to both reflect and constitute what such disorders actually 
are”. In Chapley Hospital, where there is more frequent and visible service, the problems 
are more categorised and overt. Although the staff have developed knowledge and skills 
through “osmotic learning” the problems are not wholly embraced. Henry Minardi 
(2004) suggests that the role of liaison mental health professionals is to influence change 
in practice. “There are egos that want to be massaged, overt and covert power struggles 
and attempts at gaining control over the work of others. Practice can be changed through 
role modeling, confidence building and an informal educational input supplement and 
encourage formal education.” It seems that such influence is occurring in Chapley 
Hospital, and may even have some effect on the differing focus on some elements of 
consumer power as opposed to those of the medical tradition and the organisation. 
However, Chapley staff remain uncomfortable with having to deal with that which they 
do not see as their job, however well they are doing so.
The will of all the cluster groups in this research, to either remove older people with 
mental health problems from their setting or have an increased presence of mental health 
professionals to address the problems suggests that, despite the purported desire of the 
staff for more knowledge, the overriding wish is for somebody else to deal with the 
problem. Through exploration and examination of the data, the suggestion is that the 
provision of external mental health services, using whichever model, serves to allow 
division to remain. The mental health expert is expected to sort out the problem, 
removing responsibility from those in the general hospital setting either by physical 
removal or by providing a lead in “dealing with the problems” as Nurse Fiona describes. 
Such a finding concurs with the view of Crawford and Brown (2002) who suggested that
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providing external mental health expertise perpetuates negative attitudes and prevents 
shifts of mindset in general hospital practitioners.
The original research question sought to discover the social constructions that influence 
perceptions about mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting. It is 
apparent that those influences not only lead to the development of perceptions but serve 
to sustain them. The increased presence of older people with mental health needs in 
general hospital wards creates challenge and has led to local and political response, in 
service development and guidance. However, the social constructions that detract from 
enhancing visibility, recognition and service integration remain in place and sustain the 
divisions. The historical and ongoing service and educational divisions between general 
and mental health perpetuate stigma and perceptions of fear, exclusion and desired 
invisibility. Current mental health services for general hospitals, it transpires, do little to 
remove the barriers.
I explore the implications of these findings with regard to potential future service further 
in Chapter 9. i  advocate for the merging of general and mental health services in old age 
and in professional education. I explore a possibility that the current political driver 
aimed at improving service integration in general hospitals by using the consultation / 
liaison service model (CSIP 2005) will not serve to bring the differing constructions of 
mental health problems in old age together. However, before moving on to such 
consideration I return to the theoretical framework around which I have built this 
research.
8.5 A Return to the Theoretical Framework
In Chapter 1 1 defined Interpretive Interactionism, in the words of Norman Denzin (1989) 
emphasising his assertion that both “personal troubles” and “policies and institutions” 
affect how we interpret social life. Throughout this work the degree of power and 
influence of organisational policies and institutions has shown to be all encompassing. 
The knowledge and perception of mental health problems in old age in the general
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hospital setting has, as Foucault suggests (Porter 1998), been created by the power within 
the setting. The “personal trouble” is seen as the trouble mental health problems bring to 
the organisational culture, not to the person with the mental health problem. The stigma 
associated with mental illness enables those in power, both professionally and 
organisationally, to deflect responsibility onto others, the mental health services, whose 
business it is to address such issues. In psychiatric circles the “personal trouble” is 
diagnostically termed and as such is core to their raison d'etre. The general hospital 
professionals adopt the lay view of mental illness, not seeing such illness as equivalent to 
those illnesses within the property of general medicine.
In the rigid and controlled setting of a general hospital, mental health problems are thus 
seen only when they are overt and obstructive of the normality of the setting. Any 
problems that are not seen, in the context of challenge to the organisation, do not exist. A 
less rigid organisational structure and/or the presence of consultation/liaison mental 
health services may serve to make such differential less stringent.
Using the language of social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1991), the recipe for 
mental health problems in old age in this setting is that they do not exist, as this is not the 
place where the competing powers of medicine, psychiatry and organisational politics 
deem them to belong. They are invisible unless they impact on the smooth running of the 
system, be that through exhibition of behaviour deemed inappropriate or due to inability 
to flow through the organisational system. The silent majority of those with mental 
health problems therefore move through the system unnoticed and without the offer of 
any service. Those with overt and bad behaviour are deemed as mentally ill and within 
the scope of psychiatric services to address. Such a well-established taken for granted 
view is evidenced in die presence of ongoing separate psychiatric services, supported in 
policy and law, who are themselves keen to hold onto their power bases within 
organisational systems.
As discussed in Chapter 5, Stephen Hacking (1999) describes six grades of Social 
Constructionism (Box 5.1). Where the phenomenon being studied is mental health
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problems in old age, the broad perception throughout this research is that of the historical 
concept founded on fear and suspicion of the unusual still holds. However the sites do 
differ and Glimster General has a predominantly “ironic” construct whereby it knows that 
mental health problems in old age are present but perceives that little can be done, 
therefore the reaction is to ignore, or indeed not to see it. In Chapley Hospital there 
exists a more reformist perception whereby the problem is acknowledged as bad and that 
something should be done by way of either removing the problem to another place or by 
achieving more rescue from mental health services. Again, this suggests that either the 
less rigid organisational structure of Chapley Hospital and/or the presence of 
consultation/liaison mental health services has a positive effect. Either enables people 
within that culture to see and act upon mental health problems in old age more creatively 
than their Glimster General colleagues.
8.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have set out the data concerning service, knowledge and skill, and 
examined the cluster and site differences. I argue that site differences, specifically within 
the staff clusters, suggest that the presence of mental health liaison influences the 
knowledge and skills of staff and therefore how older people with mental health problems 
are conceptualised. The staff at Chapley Hospital are less likely to attribute pity, and 
appear to “care about” rather than “care for” those in their care. Those staff who have 
been exposed to the consultation/liaison model appear to have acquired knowledge by 
osmotic learning. They are more ready to embrace the challenges of working with older 
people with mental health problems. Yet, in contradiction, they would still prefer for 
someone else to do the job.
There is consensus, across the cluster groups, that issues of mental ill health are not the 
business of the general hospital and, while the staff should have more knowledge and 
more available mental health staff, it would be preferable for those people who challenge 
the equilibrium of the setting to be cared for elsewhere. It appears that neither model of 
service in operation in these two sites address the issues arising: in Glimster through
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perceived absence and in Chapley by perpetuating a model of exclusion through 
deference to mental health expertise.
While it remains the expectation that mental health problems are the rightful business of 
external specialists it is questionable whether the rhetoric of government documents, such 
as Everybody’s Business (CSIP 2005) can be realised. Consultation/liaison models may 
serve to perpetuate the division but traditional models seem to possibly render mental 
health problems more invisible. Depression however is invisible in both sites.
In summarizing the component parts of the analysis and discussions within these last 
three chapters, it is evident that the way in which mental health problems in old age are 
perceived in these settings is a product of the culture of the setting, lay representations of 
mental illness and the combined stigmas of old age and mental illness. Perceptions are 
produced and influenced by the historical power of bio-medical psychiatry as it has 
separated from that of general medicine, and also by the growing organisational power. 
This latter is the product of providing a health service built on die principles of a market 
economy. That mental health services are provided as a separate, marketable, product 
seems to protect others from having to consider mental health problems in their midst, 
particularly when presentation is covert. The many older people in general hospitals with 
invisible mental health problems are thus not seen because nobody thinks they are there. 
Thus the lay position of mental health problems as being characterised in social deviance, 
and feared, is held safely in that place by a society that is happy with that arrangement.
In the final chapter I draw together the conclusions drawn through this research and 
further discuss the resultant implications for future services for older people with mental 
health problems in general hospital.
225
Chapter 9
Conclusion, Recommendations and Implications for the Future
9.1 Introduction
I started this work with a will to discover whether mental health problems in old age were 
perceived differently within the health care setting of a general hospital as compared with 
those of medical psychiatry. I also sought to consider how the older people with mental 
health problems in the general hospital setting could best have their health service needs 
met. Using methodology based upon the theoretical framework of social constructionism 
(Berger and Luckmann 1991) the research sought to see the social world of the general 
hospital from the perception of those within it.
In this concluding chapter I draw together the various strands of theory that have emerged 
and have been explored in the last three chapters. I highlight the key findings under the 
three headings of culturally determined problems, structured depression, and perpetuating 
division.
The first section confirms that mental health problems in old age in the general hospital 
setting are perceived with influence from the power structures within the setting and by 
broader lay perceptions, associated with the combined stigmas of both mental illness and 
old age. I note that the perceptions of medical psychiatry are not a major influence in 
defining mental health problems in this setting.
The second section explores again the concept of depression and its invisibility among 
older people in this setting. I describe this structured depression as an artifact of the 
structured dependency of old age described by Townsend (1981). I also speculate that 
depression, when it occurs as one enters the last years of life, in chronic ill health, may be 
a different phenomenon than that currently medically defined. I consider how this 
position of social invisibility may be addressed.
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Thirdly I bring together conclusions on service provision. I note some advantage in the 
consultation/liaison method of mental health service provision, particularly due to the 
influence of osmotic learning. However, I conclude that any external mental health 
service provision serves to perpetuate the Cartesian division, between general and 
psychiatric services, and facilitate the ongoing lack of acceptance, and indeed invisibility, 
of mental health problems within non mental health settings. I suggest a need for radical 
service and professional education review if current perceptions are to be challenged.
Prior to concluding the chapter I reflect on the research methodology and my experiences 
in conducting this research.
9.2 Culturally determined visible problems
In considering the answer to the first of my research questions:
What are the social constructions that are drawn upon and that generate 
perspectives on mental health problems in old age in the general hospital 
setting?
I conclude that mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting are 
defined, across sites and cluster groups, by the extent to which the confused person 
conforms to the requirements of the social setting. Perceptions are formulated with the 
influence of the broad lay concepts of mental illness and exaggerated by the rigid and 
controlled setting of a general hospital ward. The divisions between normality and 
abnormality in this setting are emphasised by the systems and power relationships that 
dominate the culture, through both the stringent organisational structures and the 
biomedical focus.
What may elsewhere be perceived as a minor deviation from the norm is readily 
classified as a mental health problem in these settings. Older people defined as having a 
mental health problem are therefore those who are perceived not to fit in, either through
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their behaviour or, particularly in Glimster General, because they do not conform to 
organisational expectation.
In Chapter 1 1 presented the following quote from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann:
It is our contention, then, that the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with 
whatever passes for “knowledge” in the society, regardless of the ultimate validity 
or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such “knowledge”. And in so far as all human 
“knowledge" is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, the 
sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is 
done in such a way that a taken-for-granted “reality” congeals for the man in the 
street. In other words, we contend that the sociology of knowledge is concerned 
with the analysis of the social construction of reality.
(Berger and Luckmann 1991 p15).
This research suggests that “knowledge” about mental health problems in old age in the 
general hospital setting is similar to, but exaggerated from, the popular view of such 
problems within society as a whole. I have confirmed that the bio-medical constructions 
of mental illness through diagnosis, held within psychiatric services, are not shared by the 
people interviewed within the general hospital setting, including those who work within 
the health service.
One may suggest that the research has been hampered by the discovery of organisational 
and power differences within the two, initially apparently comparable, hospital sites. 
However, these differences have served to clarify the fundamental importance of power 
and organisational structure in influencing views upon what constitutes a mental health 
problem. Both hospitals display the influence of traditional bio-medical power. They 
also are both bound by the same government directives that focus their attention on 
throughput and prevention of delays in moving people through the system. However, it is 
clear that Glimster General is more tightly politically driven, with Chapley Hospital 
apparently beginning to display some influence from the power of the consumer. While I 
have noted that Osmotic Learning occurs due to the presence of a consultation/liaison 
nurse, this can only be said to a factor in the nature of those perceptions.
228
FORCES 
THAT 
DETRACT 
FROM 
VISIBILITY 
& 
R
EC
O
G
N
ITIO
N
TOn Oaoa
£L
TOas
<zi"asassa.
3
o ’Sasoa in
o ’
as
n•aas
sro
as
aas
=r.o
P sO•a
<8 o
a
* S S. ““ «>
ST 83 O
o’“S. §asas — 
“  c/3
• a3so
3
o
S'n
m
OTQ*
3
toto
vo
rasopr
o*a<x>srasa«Q.
*T3«aoo•aaos
Figure 
9.1 
Influences on 
Perceptions of M
ental Health 
Problem
s in 
Old 
Age 
in 
the 
G
eneral H
ospital Setting
I now refer to figure 9.1 in reiterating the range of social constructions that both influence 
and sustain perceptions of mental health problems in old age in the general hospital 
setting. Of course, as I have emphasised throughout this work, the influence differs 
between the two sites but the elements are the same.
I have diagrammatically shown that mental health problems in old age in the general 
hospital setting are either visible or invisible. There are forces that promote the visibility 
and recognition of those with mental health problems and those that detract from such 
visibility and recognition. My view is that the ongoing presence of these social forces 
perpetuates the unaccepted and often invisible nature of mental health problems in the 
general hospital setting.
The forces that promote attention to the issues are the increased presence of older people 
with mental health problems in the social setting and the resultant perceived challenge on 
the smooth running of the systems. In response to this growing visibility of this “new” 
social group, government guidelines promote and highlight the need for attention and a 
move away from the traditional psychiatric focus (DoH 2001a, CSIP 2005). During the 
time taken to complete this research mental health consultation / liaison services have 
proliferated in an attempt to address the service challenge.
In Chapter 8 1 explored the positive influence of the presence of a consultation/liaison 
mental health service in facilitating osmotic learning, thus promoting the development of 
knowledge and skills among non-specialist staff. There is however a cautionary note in 
respect of the positive force of osmotic learning in that its benefits are outweighed by the 
detracting forces that I reiterate below. If learning occurs due the influential presence of 
an external mental health service provider the staff involved know, but do not own, the 
knowledge and skill that they have developed. Such inductive education would therefore 
better be provided by experts within the organisation, thus making mental health issues in 
old age part of the general hospitals organisational agenda.
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The forces that detract from visibility and recognition include the ageist invisible social 
construction of depression in old age, as I explore in the next section. The ongoing 
divisions in both service provision and in professional education also serve to prevent 
non-specialist staff from believing that issues of mental health and illness have anything to 
do with them, as I explore further in the section headed “perpetuating division”. The 
combined stigmas of both mental illness and ageism emphasise a perceived alien status of 
this group of people. It is notable that all the research participants, in one way or another, 
sought to distance themselves from association with mental health problems. Other than 
for depression, there were no overtly acknowledged descriptions of mental illness from 
within the experience. The mental health problems were always exhibited by somebody 
outside oneself ones relatives or, in die case of staff, ones proper patients.
The numbers of older people with mental health problems in general hospitals have been 
increasing, year on year, due to changes in mental health service provision and increased 
longevity. However, die issues arising are not accepted as having a proper place in the 
general hospital. The lack of belief that these people do belong in hospital, when they have 
an acute medical problem, is not clarified by conflicting political messages. There is a 
lack of shared perception between politicians, organisations and service users and staff 
about what constitutes a mental health problem. While guidance suggests a need to 
embrace the issues of older people with mental health problems as ‘Everybody’s 
Business” (DoH2001a, CSIP 2005), separate mental health services, and associated 
education systems, exist to provide for those with severe and enduring need (DoH 1999).
As this work demonstrates, when mental health problems are noted in this population 
group they are always perceived as severe, questions of degree are not considered. There 
is no concept of being a little mentally ill, it is an all or nothing construction. People are 
mentally ill either by virtue of their behaviour or by their inability to meet service 
requirement through social incompetence. The language of psychiatry, and indeed the 
political language associated with psychiatry, is not shared outside the specialty.
However, mental health problems in old age in the general hospital setting are, almost
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exclusively, described as descriptive of the diagnostic label of dementia. Dementia is the 
mental health problem of old age.
It has long been the lay view that mental health problems are defined by unusual 
behaviour, that is behaviour that is outside the realms of normality within a given culture 
or setting. In the general hospital this lack of conformity is viewed in terms of the effect 
the individual and their presentation has on the equilibrium of the setting. Perceptions are 
formulated either through observed overt unusual presentation or covertly due the impact 
of the individual on the hospital system through passive inaction. Those perceived to have 
mental health problems are deemed to be a threat to that equilibrium. They are overtly or 
covertly disruptive to the normal business of the setting. The predominant feature, in line 
with the literature (e.g. Pilgrim and Rogers 1999), in description is that of behaviour 
perceived as unfitting to the hospital setting. In contradiction to the recent literature on 
dementia that encourages a perception that dementia damages the brain and not the 
person, in this setting people with mental health problems are seen as damaged, and even 
damaging, people.
Particularly in Glimster General there are some older people who are categorised as “poor 
things” rather than mentally unwell. These are people with dementia who are attributed 
no social capital, they are socially dead (Sweeting and Gilhooly 1997) and as such do not 
fit into a setting where there is an expectation of conformity and recovery. From the staff 
perspective such people only become visible, as having mental health problems, when 
they challenge the throughput of the system. At that point they move from being poor 
things to become problematic things, like their counterparts who overtly misbehave. This 
suggests that many such “poor things” remain invisible and are removed from the setting 
to care homes without having been afforded a voice (Gilleard and Higgs 2000). They 
have lost all power, are socially excluded and can exercise no choice as it is assumed that 
they are unable to manage or engage in discussion or decision making. Conversely the 
people with perceived mental health problems exhibited through their behaviour, or lack 
of conformity to the rules, possess liminal power (Turner 1974) through the attention that
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their behaviour draws. However, this power serves to stigmatise rather than empower 
them. They are defined as socially inept and are thus marginalised.
The perception of social dependence is in line with theories of ageism whereby older 
people are assumed to require the nurture of able minded and cognitively proficient 
younger adults. Whether their presentation is overt or covert people behave towards them 
as though their cognitive ability has left them completely.
When an attributable behaviour is present, any other potential cause including the 
presence of a biological illness, even if considered, seems to become secondary to the 
predominant deviant presentation. There is little evidence of any differentiation between 
delirium, acute confusion with remediable cause, and dementia. I find the lack of 
recognition of this curable medical condition potentially alarming and suggest that this is 
an area that requires more study. As I have discussed (pi 56), the lack of reference to 
delirium, particularly in the more ordered, bio-medically focused Glimster General, may 
be explained if delirium is defined as a medical, rather than psychiatric, diagnosis. 
However exploration is desirable.
As I have said, it is clear that perceptions, even among staff members, are markedly 
different from those within the field of psychiatry with a general conclusion that mental ill 
health is defined through behaviour rather than any other diagnostic symptomology. As 
demonstrated with the “poor things” a dilemma occurs between the classification of old 
age and that of mental health problem, making singular construction impossible (Hacking 
1999). The individuals may be seen as bad, yet the group, as older people, are socially 
inadequate. Therefore to be recognised as having a mental health problem in old age the 
behaviour needs to only marginally move from the expected norm of conformity and 
passivity expected in old age especially in this setting. This dichotomy of definition 
between bad, and being pitied and in need of nurture leads to conflict, particularly in 
considering how needs can be met. A potential compromise position, a specialist ward 
within the general hospital, seems to appease the conflict. It removes the stigmatised
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person but also defines them as not “bad” enough to warrant admission to a mental health 
unit.
In summarising this section, I suggest that the very controlled nature of the general 
hospital setting, a rigid microcosm of the wider society, makes deviation from a strict 
norm highly noticeable and all the more intolerable. Those who are perceived to have 
mental health problems are thus potentially more visible in this environment than 
elsewhere. Conversely however, there are problems, defined within psychiatry as mental 
illnesses, which are invisible in this setting as they are seen as part of normal ageing. As 
they do not adversely impact on the business of the hospital they are not noted. Foucault 
(1967) described mental illness in terms of unreason and irrationality, here it appears, only 
the latter is applicable in that irrational behaviour is the definition used. If one is solely 
without reason in old age, society accepts this as normal.
I have discussed above those people with memory problems who are excused the label of 
mental illness due to their age and their passivity until they threaten the organisational 
system. I now go on to re-examine and conclude upon the phenomenon of depression.
9.3 Structured Depression
Exploration of the data suggests that depression in old age in this setting is an invisible 
phenomenon and I suggest that this is so as it is an artifact and extension of the Structured 
Dependency (Townsend 1981). Misery is seen as part of the fabric of old age, particularly 
in the presence of ill health and hospitalisation, and it is not seen as remediable.
The theory of structured dependency (Townsend 1981) describes a state driven process 
whereby older people are socially moulded into dependent beings, through enforced 
processes such as fixed retirement ages and low income. Depression can be seen as a 
product of structured dependency caused by the inferior social position into which older 
people are placed. They are discarded as socially useless. Alternatively depression, or the 
assumed normality of depression, can be said to be a cause of structured dependency.
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Because society assumes that to be old is equivalent to being sad and miserable, social 
uselessness is assumed. Society therefore reacts in order to necessarily discard those who 
are assumed to be unable to play a full social part. This duality, of potential cause and 
effect, runs parallel to the biomedical literature that defines depression as caused by, or 
causative of, physical health problems (Godfrey and Demby 2004). To extend on 
Townsend’s theory then, I suggest that depression in old age in this setting is an artifact of 
structured dependency as Structured Depression and as such it is accepted as the norm and 
is invisible.
The nature of the general hospital setting, combined with the experience of ill health and 
and ageist perception of social uselessness, combine to formulate a powerful perception of 
inevitable depression in the circumstance of hosptialisation in old age. Depression is seen 
as an intrinsic part of the experience and, as such, is not separated from the whole. To the 
outsider it is seen as an intrinsic part of membership categorisation (Baker 1997) for older 
people in general hospitals. Such a perception renders depression accepted, intrinsic and 
invisible.
Unlike depression in the general population, which has become the acceptable face of 
mental illness and readily recognised and treated, depression for this population group is 
infrequently considered. For the staff in the general hospital this contradiction can cause 
confusion. They may conceptualise low mood as being a structured component of being a 
patient, yet they are theoretically aware of the diagnostic category of depression.
However, the lay view, of inevitability and hopelessness, overshadows any professional 
knowledge.
Current government policy direction, in terms of mental health problems, has removed 
depression from the scope of specialist mental health services, except when it is severe 
and causing significant risk. This exclusivity of mental health service to address severe 
mental health problems leaves the minor conditions, such as depression, to be addressed 
by non specialist services (DoH 1999, CSIP 2005). th is  policy move away from 
depression as a mental illness reflects societies changed view and acceptance of
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depression as a life condition rather than an illness. However, because depression is an 
invisible and normal artifact of old age, neither older people themselves, nor non specialist 
staff, perceive it. Arguably, due to ageism, depression in old age, particularly in the 
general hospital setting, has not achieved the same degree of medicalisation as that for 
other social groups. It does not exist as an ontological reality.
The danger then lies in its presence being overlooked by both general and mental health 
services, with medicine not seeing it, and psychiatry not seeing it as their business. Thus 
older people are left to suffer with an unrecognised potentially remediable condition. A 
condition that is life threatening and enhances the risk of early institutionalisation 
(Godfrey and Demby 2004, Manthorpe and Iliffe 2005, RCP 2005).
In examining the data, concern about the invisibility of depression uncovers specific areas 
in need of further study in order to advance understanding. There is a suggestion, within 
the data, that there may be differences in depression, as it is diagnostically recognised and 
experienced in older old, as opposed to younger old, adults. This may particularly be the 
case for older people who are moving towards their life’s end. There is a suggestion of 
accepted inevitability, in die absence of clear feelings of sadness, present in some of the 
older participants. This area warrants specific research attention, as does the differing 
rates of depression among women of different ages.
With regard to the latter I have considered the apparent absence of diagnosis of depression 
in older people in hospital. This cohort, specifically the older women, were, in the mid 
twentieth century readily diagnosed with depression and arguably over-treated, in line 
with the medical recommendation of the time, using tranquillising medication. Yet now 
they remain unrecognised as in any need of attention, and under-treated. I conclude that 
their invisibility underlines the power of ageism. These women, now that they are old, are 
not fulfilling their former valuable role in raising the post-war generation. They now hold 
much reduced and invisible social value.
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The invisibility of depression in this setting raises major challenges for the fixture. As I 
have discussed in Chapters 4 and 7, much of the recent literature and policy direction with 
regard to depression in old age (DoH 2001, Godfrey and Denby 2004, Manthorpe and 
Iliffe 2005, RCP 2005, CSIP 2005) has focused on the under recognition of this medical 
phenomenon. In line with the limited literature (Rapp et ai 1988, Grout 1997, Rothera et 
al 2002) they note that staff believe that they readily identify depression in absence of 
evidence that they do, as is mirrored in this work. The need to increase recognition of 
indicators of depression, and therefore facilitate appropriate action, has been emphasised.
However, this attention to recognition of indicators of depression assumes that depression 
is accepted as a social reality in a given setting. This is not the case for older people in the 
general hospital. The invisibility of depression as a concept, in this setting, means that the 
potential for its presence, and therefore attempts to search for indicators, does not enter the 
mindset of the social actors. As Stephen Hacking (1999) suggested, the danger in 
exploring a “thing”, in this case depression, as a social reality to be constructed, is that we 
initially assume its reality as a starting point. In psychiatric circles depression is perceived 
as a reality, in the general hospital setting, for older people; it appears that it is not. The 
same rules of recognition cannot be applied by those who do not perceive the phenomenon 
in the first place.
Depressed older people, like cognitively impaired older people who cause no disruption, 
are unnoticed unless they disrupt the organisational system by not getting better and 
moving out. If they are not noticed due to this organisation need, they are invisible and 
assumed to be merely old and inevitably dependent and needy. Their low self esteem, 
combined with their low social position as old, renders them without a voice. Indeed their 
own perception appears to be that this is as it inevitably should be.
It seems that the issue of recognition of the phenomenon of depression in old age sits 
alongside the social need to eradicate ageism. Social inclusion is the key to enabling the 
mental health needs of older people to be viewed and addressed in the same way as those 
of their younger counterparts. In the field of general health care much progress has been
Gwyn Grout 237
made in removing age specific services and service exclusions. However, in mental health 
service a clear chronological age division remains in place.
Given that there is a markedly different perception of depression in mental health and 
general hospital settings, providing in reach services from psychiatry, from a different 
paradigm, is, according to the findings here, unhelpful. Indeed the Chapley Hospital staff 
mention depression less readily than their Glimster General counterparts. It seems that 
what is required is a paradigm shift from within, facilitated by generic education of health 
staff and political attention to the breaking down of divisions between general and mental 
health services as I discuss below. Until this happens the practitioner in die general 
hospital and the mental health specialist will continue to have different views on what 
constitutes depression, and indeed mental health problems. For example, when an older 
person is admitted with a significant infection and fails to get up and about after medical 
treatment is complete, the general hospital staff assume either an ongoing medical 
problem or inevitable age related change whereas the mental health worker considers 
depression but does not focus on potential ongoing physical health problems ( see Peplau 
1964).
The issue of depression in old age brings many challenges, not least to the older people 
currently suffering in silence and invisibility. Ongoing research is essential in this area 
but will be, as I found in recruiting candidates for this research, very challenging. The 
very nature of the condition, its social invisibility, the associated low self esteem and the 
resultant social isolation, makes achieving an appropriate sample very difficult. However, 
such barriers must be overcome. Appropriately researching and addressing issues of 
depression in old age will not only relieve the suffering of many, improving their quality 
of life, and the length of life, but contribute to the political and organisation agenda of 
minimising length of hospital stay.
I now move on to conclude on the research as it pertains to future service for older people 
with mental health problems in the general hospital setting.
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9.4 Perpetuating Division
Part of the initial concern that fuelled this research was a lack of clarity about how best to 
provide mental health services for older people with mental health problems in the general 
hospital setting. I have found that neither the traditional jnodel nor the consultation/liaison 
model, as provided in these sites, provides an ideal option. However, in answer to the 
second research question, there is some influence from the model on perceptions of mental 
health problems in old age.
Those staff who have had regular contact with a mental health professional, through the 
consultation/liaison model, demonstrate a more person centred approach in caring for 
confused older people. They have achieved increased knowledge and skill through 
osmotic learning and are more focussed on meeting individual desires. This learning may 
also improve differentiation between dementia and delirium. However, the use of the 
consultation/liaison model does not have an effect on 1he ability of non specialists to 
recognise and address the needs of people with depression in old age.
Interestingly, although the consultation/liaison model creates more positive perceptions 
about people with mental health problems, it does not encourage staff in embracing die 
mental health agenda as core to their role. Rather, the continued provision of an external 
specialist service perpetuates the traditional Cartesian division. The availability of mental 
health specialists facilitates ongoing stigma and the will for those in the general hospital 
setting to be rescued from having to accept and contemplate howto absorb and meet the 
needs of people with mental health problems in their setting. People within the social 
world of a general hospital, in both sites, either want people with visible mental health 
problems to be removed, or they want experts to manage the issues for them. It is clear 
that the taken for granted reality is that mental health problems are the business of mental 
health services and not the business of general hospitals.
The way in which health services are set up, that is by having specific and separate general 
and mental health services, emphasises this view of separateness. Professional education,
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delivered separately, adds to the chasm. Such rifts minimise the potential, and the 
incentive, for non-specialists to embrace the mental health agenda. These arrangements 
seem to suit both those in general hospital who are comfortable in avoiding mental health 
issues, and mental health practitioners and organisations who retain power through their 
exclusive expertise.
The nature of continuing external mental health provision contradicts government rhetoric 
about social inclusion and the need for mental health problems in old age to be embraced 
by non specialists (DoH 2001a, CSIP 2005). Government guidelines emphasise the 
presence of older people with mental health problems in all health care settings and 
encourages social inclusion through focus on recognition, education and appropriate 
attention. Everybody’s Business (CSIP 2005) suggests that the presence of mental health 
liaison teams in general hospitals aids best practice. The participants in this research 
clearly support such a recommendation. However, the support for such intervention 
seems to be driven by a will to avoid having to be in contact with a stigmatised 
phenomenon, rather than by a wish to improve the care for older people with mental 
health problems.
As aptly described by John Holmes et al (2002) older people with mental health problems 
in general hospitals fall “between two stools” with psychiatric services concentrating on 
those with “severe and enduring” mental illnesses (DoH 1999) and general hospital staff 
and their organisations, neither recognising need nor perceiving meeting such need as 
within their remit. Arguably this gap, into which people can fall, has widened since the 
closure of the asylums, the move to community care and, more recently, the policies of 
“New Labour” and the NHS plan. Within this new way, the role of mental health services 
has narrowed and is defined as being solely to provide care and treatment for those with 
enduring mental health problems (DoH 1999). Theoretically therefore those with lesser 
problems, those not diagnosed with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, are deemed the 
responsibility of others within the health service. However, culturally this shift of 
acceptance and responsibility has not occurred. As demonstrated by the participants here, 
mental health problems are not seen to be within the scope of general hospital business.
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The amalgamation of services for older people with both physical and mental health 
problems has been a subject of political speculation since the Macmillan report of 1926 
(p7) which advocated for mental health wards to be part of every general hospital site. 
Similar political rhetoric, for improved service integration has, and continues to be, voiced 
in various guises, most recently in the recommendations of the Care Service Improvement 
Partnership (CSIP 2005). However, there remains little evidence to suggest that a 
powerful driver will break down the organisational barriers that perpetuate the position of 
isolation and persistent stigma of mental illness. Just as the recommendations of the 
Macmillan report never came into fruition, arguably due to the will of the emerging 
medical power of psychiatrists who wished to hold onto their power base, there now exist 
large mental health trusts whose interests are served by maintaining the status quo. Social 
political rhetoric may continue to strive towards the integration of services but stigma and 
historical and ongoing power issues continue to prevent it. The social stigma and fear of 
mental illness, in our risk averse society, provides rationale in favour of the ongoing social 
exclusion from mainstream services.
As I have discussed, there has been an increase in mental health liaison provision in recent 
years, with many Mental Health Trusts seeking to further increase the service. However, 
Mental Health services experience difficulty in achieving commissioning for such 
provision. The reason that services are not purchased is, I suspect, due to the same 
invisibility phenomenon discussed in Chapter 7. Visible mental health problems are 
addressed by existing service, other problems, defined as mental illnesses by those who 
work in mental health services, are not seen. Thus need for service is not perceived. Just 
as practitioners cannot perceive depression, service managers and commissioners cannot 
perceive the extent of the need for attention.
It appears that, at present, mental health consultation/liaison services are the sticking 
plaster over die gaping wound of the social exclusion of older people with mental health 
problems in the general hospital setting, providing the illusion that the sticking plaster is 
enough to meet the needs of these people.
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I suggest that radical philosophical change is required if the invisibility and social 
exclusion of older people with mental health problems in the general hospital setting is to 
be addressed. As I have shown, there is evidence in this research, that the integration of 
mental health specialist staff with their general hospital colleagues can influence 
knowledge and skill. The ideal service, based on the findings of this research, would 
appear to be integration of that mental health expertise, by employing people with the 
relevant expertise, within the organisational structure of the general hospital. Through 
such integration older people with mental health problems would be seen as integral to the 
normal business of all staff, with the experts within facilitating osmotic learning through 
the “drip, drip” development that Kate describes.
Issues related to mental health, within the health agenda, could then be embraced as a 
feature of the one agenda, with mental health expertise and specialism becoming a branch 
of the health agenda in the same way as cardiology is such a specialism. Thus those with 
a non-specialist need would become the normal business of the non-specialist ward, with 
the specialist accessible within.
Within such a model there is potential for specific wards to address those with specific 
needs while minimising the risk of such a ward becoming a new “asylum” for those that 
others do not want to see. This could occur in the same way that specialist neurology and 
urology wards, for example, exist at present. There are currently emerging models of 
shared care wards in general hospitals in the United Kingdom (RCP 2005) whereby wards 
in general hospitals specialise in the care of older people with both medical and mental 
health problems. Limited research in the United States (Bartels 2003) provides positive 
evidence for similar community models but research is required specifically examining 
such shared care wards.
In summarising this section, I suggest that the ongoing division, both in professional 
education and in the organisation of services, is the result of the political division between 
general and mental illness. People with mental health problems are seen, socially and
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politically, as a threat to social order; therefore they continue to be treated separately. 
Although recent guidance has made it clear that psychiatric services need only attend to 
those who are an ongoing risk to themselves and/or others, the lay opinion does not 
separate people in this way. Professionals outside psychiatry share the lay opinion, and 
therefore expect mental health services to address the needs of all of those who they 
perceive to have mental health problems. While government policy, and professional 
qualifications, continue to exclude focus on people with mental health problems from the 
mainstream, as seen in the National Service Framework for Long Term Conditions (DoH 
2001b), and separate power bases exist, integration is unlikely.
To view this from the perspective of interpretive interactionism (Denzin 1989) society 
wants and needs the power within mental health services to remain in the structure and 
organisation of psychiatric care as it is now. The research participants exhibit desire for 
people with mental health problems to be out of their sight and not within the scope of 
their social world, in this case the social world of a general hospital
In concurrence with Bartels (2003) I agree that an essential starting point for integration of 
services for older people with mental health problems is to address the way in which 
health professionals, particularly nurses and doctors, are educated separately in general 
and mental health specialties. Only when health problems are not thus divided can 
integration occur. Future service must seek to close or obliterate the current structures that 
serve to sustain division. Both theoretical medical knowledge and evidence of the popular 
perceptions of visible and invisible mental health problems must be used in combination 
in order to ensure that the needs of older people are better met.
Throughout this work I have been challenged, both practically and philosophically, by the 
experiences and discoveries within this research. Before drawing my final conclusions, I 
reflect on the journey.
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9.5 Reflexivity and Reflections
Of course as I have moved through this work, and particularly as the influence of various 
power dynamics as crucial to the phenomenon have emphatically emerged, I have had 
much cause to consider my own position in this conundrum. My research interest is in 
how those within the general hospital setting construct mental health problems in old age, 
using whatever passes as knowledge in that setting (Berger and Luckmann 1991). I have 
had to be ever mindful of my own thoughts and perceptions when gathering and analysing 
the data. My professional background places me within the power structure of psychiatry 
and mental health services. During the period of this research, as an employee, I have 
experienced the growth of bigger and more organisationally powerful mental health trusts 
with a vested interest in sustaining 1heir position as experts in, and providers of, mental 
health services. The development of mental health liaison services to general hospitals 
can, as I have argued, be seen as a means of holding on to the traditional power base, 
sustaining control of the mental health agenda.
Professionally I have worked from this organisational position while the analysis of my 
research data suggests that this is not the best way to provide services, care and treatment 
for older people with mental health problems or to overcome the stigma and fear that 
dominates the lay view of mental illness. My field notes are full of my deliberations and 
discomfort about the tom position I felt, doing a job that may perpetuate divisions. Before 
I embarked on this research I was comfortable that a consultation liaison method of 
delivering service for older people in general hospitals was probably effective and useful. 
The analysis and exploration of the data suggests that this may not be so. At one point I 
did apply for a job, in a general hospital, seeking to provide the service from within that 
seems necessary.
From field work diary: “Today I am going for an informal visit for a job in a general 
hospital. Reflecting on why I am doing this it...it is due to my will to challenge this 
dualism. To encourage acceptance of mental illness from within. I am sure that I 
won’t get the job because I belong on the other side.”
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I did not get the job as the hospital concerned were not actually seeking someone to 
perform that role. In line with my findings, they were happy to assume that mental health 
services are provided from external experts and were satisfied with the status quo. They 
did not share my perception of the degree of need for attention to this agenda.
Through conducting this research my own perceptions of mental health problems in old 
age in the general hospital setting have markedly changed. I no longer feel comfortable 
that the professional role I fulfil, as a mental health liaison nurse, is the best way to meet 
the needs of older people in hospital.
I have also examined the process and the experience of the research from a more 
pragmatic perspective. Here I consider the methodology and some possible shortcomings 
and how problematic issues may have been better overcome, had I been able to predict 
them.
There are many things that I would consider doing differently were I to conduct this work 
again, knowing what I know now. I would certainly be more prepared for the necessary 
rigours of the ethics committees and would ensure that I only had to conduct the process 
once.
Of course, given the proliferation of consultation/liaison mental health service provision in 
recent years, I would not now have to carry out the research in a site where I also held a 
clinical role. This would have provided a more level playing field within settings, with 
none of the participants having met me before. Although I have been scrupulously careful 
in minimised the potential effect of former relationships, personal anonymity would have 
been preferable.
The biggest change of focus that I would make were I to repeat this work, would be my 
attention to the nature of the samples of older people and relatives. I had not considered, 
from my position within the mental health paradigm, that the older people in Glimster 
general who had not seen a mental health professional, would so clearly appear to me to
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have mental health problems that nobody had noted. Nor had I anticipated that people 
diagnosed with depression, in Chapley Hospital, would overwhelmingly not engage in 
research. In future work on depression much methodological attention will be necessary 
in achieving a sample. The older peoples sample clusters also differed in that those at 
Chapley almost all had dementia and sometimes had difficulty in recalling their recent 
experience in the setting to the same degree as their counterparts in GHimster General, and 
as such were not wholly comparable. The relative groups were dissimilar in that one 
cluster had experienced mental health service and one had not, thus making comparison of 
experience impossible. I have also considered the lack of comparability of organisation 
structure between the sites and whether or not such diversity could have been avoided. I 
conclude that earlier recognition of the differing cultures was not possible. It was only 
when I was immersed within die settings that die differences became apparent. As has 
been evidenced throughout analysis and discussion, the diversity of the settings added to 
the findings rather than deferred from them.
Lastly, in reflection it is interesting to note that I had not considered extensively enough, 
my own taken for granted views about mental health and illness; that is those views held 
due to my professional position within mental health services. Particularly this position 
caused me to initially assume that participants would come up with depression as a mental 
health problem of old age. I had to change my approach when this did not occur.
Secondly, my professional position caused me not to question participants about who they 
felt should provide mental health services. In line with my personal history, I just 
assumed such issues to be within the rightful scope of psychiatric services. It was not 
until I was conducting analysis that I realised the depth of my own beliefs in this regard. 
This reflection serves again to emphasise the power of historical views and the challenge 
that exist, even in those who seek to challenge them.
Notwithstanding the limitation described here, I am confident that I have achieved and 
demonstrated that the methodology used provides data that addresses the questions that 
were asked within the research.
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9.5 Conclusion
I started out in this research to consider whether or not people in the general hospital 
setting viewed mental health problems in old age differently than those in psychiatry. The 
answer is a resounding yes.
In the general hospital setting older people are recognised to have mental health problems 
when they are cognitively impaired and when they challenge the setting in some way.
This may occur overtly, through behaviour, or covertly, by not fulfilling the expected 
patient role in moving smoothly through the hospital system.
Older people who, in psychiatric terms, are depressed, are not seen. I suggest that 
structured depression is perceived as an artefact of old age, especially in combination with 
ill health and hospitalisation. More research attention is warranted on die broad issues of 
depression in old age, particularly as it may differ in gender, age and disability. If such 
attention is forthcoming issues of depression in old age may achieve the same advancing 
focus and status that is now afforded to people with dementia.
I have considered the necessary service requirements for older people with mental health 
problems in general hospital settings. The research has revealed that current services, 
whether they are of the traditional or consultation/liaison model, serve to rescue non­
specialists from having to meet the challenge of embracing mental health issues as part of 
their world,
I have explored the social constructions that inform perceptions of mental health problems 
and models of service delivery and note that influences of stigma, history, professional 
and organisational power are significant. Those who hold political power proffer social 
inclusion and integration of services. However, I conclude that current policies, guidance, 
and organisational and educational structures serve to ensure that mental health problems 
are kept at arms length, under the umbrella of mental health services. This keeps the 
agenda away from the fearful public who are happy with this arrangement
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The provision of consultation/liaison services, that provide proxy integration of service, 
are a sticking plaster option. Integration and acceptance of mental health problems in old 
age as part of general hospital business requires a radical review of both service 
organisation and professional education. By developing the presence of expertise within, 
mental health issues in old age could become part of a general health care paradigm, that 
does not differentiate physical from mental health.
I recommend that political attention must be given to the divisions in service structure and 
professional education. Currently the social constructions that influence perceptions of 
mental health problems in old age also serve to sustain them.
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APPENDIX 1 Information sheets.
Relative information sheet 2.(version3)
RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET
Study Title: MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES AND OLDER
PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITALS
Thank you fo r  considering participating in the research.
My name is Gwyn Grout and I am a researcher looking at the experience of 
older people in hospital.
Before you decide to take part it is important that you understand what will 
be involved Please take time to read the following information carefully 
and, i f  you wish, discuss it with others. Please do not hesitate to ask me if  
there is any thing that is not clear or i f  you would like more information.
I t is up to you whether or not you take part You are free to withdraw at 
any time and without giving a reason. This will not affect your relative’s care. 
Nobody will be upset if  you decide not to take part
What is the research about?
At present the care and treatment for older people in hospital, who have mental health 
problems, are provided in different ways. The research will compare two hospitals and ask 
the views of 20 older people, 20 relatives of older people who are in hospital and 20 staff 
members, about mental health problems and how they feel that mental health needs can be 
met.
Can anyone participate?
Participants will include hospital patients who are over 65, relatives of patients in hospital 
and staff associated with the care of older people. If you have had been involved with 
mental health services in the past, it may not be appropriate for you to take part.
If I choose to participate, what will I have to do?
You will be asked to agree to be interviewed. The interview will last approximately half 
an hour and focus on your views, associated with your experience of your relative’s 
hospital stay. You will be asked to allow the interview to be taped in order that what you 
say can be accurately reported, without interrupting the flow of conversation. If  during 
the interview information is brought up which may require clinical attention the 
interviewer will discuss with you whether you would like her to deal with that information 
after the interview is over.
PTQ
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How does the research aim to help older people and their families
By comparing two ways o f providing service and by seeking views, the research aims to 
focus attention on how service can be delivered in the future.
How will my privacy be protected?
All the information collected during the research will be strictly confidential. Your name, 
or any identifying information, will not be disclosed. Any information used when the 
work is published will not identify you or the hospital. Hospital notes are not being used 
in this research.
Who else is involved with the research
I am conducting this research under the supervision of the Department of Sociology at the 
University of Surrey and aim to complete the work by 2005. My employers,..., are 
sponsoring my work. ... Hospital Trust and die ... Hospital NHS Trust are fully aware of 
the research project.
The detail and conduct of the study has been approved by both ... and ..., Local Research 
Ethics Committees.
Will anyone be getting paid for taking part?
Nobody is receiving payment for participation in this study. No monies are for any 
expenses involved in participation.
Can I receive information about the research when it is complete?
If you wish you can ask to be informed of the conclusions of the study. On request, the 
researcher will ensure that you receive a report. You may also request a copy of the tape 
recording of the interview.
What if I want to complain? .
If you have any cause to complain about any aspect of the way you have been approached 
or treated during the course of the study the normal National Health Service complaints 
mechanisms are available to you.
I f  you require any further information in order to reach a decision or 
clarify any o f  the above information please fee l able to contact me: - 
Telephone: 
Pager
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any time and without giving a reason. Nobody will be upset i f  you decide 
not to take part
What is the research about?
At present the care and treatment for older people in hospital, who have mental health 
problems, are provided in different ways. The research will compare two hospitals and ask 
the views of 20 older people, 20 relatives of older people who are in hospital and 20 staff 
members, about mental health problems and how they feel that mental health needs can be 
met.
Can anyone participate?
Participants will include hospital patients who are over 65, relatives of patients in hospital 
and staff associated with the care of older people. If you have had been involved with 
mental health services in the past, it may not be appropriate for you to take part.
If I choose to participate, what will I have to do?
You will be asked to agree to be interviewed. The interview will last approximately half 
an hour and focus on your views, associated with your experience of your work with older 
people. You will be asked to allow the interview to be taped in order that what you say 
can be accurately reported, without interrupting the flow of conversation.
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How will mv privacy be protected?
All the information collected during the study will be strictly confidential. Your name, or 
any identifying information, will not be disclosed. Any information used when the work 
is published will not identify you or the hospital.
How does the research aim to help older people and their families
By comparing two ways of providing service and by seeking views, the research aims to 
focus attention on how service can be delivered in the future.
Who else is involved with the research
I am conducting this research under the supervision of the Department of Sociology at the 
University of Surrey and aim to complete the work by 2005. My employers, ... NHS 
Trust, are sponsoring my work. ... Hospital Trust and the ... Hospital Trust are fully 
aware of the research project.
The detail and conduct of the study has been approved by both the ... and ..., Local 
Research Ethics Committees.
Will anyone be getting paid for taking part?
Nobody is receiving payment for participation in this study. No monies are for any 
expenses involved in participation.
Can I receive information about the research when it is complete?
If you wish you will be informed of the conclusions of the study. On request, the 
researcher will ensure that you receive a report. You may also request a copy of the tape 
recording of the interview.
I f  you require any further information in order to reach a decision or 
clarify any o f the above information please fee l able to contact me: - 
Telephone: 
Pager
THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST.
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Older Persons information sheet.2.(version 3)
RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET
Study Title MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES AND OLDER
PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITALS
Thank you fo r  considering participating in the research.
My name is Gwyn Grout and I am a researcher looking at the experience of 
older people in hospital.
Before you decide to take part it is important that you understand what will 
he involved Please take time to read the following information carefully 
and, i f  you wish, discuss it with your relatives andfriends. Please do not 
hesitate to ask me if  there is any thing that is not clear or i f  you would like 
more information.
It is up to you whether or not you take part You are free to withdraw at 
any time and without giving a reason. This will not affect your care. 
Nobody will he upset i f  you decide not to take part
What is the research about?
At present the care and treatment for older people in hospital, who have mental health 
problems, are provided in different ways. The research will compare two hospitals and ask 
the views of 20 older people, 20 relatives of older people in hospital and 20 staff members 
about mental health problems and how they feel that mental health needs can be met.
Can anyone participate?
Participants will include hospital patients who are over 65, relatives of hospital patients 
and staff who provide care for older people. If you have had been involved with mental 
health services in the past, it may not be appropriate for you to take part.
If  I choose to participate, what will I have to do?
You will be asked to agree to be interviewed. The interview will last approximately half 
an hour and focus on your views, associated with your experience in hospital. You will be 
asked to allow the interview to be taped in order that what you say can be accurately 
reported, without interrupting the flow of conversation. If  during the interview 
information is brought up which may require clinical attention the interviewer will discuss 
with you whether you would like her to deal with that information after the interview is 
over.
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How does the research aim to help older people and their families?
By comparing two ways of providing service and by seeking views, the research aims to 
focus attention on how service can be delivered in the future.
How will mv privacy be protected?
All the information collected during the research will be strictly confidential. Your name, 
or any identifying information, will not be disclosed. Any information used when the 
work is published will not identify you or die hospital. Hospital notes are not being used 
in this research.
Who else is involved with the research?
I am conducting this research under the supervision of the Department of Sociology at the 
University of Surrey and aim to complete the work by 2005. My employers, Hampshire 
Partnership NHS Trust, are sponsoring my work. ... Hospital Trust and ... Hospital NHS 
Trust are fully aware of the research project.
Unless you do not wish it your/your relative’s G.P and hospital Consultant will be advised 
of your participation.
The detail and conduct of the study has been approved by both die ... and .. .Local 
Research Ethics Committees.
Will anyone be getting paid for taking part?
Nobody is receiving payment for participation in this study. No monies are for any 
expenses involved in participation.
Can I receive information about the research when it is complete?
If you wish you can ask to be informed of the conclusions of the study. On request, the 
researcher will ensure that you receive a report. You may also request a copy of the tape 
recording of the interview.
What if I want to complain?
If you have any cause to complain about any aspect of the way you have been approached 
or treated during the course of the study the normal National Health Service complaints 
mechanisms are available to you.
I f  you require any further information in order to reach a decision or 
clarify any o f the above information please fee l able to contact me: - 
Telephone: 
Pager
THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST
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APPENDIX 2
INFORMATION SHEET FOR GP (Produced at the request of the Ethics 
Committees)
MENTAL HEALTH LIAISON FOR OLDER PEOPLE IN 
GENERAL HOSPITAL 
GP and Consultant Information Sheet
Research being undertaken by: -
Gwyn Grout RMN MSc
Telephone:
Pager
I send you this information sheet to advise you that your patient 
______________________________ has agreed to participate in the study.
I enclose the relevant information sheet (Patient/relative information sheet.2.(version 3Y) 
for your reference.
If you require any further information, have any points for discussion or wish to receive 
information on the results of the study please contact me.
Please note that there is no GP input in this study.
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APPENDIX 3
Consent Form -  Patient Participant
MENTAL HEALTH LIAISON FOR OLDER 
PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITAL
Name of Researcher: Gwyn Grout 
Centre number:
Study Number:
Please indicate your consent to each of the following statements by placing your 
initials in the box and signing below.
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheets dated___________
(version )for the above study, and have had the opportunity to ask questions
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without my care or legal rights being affected now or at any time.
I consent/do not consent (please delete as applicable) to my GP and hospital consultant 
being advised of my participation.
I consent/do not consent (please delete as applicable) to the interview being tape recorded
I agree to take part in die above study.
I consent/do not consent (please delete as applicable) to my relative/carer/friend being 
invited to be involved in this research.
Name Date Signature
Patient
Researcher
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Assent Form -  Representative
MENTAL HEALTH LIAISON FOR OLDER
PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITAL
Name of Researcher: Gwyn Grout 
Centre number:
Study Number:
Please indicate your assent to each of the following statements by placing your 
initials in the box and signing below.
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheets dated__________
(version )for the above study? and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
I have discussed the research with the participant and confirm that he/she agrees to 
participate.
I understand that participation is voluntary and that the participant is free to withdraw at 
any time without care or legal rights being affected now or at any time.
I assent/do not assent (please delete as applicable) to the interview being tape recorded
I assent/do not assent (please delete as applicable) to my relative’s GP and hospital 
consultant being advised of participation.
I agree that________________  take part in the above study.
Name and relationship Date Signature
Representative
Researcher
A copy o f this assent form will be kept by the representative and by the researcher.
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Consent Form - Relative
MENTAL HEALTH LIAISON FOR OLDER
PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITAL
Name of Researcher: Gwyn Grout
Centre number:
Study Number:
Please indicate your consent to each of the following statements by placing your 
initials in the box and signing below.
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheets dated___________
(version )for the above study, and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without affect the care or legal rights of either me or my relative now or at any time in the 
future.
I consent/do not consent (please delete as applicable) to the interview being tape recorded
I agree to take part in the above study.
Name Date Signature
Participant
Researcher
A copy o f this consent form will be kept by the participant and by the researcher
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Consent Form - Staff
MENTAL HEALTH LIAISON FOR OLDER
PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITAL
Name of Researcher: Gwyn Grout
Centre number:
Study Number:
Please indicate your consent to each of the following statements by placing your 
initials in the box and signing below.
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheets (staff version) 
dated___________for the above study, and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time.
I consent/do not consent (please delete as applicable) to the interview being tape recorded 
I agree to take part in the above study.
Name and profession Date Signature
Participant
Researcher
A copy o f this consent form will he kept by the participant and by the researcher.
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APPENDIX 4
PARTICIPANT DATA SHEETS 
Older Person
MENTAL HEALTH LIAISON FOR OLDER PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITAL 
Name:
Centre number:
Study Number:
Given Information sheets on:
Consent/Assent received on:
Interview conducted on:
Request detail of research results:
Copy of tape :
AGE:
GENDER:
ETHNICITY:
TIME FROM ADMISSION TO REFERRAL:
REASON FOR REFERRAL:
PROFESSION OF REFERRER:
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PARTICIPANT DATA SHEET -  RELATIVE/CARER 
MENTAL HEALTH LIAISON FOR OLDER PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITAL 
Name:
Gender:
Ethnicity:
Relationship to patient:
Centre number:
Study Number:
Given Information sheets on:
Consent received on:
Interview conducted on:
Request detail of research results:
Copy of tape :
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PARTICIPANT DATA SHEET -  STAFF
MENTAL HEALTH LIAISON FOR OLDER PEOPLE IN GENERAL HOSPITAL
Name:
Gender:
Ethnicity:
Profession:
Centre number:
Study Number:
Given Information sheets on:
Consent received on:
Interview conducted on:
Request detail of research results:
Copy of tape :
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APPENDIX 5
INTERVIEW GUIDE 1
The following subjects will be explores during the course of each interview, though not 
necessarily in the order stated: -
♦ Concept of mental health/illness
♦ Concept of mental health service provision
♦ Being informed
♦ Feelings about having to see a mental health professional
♦ The expected profession of the mental health professional
♦ Detail of any experience they have had
♦ The perfect service
Staff will also be asked about: -
♦ Referral reasons and process
♦ Any affect on own knowledge and skills
Added after 3 interviews
If depression is not mentioned, ask views on it.
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Appendix 6
The Research Participants
SITE NAME GE AGE ETHNICITY RELATIONSHIP PROFESSION
P A T IE N T
Chapley Arnold M 7 5 Wh.UK
Chapley Beattie F 7 9 W hUK
Chapley Cathy F 8 9 W hUK
Chapley Daphne F 8 4 W hUK
Chapley Elsie F 8 7 Wh UK
Chapley Felicity F 8 6 W hUK
Chapley George M 8 0 Wh UK
Chapley Hilda F 8 0 Wh UK
Chapley Janet F 8 3 W hUK
Glimster Louisa F 8 9 W hUK
Glimster Mary F 6 5 Wh UK
Glimster Nora F 8 2 Wh UK
Glimster Olive F 8 3 W hUK
Glimster Pru F 8 6 Wh Eu
Glimster Rose F 81 Wh Eu
Glimster Selina F 6 7 Wh UK
Glimster Tom M 8 4 W hUK
Glimster Vera F 81 Wh UK
Glimster Win F 8 0 W hUK
R E L A T IV E
Chapley Angela F Wh UK Daughter
Chapley Bob M Wh UK Nephew
Chapley Ellen F Wh UK Daughter in 
law
Chapley Flora F Wh UK Daughter
Chapley Helen F Wh UK Daughter
Chapley Geraldine F W hUK Daughter
Chapley Charlie M Wh UK Husband
Glimster Lesley F W hUK Daughter
Glimster Malcolm M Wh UK Husband
Glimster Pat F Wh UK Daughter
Glimster Natalie F W hUK Daughter
Glimster Oliver
M
Wh UK Husband
Glimster Rachel F W hUK Daughter
Glimster Steven M Wh UK Son
Glimster Terry M W hUK Son
S T A F F Ann F Wh Eu Physio
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Chapley
Chapley Bev F W hUK Social
Worker
Chapley Christine F W hUK Nurse
Chapley Dianne F W hUK Doctor
Chapley Fiona F Wh UK Nurse
Chapley Elizabeth F W hUK O.Therapist
Chapley Gayle F W hUK O.T
Chapley Hannah F W hUK Doctor
Chapley Kate F W hUK Discharge
Nurse
Glimster Linda F Wh UK
Nurse
Glimster Maggie F W hUK Physio
Glimster Naomi F W hUK Doctor
Glimster Zoe F W hUK O.T
Glimster Peter M BIUK Doctor
Glimster Sue F W hUK
Nurse
Manager
Glimster Val F W hUK O.T
Glimster Ruth F W hUK Discharge
Nurse
Glimster Trish F Wh UK Nurse
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APPENDIX 6
WARD POSTER
University of Surrey, 
School of Human Sciences
RESEARCH STUDY
is ward is participating in a 
study examining how older people, in hospital, 
may best be helped with any emotional, memory or
mental health problems.
The research is taking place in the Chapley and
Glimster Hospitals.
If you are eligible for inclusion in the research, a 
member of the ward team will approach you with 
further information. You will then be given time 
to decide whether or not you wish to participate.
For further information please contact the researcher:
Gwyn Grout — telephone
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